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ABSTRACT
The patterns of socio/political transformation that Iran went through in the 20th
century generated episodes of great ideological divergence within Iran’s shi’ite
establishment. The current study seeks to shed light on an instance of textual exchange that
took place in the earlier part of the century – in 1943 – but became the bedrock for
subsequent discursive conflicts within shi’ism notably during and after the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. Adopting the format of a dialogue and operating within the milieu of a shi’ite
outlook, the authors of this exchange, Hakamizadeh and Khomeini, touched upon several
social and political topics such as the God/human relation, the notion of Imamate, the
institution of the clergy, the state, and the law. In this doctrinal dialogue, one writer, the excleric Hakamizadeh, set out to depict shi’ism as simply a persuasive system to deter the
individual from harmful deeds. His critic, the cleric Khomeini, represents shi’ism as a divine
regulatory system to codify the standard of not only ethics and manners but also the political

vii
management of society. Three decades later, Khomeini found himself intimately engaged in
the construction of such an Islamic regulatory system, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This study explains how Khomeini’s construction of this system after 1979 was inspired by
his analytical conception of an ultimate order that he communicated in the above discursive
exchanges more than three decades earlier.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In two distinct eras in the history of Iran, first in the period of the Safavid dynasty
(1501-1722) and later in the period of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 20th century (1925-1979),
shi’ism prospered into social and political preeminence. From an obscure sectarian
collectivity, shi’ism evolved into a delineated religious institution during the rule of the
Safavids. During this period, the shi’ite establishment served as functionaries of the state and
advisors to the kings, exercising a significant influence over the social and political affairs of
the state. Concurrently, the same establishment gradually built an institutional structure
independent from the state that was completed subsequent to the demise of the Safavids and
lasted through the inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 (Arjomand, 1984).
In the 20th century, in the face of the modernizing efforts of the Pahlavi state, the
shi’ite hierocracy retreated largely into political quietism. On the basis of the theological and
doctrinal principle of religion/state separation, a group of the traditional ulama took the
quietist approach. However, another group of the clergy tactically complied with the Shah’s
policies only to bounce back in the last quarter of the century through an astounding
sociopolitical upheaval, establishing de jure dominance over the political structure.
The above two eras coincided with two transformative epochs in which modern
developments were about to change the course of world history. First, in the 17th century,
the streams of enlightenment began to penetrate every aspect of life in the West, and
Cartesian thought became the dominant mode of inquiry. Second, in the last quarter of the
20th century, the third wave of democratization around the world, especially in modernizing
societies, grew to become a towering force of social change.
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While affected in some part by these developments, Iran – as the bearer of an old
civilization – remained in large part resistant to them. In both transformations, religious
obscurantism formed the ethos of this historical anachronism (Milani, 2004). Under the
Safavids, shi’ism in its fundamentalist form became “the dominant language of politics”
(Milani, 2004, p. 28). In this sense, fundamentalist shi’ism entered the political sphere as the
religion of a patrimonial state granting certain caesaropapist prerogatives to the Safavid
dynasty (Arjomand, 1984). In the last quarter of the 20th century, a parallel version of
fundamentalist shi’ism developed into a statist ideology to legitimize the rule of the shi’ite
hierocracy in a modern theocracy. In both eras, two prominent clerics, Majlesi in the 17th
century and Khomeini in the 20th century, played a determining part in derailing the Iranian
modernist trajectory.
The obstruction of modern developments appears to be the continuation of Iran’s
failed experiment with certain aspects of modernity that, according to Milani (2000, and
tajadod setizi), began between the 10th and 13th centuries. Concentrating on the second era of
the two historical periods, this study focuses on the shi’ite blueprint of social change in
twentieth century Iran.
The advent of Constitutional Revolution (1905-1909), in spite of its eventual failure
in establishing constitutional democracy in Iran and especially the Pahlavis’ modernizing
efforts, catapulted the modernization movement in Iran. As a result of its political
prominence and amid its traditional ethos, shi’ism found itself laboring with modern life.
This gave birth to two main contesting discourses within the shi’ite hierocracy - modernist
and fundamentalist. It should be noted that some contention exists among analysts of shi’ite
Iran in the usage of the terms “fundamentalism” and “traditionalism”. Arjomand (1984) uses
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“shi’ite fundamentalism” to refer to radical Islamism in the Iranian context and differentiates
it from “shi’ite traditionalism.” While both trends tend to sustain and reproduce Islam in
what they consider its authentic and literal mode, shi’ite fundamentalism “represents the
revitalizing synthesis not of the ulama but of Moslem laymen” (Arjomand, 1984, p. 229).
Accordingly, “shi’ite fundamentalism” tends to transcend intermediary institutions as its
referent framework and resort instead to its main sources such as the Qur’an and hadith.
Arjomand, furthermore, proposes the term ‘revolutionary traditionalism’ to be contrasted
with shi’ite reformism. ‘Revolutionary traditionalism’, according to Arjomand, is
oppositionally geared to the part of Western cultural influence that carries a sense of
militancy against the inferior “other”, and is increasingly interested in a sociopolitical
overhaul. Riesebrodt (1998), on the other hand, prefers the term “fundamentalism” due to its
connotation of a literal regress to a past conceived as the “Golden Age” of Islam. It is fair to
assert that both “shi’ite fundamentalism” and “revolutionary traditionalism” identify with
literalism and a puritan ideal order; however, the latter attains distinction by its desire for a
revolutionary transformation of society. For the sake of simplicity and parsimony, I use
‘shi’ite fundamentalism’ and ‘revolutionary traditionalism’ interchangeably, depending upon
whether my analysis takes place in the context of literalism or radical change or both. This
study thus focuses primarily on discourses of shi’ite fundamentalism and shi’ite modernism,
also termed respectively revolutionary traditionalism and shi’ite reformism.
The advent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shifted the political place of shi’ism from
the periphery to the core, thus providing a new twist in the shi’ite modern maelstrom and
forcing the two competing shi’ite trends to reflect on their assumptions, constraints, methods,
and motives.
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Modernity and Iran
Modernity, an intrinsically sociological phenomenon (Giddens, 1990), refers to
modes of social life or systems that emerged in post-feudal Europe around the 17th century
and gained global influence in the 20th century (Giddens, 1990, 1991; Hall et al., 1992). As a
post-traditional order, modernity has given rise to an increasingly complex system of
differentiated social institutions. Each institution possesses a certain degree of autonomy and
follows its own patterns of change and development.
Remarkable in this process are the emergence of the capitalist mode of production
and the nation-state, the formation of democratic rulership whose legitimacy is based on
popular will, the expansion of civil society, the separation of the public and private sphere,
the relegation of religion to a differentiated sphere of society resulting in the severance of
church/state unification, the emancipation of the realm of ideas from the enslaving embrace
of religious dogma, and the institutionalization of critical reasoning and the permanency of
radical doubt in all areas of knowledge. Beyond these epistemological and institutional
developments, modernity interweaves deeply with individuality. The new individualistic
outlook centers on the natural and inalienable rights of the individual (Giddens, 1991; Milani,
1998).
As stated above, Iran was not exempt from the consequences of modernity. The
discourse of modernity has significantly influenced all dimensions of social life in Iran in the
past two hundred years, a small period for historical Iran. Modernity has taken a distinctly
central place in the accounts of social change in twentieth and twenty-first century Iran.
Institutionally, Iran’s encounter with modernity dates back to the early 19th century
during the reign of the Qajar Dynasty (1794-1925). Iran experienced various domestic and
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international challenges during the course of the century. Domestically, the central
government remained impotent and powerless; the administrative system was recalcitrant and
ineffective; military forces were unqualified and weak; the fiscal structure was antiquated
and unproductive; and the educational system was underdeveloped (Issawi, 1971).
Additionally, Iran was the target of Russia and Britain’s economic and political
interests. In the North, Iran engaged in two devastating wars with Russia which resulted in
humiliating defeats and ensuing treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkomanchai (1828). From
the South, the British government invaded Iran and forced the Paris treaty (1857) on the
Qajars (Abrahamian, 1982; Keddie, 2003). As Abrahamian (1982) notes, “thus military
defeats led to diplomatic concessions; diplomatic concessions produced commercial
capitulations; commercial capitulations paved the way for economic penetration; and
economic penetration, by undermining traditional handicrafts, was to cause drastic social
dislocations” (p. 52). The debilitating results of these factors made modern reform a
necessity for the country.
Thus, much to the consternation of the King, Nassir-al-Din Shah, and the ulama,
several state-oriented attempts at rapid modernization by the Prime Minister, Amir Kabir,
began, first in the military establishment in early 1800s, and later in other social arenas such
as the judiciary, economy, education, and politics (Nashat, 2002; Abrahamian, 1982; Vahdat,
2002). The implementation of modern reforms varied from building an army, constructing
15 factories to supply the army, to publishing the first official newspaper (Newspaper of
Current Affairs). In 1851 the country’s first secular polytechnic school (Dar-al-Fonun or
Abode of Learning) was founded in which social and applied sciences, medicine, military
sciences, professional training for administrative officials, and even band music were taught.
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As Moaddel (2005) notes, the school “became an effective channel for the transformation of
thought, having considerable social impact and throwing doubt on the adequacy of the
curriculum in the traditional schools” (p. 110).
Reform struck the state’s organization of finance as well. It established a new tax
system on fief holders, tried to rein in on government’s expenses and increased state
revenues by raising exports. For the implementation of these reforms, the government
decided to seek professional assistance from France and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire
(Abrahamian, 1982). To some extent, these reforms, although short-lived, helped rationalize
the function of the state, increase administrative efficiency, raise the standard of living, and
encourage the practice of honesty, sincerity, and social trust. Still, this experience with
modernity concentrated on the scientific and technological achievement and exhibited an
anemic interest in introducing democratic institutions (Vahdat, 2002).
However, modernist reforms received fierce resistance from three sources. First, the
Qajars had no vision and no interest in modernizing the country. The king of the Qajars at
the time, Naser al-Din Shah, ordered to truncate modern initiatives in favor of a slower pace
of social change. In this decision, he was pressured by the other two sources. Due to the
establishment of protective tariffs and the presence of Austrian-Hungarian professional and
technical advisors in Iran, the Russian and British governments became worried about their
economic interests and political influence in Iran. Through diplomatic pressure, threat of
war, and their influence in the royal court, these two powers persuaded the King to digress
from reforms. Finally, conservative shi’ite ulama positioned themselves against modern
reforms. This opposition took an uncompromising character when reforms were directed
toward the secularization of laws and the court system and modernization of culture (Nashat,
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2002; Moaddel, 2005). Moaddel (2005) specifically characterizes the second half of 19th
century Iran as “a period of intense conflict between the reformists and conservatives over
cultural change.” (p. 109). The differential association of the shi’ite ulama in this cultural
feud is of particular import to this dissertation, and thus warrants exclusive attention at this
juncture.
Historical Background and Dynamics
The European and Russian encroachment in Iran paved the way for preserving the
authoritarian structure of power, while providing an opportunity for Iranian intellectuals to
become familiar with Western thoughts and spread modern ideas across Iranian society.
Through travel and education abroad, publications and translations, and the establishment of
educational institutions, a group of distinct and heterogeneous intellectuals embarked on the
task of circulating the discourse of modernity in the country. The translations of Descartes’
Discourse on Method, Darwin’s The Origins of Species, and works of Newton exemplify
Iranian intellectuals’ attempt to appropriate modern ideas, especially the emphasis on human
reasoning and discarding religion as the sole source of knowledge (Abrahamian, 1982;
Vahdat, 2002; Moaddel, 2005).
The shi’ite ulama’s reaction to these reforms was fierce. Having already gained
powerful standing due to the weakness of the central bureaucratic status, the ulama perceived
the spread of modern thought as a serious threat to their religious and cultural hegemony.
Two historically consequential developments with significant cultural implications within the
institution of shi’ism cleared the way for the shi’ite ulama to strengthen the social standing of
orthodoxy while remaining doctrinally fragmented: (a) the emergence of the Usuli School,
and (b) the Babi movement.
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Rise of the Usuli Tradition
In the early decades of the 19th century, the competition and rivalry between the two
major schools of shi’ism, the Akhbari (traditionalist) and the Usuli (orthodox or principalist),
ended with the triumph of the Usulis. The Akhbari School was prominent in the 11th century
and rose to dominance again in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to the Akhbari
teachings, juridical authority is the undivided and sacrosanct domain of the Prophets and his
descending Imams. However, the occultation claim of the 12th Imam in 872 A.D. stopped
the exertion of this authority. The source of religious jurisprudence during his absence was
restricted to the Qur’an and the Traditions and Practices (akhbars) of the Prophet and Imams
(Algar, 1968; Hairi, 1977, Arjomand, 1984 and 1988b; Keddie, 1995; Moaddel, 2005). By
denying the extension of juristic authority to individuals other than Imams, the Akhbari
tradition disclaimed the need for an independent interpretation of the Qur’an and the akhbars,
as well as systematic reasoning for law finding, i.e. the practice known as ijtehad in Islamic
jurisprudence. According to Arjomand (1984), Akhbari traditionalism “tended to prefer
philosophy and hermeneutics and devotional mysticism, centering on the figures of the
Imams, to the syllogistic hairsplitting of the jurists” (p. 146). The ulama’s function,
therefore, is to accumulate and narrate these akhbars. This practice, in fact, framed the
ulama’s religious legitimacy and had two significant political implications.
First the Akhbari orientation prescribed a sense of devotionalism to the Imams as the
basis of the ulama’s religious authority. This embodied a structure of authority sanctioned by
tradition whereby honor becomes the basis of an autonomous domination, in the words of
Weber, “the domination by honoratiores” (Weber, 1978, p. 1009, 1055). The devotional
attachment to the charisma of the prophetic-Imami lineage was appealing to the masses and
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became the basis for a social stratification between clerical notables and ordinary believers
(Arjomand, 1984). Within this social arrangement, by exercising religious authority as
collectors and narrators of the akhbars, the clerical estate gained a distinct sociopolitical
legitimacy. This leads to the second political implication.
In the political realm, the assertion of having lineage to the house of the Prophet
boosts the ulama’s authority. This is specifically noteworthy in the course of the Safavids’
reign. Building on their religious authority, the Akhbari ulama consolidated their
sociopolitical domination and refused to assign their religious authority to a socially
differentiated sphere. In other words, the Akhbari doctrine upheld a unified structure of
political and religious domination (Arjomand, 1984).
The formation of the Qajar dynasty in 1794 went together with the eclipse of the
Akhbaris and rise of the rival shi’ite school of the Usulis. The Usulis focused on restoring
the venerable status of the ijtehad that had been belittled by the Akhbari School. The act of
jurisprudence, thus, concentrated on the practice of certain jurists, called mujtahids, who
were qualified and certified for independent reasoning and judgment. The Usuli mujtahids
appropriated the body of the Practices and Traditions of the Imams and the Prophet that was
accumulated in the course of the Akhbari dominance. In the words of Arjomand (1984), this
accumulation “served as invaluable and indispensable sources upon which the value-rational
ingenuity of the Usuli jurists in creation of new legal norms could be exercised” (P. 153).
According to the teachings of the Usuli School, it is incumbent upon ordinary believers to
follow legal rulings of the mujtahids. Consequent to this, each individual is required to
choose a living mujtahid and adhere to his juristic judgment (Amanat, 1988; Arjomand,
1988c; Keddie, 1995; Moaddel, 2005).
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By extending the law finding legitimacy beyond the Prophet and Imams’ rights, the
Usuli orientation reestablished the legal authority of the clerical estate. However, unlike the
Akhbaris, the Usuli School refrained from the extension of this authority to the political
sphere. Furthermore, the Qajar state enhanced the Ulama’s legal legitimacy by conceding
the autonomous function of educational and judicial institutions to the Ulama, but
uncompromisingly maintained a monopoly over temporal power. In this way, the Qajar rule
smoothed the way for the formation of a dual structure of authority consisting of the
religio/legal and secular/political. In the light of this argument, it is fair to say that the
dominance of the Usuli intellectualism went along with the consolidation of the shi’ite
hierocracy (Arjomand, 1984). Ironically, it was Khomeini, a senior Usuli mujtahid
(Abrahamian, E., 1993; Arjomand, S.A., 1988c), who eventually digressed from the Usuli
doctrine to extend the right of legal authority to the domain of the political, thus dismantling
the aforementioned duality in favor of the theocratic structure.
Rise of the Babi Movement
The second historical event involves the emergence of the Babi movement in the mid19th century. This movement surfaced within the shi’a tradition during a period of economic
decline and the menace of political disintegration. As the result of two defeats during wars
with Russia, the central government was weak and financially bankrupt. People were overtaxed and enormously pressured by the burden of the wars (Issawi, 1971; Keddie, 1980;
Moaddel, 2005). Bemoaning these conditions, the Babi movement denounced the
government in the first place. Under duress, disaffected masses found Babism politically
appealing and joined the movement in significant numbers. It is estimated that 20 per cent of
the total population actively supported the movement (Moaddel, 2005). Furthermore, the
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Babi faith disparaged the religious and ideological superiority of the shi’ite orthodoxy and
targeted the shi’ite hierocracy as its main enemy.
Babism adheres to the basic tenets of shi’ism, which is the belief in the absolute and
permanence of God’s authority. This authority is mediated through the Prophet and after him
to the 12 Imams to men. However, the disappearance of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam, put an
end to this mediation. At this juncture though, the Babi faith departs from traditional tenets.
It states that in the absence of the last Imam, the Mahdi, it is up to the Bab1 to function as
intermediary, and he becomes the gate (Bab) between the Hidden Imam and men. According
to Arjomand, (1984), “Mirza Ali Muhammad at first claimed to be the Bab (gate) to the
Hidden Imam, but soon relegated the position of the Bab to a disciple and claimed
mahdihood as the redresser of the house of Muhammad.” (p. 254). In this sense, the Babi
faith falls under the category of millenarian extremist movements. The Bab proposed a new
scripture called the Bayan or “Enunciation” superseding the Qur’an to the extent that he
eventually claimed to be advocating a new religion. In an attempt to portray Babism as a
reformist movement, Bayan put forth certain modernist ideas; as Keddie notes (2003):
In his scripture and preachings the Bab spoke out for greater social justice, and his
partially modern, perhaps “bourgeois” contents is seen in such points as a high
valuation of productive work, a denunciation of begging… a call for mild and
humanitarian treatment of children and others, and the end to the prohibition of taking
interest. He also called, if not exactly in modern economic terms, for guarantees for
personal property, freedom of trade and profits, and the reduction of arbitrary taxes.
He called notably for a higher position for women, who were to be educated and not
1

Ali Muhammad Shirazi, the founder of the Babi movement, called himself Bab, which means gate.
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to be beaten, and for limits on polygamy. The already educated but formerly
secluded Babi poet and preacher, Qorrat al-Ain, was reported to have preached
unveiled; most Babi women did not dare go that far at this early time (p. 46).
In addition, the Bayan prescribes a wide range of meticulous ethical injunctions to
regulate various aspects of personal and public life. Arjomand (1984) maintains that this
generates a tension between “chiliasm and ethical rigorism” within the Babi movement. He
states that,
Though undoubtedly reflecting the intention of the Bab, it is difficult to assess the
immediate reception of his ethical regulations by his followers. While one group of
converts, predominantly the craftsmen and merchants, can be presumed to have found
them palatable, another group, chiefly the young seminarians (tullab) hankering after
chiliastic action, could not have cared much for them (P. 254).
The tension, however, did not prevent the movement from gaining the support from ordinary
populace and noteworthy members of the shi’ite hierocracy in its short-lived history.
By opposing both the shi’ite establishment and the state, the spread of the Babi
movement appeared to undermine the aforementioned dual structure of authority.
Consequently, both sides of this duality, the shi’ite hierocracy and the Qajar state, joined
together to violently suppress the movement. Due to insufficient modern transportation and
communication, the Babi movement was not able to mobilize its mass supporters in a
coordinate and coherent way (Keddie, N., 1981). With the backing of the shi’ite hierocracy,
the Qajar government employed its newly reformed and organized military machinery to
cruelly defeat the Babi revolts.
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Social Reform and Fragmented Shi’ism
The suppression helped the shi’ite establishment to solidify its doctrinal orthodoxy
while it remained fragmented. With the reestablishment of the practice of ijtehad, major
mujtahids enjoyed the authority of independent ruling and interpretation concerning religious
law, a practice that deepened the pluralistic make-up of the shi’ite institutions. Moaddel
(2005) states “this pluralism made their unity vulnerable to the crisscrossing pressures
emanating from diverse social forces…. As a result, they almost always displayed disunity
vis-à-vis virtually all historically significant issues facing the public” ( p. 102). Moaddel’s
insight can be an effective lens in assessing the predicament of the shi’ite hierocracy when
Iran marched into the 20th century.
Towards the end of the 19th century, Iranian society was marred by multiple level
crises. The Qajar state’s subordination to and dependence on Russia and England resulted in
the loss of control of internal markets by indigenous merchants and traders. Urban and
working classes increasingly suffered by high rate of inflation and unemployment (Foran,
1993). The central government was powerless. Centrifugal provincial forces increasingly
eroded the authority of the state. Society, according to Abrahamian (1980), was deeply
disintegrated and “divided horizontally into a ruling court with no organizational roots
among the population: and the population itself was fragmented vertically into a number of
distinct sectarian, linguistic, and tribal communities” (p. 98). The shi’ite establishment held
the Qajars responsible for the country’s calamities and began to distance itself from the
ruling state.
Amir Kabir’s partial social reform, described above, led to the formation of an
intelligentsia that became inspirational in propagating modern concepts such as
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constitutionalism, national sovereignty, popular will, individual rights, and the secular state.
While older traditional ulama perceived the spread of modern concepts as a threat to Islam,
and felt challenged and displaced by the emerging intelligentsia, a group of young clerics
found these ideas appealing and forged an alliance with the nascent intellectual group. The
embrace of new concepts was notable in the realm of political culture. As Abrahamian
(1980) observes:
The old basis of legitimacy – the divine right of kings – was gradually replaced by the
concepts of elective institutions, representative governments, and inalienable rights of
man. Secularism gradually eroded the political influence of the wide gulf between
the governors and the governed. The traditional aloofness of the political system
from the social system became unacceptable as citizens viewed the government not as
distant court uninvolved in society, but, on the contrary, as the vanguard of economic
and social modernization. And the old tolerant attitude toward cultural heterogeneity
was gradually supplanted by an intolerant crusade for national homogeneity (p. 99)
It became increasingly clear that a historically significant social change was in the
making in Iran at the threshold of the 20th century. The Iranian shi’ite hierocracy entered this
era of modern social change structurally and ideologically fragmented. In the face of the
Constitutional Revolution in the first decade of the 20th century, this fragmentation translated
itself into the formation of two distinct shi’ite discourses: reformist and fundamentalists.
Throughout the 20th century, through a web of social actions, shi’ism played a determining
role in the process of social and cultural change that eventually led to the development of a
shi’ite state in 1979 in Iran.
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Rationale and Purpose
The two aforementioned discourses figure logically but differentially in the course of
this historical process of transformation. On one side, demonstrating a positive reading of
modernity, a group of traditional clerics takes on the task of adapting shi’ite Islam to the
impulse of modernization. On the other side, viewing modernity as a threat to shi’ite
traditional values, another traditional group of clerics employs the fundamentalist discourse
of shi’ism as an ideological instrument, eventually entirely derailing the path toward
modernization in Iran. Thus, in a broader sense, the formation and practice of these two
discourses were shaped in reaction to a larger discourse: modernity. Specifically, elemental
to the dispute between the two discourses was the establishment of an Islamic government.
Led by a traditionalist but moderate Ayatollah named Na’ini, reformists believed that the
institution of a true Islamic state is contingent upon the return of the hidden Imam. During
the Occultation of the Imam, Muslims are commanded to go along with the best living form
of the state, which, in Na’ini’s account, was constitutional democracy. The ulama will advise
the government in safeguarding the shari’a, but will not engage in the practice of power. The
opposing faction led by Ayatollah Nuri was repulsive to the professed affinity between
democracy and Islam. He advocated the restoration of pristine Islam and, in Milani’s (2009)
phrase, “dismissed democracy and the rule of law as inferior alternatives to the divine,
eternal, atemporal, nonerrant wisdom embodied in the Qur’an and shari’a.” 2 While
promoting anti-constitutional views, Nuri did not venture into formulating his desired form
of government. The burden came to rest on Khomeini who seven decades later picked up
Nuri’s anti-democratic views and put together an Islamic version of government under the
2
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authoritative command of a supreme jurist. Modern social life has pushed the shi’ite
reformist and fundamentalist discourses to forge their own distinctive patterns of social
experience.
Broadly, this dissertation aims at investigating how the different discourses within
shi’ism became involved in changing contemporary social relations in Iran. Specifically, this
dissertation will address how in the construction of modern reality shi’ism emerged as two
distinct modes of representation and discursive regimes, reformist and fundamentalist. It will
assess how these two distinct discourses reexamined and restructured their understanding of
shi’ism as well as modern social life in Iran, and in the process came to reconstruct the social
life itself.
Within this analytical envelope, this dissertation gives weight to the cultural and
symbolic dimensions of social transformations in contemporary Iran. This “cultural turn,” to
quote Hall, comprises the thread that runs through this entire study and underscores key
sections of this academic research. This study, specifically, aims to employ concepts such as
language, meaning, sign, symbols, signification, etc. within the context of a comparative
analysis of the above two discourses. To this end, it is hoped that it contributes to the
understanding of the dynamics of religion and politics through a cultural lens that has
received less attention in the study of social change in Iran.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
This study is an attempt to explore how, in reaction to the advance of modernity, the
two main shi’ite strands of reformism and fundamentalism shaped their own distinctive
domain of meanings and practices, and in turn, influenced the course of modernity in
contemporary Iran. Rather than reflecting submissively or dismissively on the reality of
modernization, the aforementioned shi’ite discourses have exercised significant agency and
actively negotiated their relationship to new sociopolitical dynamics. By stressing the
autonomous capacity of social agency, this study demonstrates the analytical and explanatory
import of the concept of culture.
The scholarly attention to the political ascendency of shi’ism in Iran has produced a
significant reservoir of studies on shi’ism and contemporary social change in Iran. This
dissertation gives more weight to the cultural and symbolic dimensions of social
transformations in Iran. It is centered on comparatively analyzing the shi’ite reformist and
fundamentalist discourses in the context of the advance of modernity in Iran. By according
higher explanatory status to these dimensions, I will show how these discourses reexamined
and restructured their understanding of modern social life in Iran, and in the process came to
reconstruct the social life itself. In this way, it is fair to say that this dissertation will take a
discursive bend, which explains the emphasis I will place on language, text, and meaning in
my social analysis of change in contemporary Iran. This mode of analysis, indeed, entails
engaging with the concept of discourse and its place in the analysis of the Iranian
contemporary social transformation.
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Discourse, Text, and Social Change
Today various social science disciplines are increasingly coming to recognize the
significance of the concept of discourse in the study of social and cultural change
(Fairclough, 1992; Downes, 1998). Discourse as a system of meaningful representations is
constitutive of social life. It constructs social reality by giving meaning to objects, the nature
of the world, people’s minds and experiences, and social relations. Discourse bridges the gap
and transcends the distinction between language and practice, and since every social practice
is meaningfully oriented, all social actions are, therefore, shaped by discourse. As a
representational system, discourse reflects not just a mental activity, but also complex
structures, social dynamism and practices that are concerned with the production of
knowledge and meaning in a given historical time (Dijk, V.A., 1997; Hall, S., 2005). In this
sense, the notion of discourse implicates social action and while it involves the use of
language, it is not exclusively a linguistic concept.
Within this perspective, one way of studying social relations would be to view how
they are translated linguistically. This view, however, runs the risk of treating language in a
purely static and semantic manner. To avoid this, I attempt to embed language analysis in
the process of social and cultural transformation, therefore shifting the dissertation from
analyzing merely the formalistic and cognitive dimensions of language to the study of
discourse. I will elaborate on this later in this study.
One discursive context wherein social and cognitive linguistics converge is text (De
Beaugrande et al., 1997). As a public mode of representation, texts are not just the utterance
of word sequences; rather, “they are cultural and psychological products, constructed in ways

19
which make things happen and which bring social worlds into being” (Wetherell, 2001, p.
16).
In Islam a great sense of authority is bestowed upon the textual manifestation of
‘divine truth’ (Milani, 2000). According to Brown, Islam enters modernity with the mystique
of the Book: “the logos is not made flesh; it is a Book.” (Brown, 1991, p. 63). The primacy
of text in Islam is evident by the place of hadith, in addition to the Qur’an as the ultimate
source of guidance, in the shaping of a Muslim’s life. Hadith presents the traditions of
Mohammad as patented in his deeds and articulated in his words. While the Qur’an is
considered a revealed source by Muslims, hadith communicates ethics and codes of conduct
on which the Qur’an has no saying (Küng, 2007; Goldziher, 1971). The collection of hadiths
contains a hefty number of textual narratives of the prophet’s remarks and actions. The
content of these narratives is founded on oral discourse and gains a divine authority merely
by its prophetic attribution. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to note that
Shi’ism, moreover, extends the traditions of the prophet to those of the twelve Imams. In
addition to the Qur’an and hadith, through practicing personal opinion and critical reasoning,
a number of Muslim scholars created various texts to cover legal concepts and norms
contributing to the development of Islamic jurisprudence. By basing their statements on the
Qur’an and hadiths, these narratives claimed divine sanctity and were treated as such. It
would be fair, thus, to stress that ulama, in the course of history, have displayed themselves
as strong textualists seeking legitimation through, quoting Greenblatt (1992, p. 93), “selfvalidating circulatory” of their own “textual construction of reality”.
In twentieth century Iran, the shi’ite scholars who represented contesting shi’ite
modes of thoughts have produced a repository of texts reflecting on various aspects of social
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life - intellectual, political, psychological, aesthetic. Few social historians dispute the
assertion that shi’ism conquered political power in Iran through the motto “the pen is
mightier than the sword” (Wilson & Dutton, 1992, p. 6), notwithstanding the fact that postrevolutionary political power is sustained by the gun rather than the text.
In reviewing these texts, I will draw upon an emerging literary and cultural school of
study known as “New Historicism” or “Poetics of Culture.” Influenced by cultural and
sociological studies, the New Historicist approach redefines the association between cultural
codes and sociopolitical formations: “on the one hand, the social is understood to be
discursively constructed; and on the other, language-use is understood to be always and
necessarily dialogical, to be socially and materially determined and constrained” (Montrose,
1989, p. 15). This formulation of the interplay of text and context, verbal and social – or, in
the word of Montrose (1989, p. 23), “the historicity of texts and the textuality of history,” –
attempts to properly place individual and collective agency in the account of social change.
The new historicist emphasis crosses the boundaries between all areas of social change
including history, politics, literature, art, and economics (Barry, 1995; Bressler, 1994;
Greenblatt, 1989). Following this argument, unlike much of the extant literature on
contemporary social change in Iran, in this interpretive assessment, in principle I would
assign parallel importance to cultural/artistic discourses and to social/political. However, I
focus here on social and political contents of the texts under study due to the limitations of
the space and expertise. To this assessment, thus, the shi’ite texts – and in a broader sense
any particular form of discursive practice – are socially and historically determinate as well
as determining. My analysis is less concerned with the structure of these texts than with their
orientation to the pattern of ideas that has influenced modern history of Iran. Simply stated,
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not just the material objects presented in these accounts, but also the concrete social
processes of modernity in which these texts are embedded are of interest for my analysis. In
this sense, I will analyze how shi’ite reformist and fundamentalist trends have textually
constructed the meaning of particular social dimensions of modern life such as
power/knowledge, individual/subject, truth/ideology, and self-identity. I will briefly make
briefer reference to how these dichotomies subsequently shape Iranian social and political
life.
As stated above, this dissertation revolves around the idea of comparatively analyzing
social narratives on the institutionalization of shi’ism in Iran. This entails an engagement
with the concept of narrative and its place in historical sociology. Through this engagement,
I will formulate a summary and synthesis of critical debates and current knowledge in
reference to the topic of this dissertation. Griffin (1993) defines narratives as “analytic
constructs (or colligations) that unify a number of past or contemporaneous actions and
happenings, which might otherwise have been viewed as discrete or disparate, into a coherent
relational whole that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same
time, constituted by them.”
The current state of literature on historical development and social change in shi’ite
Iran involves four distinct narrative trends. The first trend consists of literatures that fall
within the traditional notion of historical account limiting their narrations to a
chronologically sequential organization of descriptive historical details. While this literature
tackles the conventional elements of historiographical investigation, that is to say society,
religion, state, and culture, they barely introduce an explicit argument and simply log in
recorded instances of the above elements to build a coherent story. Quite an array of studies
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on the history of Iran conforms to this mode of historical narration. This includes the
majority of historical studies on Iran in Farsi, such as Islam in Iran written by Petrushevsky,
I.P. and Tarikh e Tahavolat e Ijtemaii (The History of Social Transformation) Written by
Ravandi, M. I classify The Cambridge History of Iran (8 volumes) under the same category
as they offer a coherent narrative of historical events in Iran but fall short of probing the
dynamics of social transformations.
Narrative construction of events in these studies tells us a story that contains a
beginning, middle, and end. Within this sequential order, the narrator presents a social entity
that is going through a process of change. In his account for change, the narrator delineates
one set of events that leads to another set with no appeal to causal inferences and relational
laws. While the author attempts to furnish his story with an argument and introduce a point,
the reader may separate the components of the argument from the story at no loss of
understanding the facts and meaning of the story itself.
The second trend, following the classical Marxian tradition of grand narrative,
attempts to locate the dynamic of change in the economic base viewing the displacement of
sociopolitical formations in Iran as the untranscendable sequence of the mode of production.
Despite the variance in their analytical arrangement, both approaches, however, drastically
diminish the capacity of human agency. Petrushevsky’s Islam in Iran and Vali’s Precapitalist Iran exemplify this trend.
Historical narratives are widely used by various comparative interpretive sociologists
in sociological inquiry. This approach represents the third narrative mode. These
sociologists tend to portray a story that introduces and elaborates an argument. The story has
a beginning, middle, but no ending. It is not the ending, but rather the proposed argument
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that casts the meaning of the story. This genre of narrative, according to White (1972, p. 8),
“directs attention to thematic elaboration.” In this sense, the narrative develops and
elaborates a particular theme, and sustains it throughout the story. For this trend, I limit my
review to four scholars whose studies on the role of religion in historical dynamics of the
medieval and contemporary shi’ite Iran typify the third narrative mode.
In a cluster of extensive studies on the emergence of a shi’ite polity in Iran in the
thirteenth century to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the last quarter of
the twentieth century, Said Amir Arjomand (1984) persuasively argues that the process of
social change in Iran “entails the gradual modification of the pattern of traditional and
affectual action in the light of new norms and values” (1984, p. 3). Drawing on rich
descriptive historical details, he explains how this process of societal change led to the
emergence of two normative structures of domination constantly competing and contending
with each other.
Derived from the “Persian theories of kingship” (Arjomand, 1985), one structure, by
grounding its legitimacy in a prophetic tradition, represents a shi’ite establishment that quests
for institutional independence through pious detachment from political life. The other
normative order of domination reflects the mindset of patrimonialism. In this context,
according to Arjomand (1984), “rulership was shorn of its caesaropapist trappings and came
to test on the basis of the patrimonial principles of legitimacy” (p. 259). Arjomand (1979),
furthermore, argues that in the traditional Islamic orthodoxy God’s domain belongs to the
otherworldly salvation, which is thus kept dogmatically distinct from the sphere of political
sovereignty: “there is a fundamental dogmatic disjunction between God and political
authority…. Allah is the creator of the universe and the lord of this and of the otherworld.
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But He is not directly involved in mundane political events” (p. 62). Arjomand seems to be
aware of the negative attitude of the shi’ite establishment toward any state in the absence of
the 12th Imam. However, the shi’ite hierocracy accommodated the state by accepting “these
principles [patrimonial principles] as the appropriate norms for the regulation of the political
sphere” (259). This separation of legitimacy will be operational during the occultation of the
Hidden Imam.
In Arjomand’s evaluation the Safavids (1501-1722) rose to power attending to the
dogma of two separated legitimacies. By eliminating sunnism and marginalizing sufism and
extremists who believed in the imminent return of the Hidden Imam, the Safavids paved their
way to incorporate the hierocracy into the institution of politics, thus establishing a
caesaropapist structure of government under a political head. According to Arjomand, the
divorce between religion and political authority in shi’ite Iran was completed in the 17th
century. By achieving their financial independence from the state, the shi’ite hierocracy was
able to establish their own sphere of authority. Short of ascendency to political rulership,
however, the ulama gained more clout in the realm of judiciary and education. However, the
power of the shi’ite hierocracy diminished significantly with the modernization project of the
Pahlavi Shahs, who never sought the support of the ulama to legitimize their power base.
The negative impacts of statist modernization projects of the Shahs have not gone unnoticed
under Arjomand’s (1988b) observations:
As the result of the dislocation caused by excessively rapid social change and a
mismanaged economic policy, popular discontent mounted while petro-dollars sapped
the vigor and commitment of the upholders of the regime. When the first crack
suddenly appeared and the imposing edifice of the Pahlavi state began to crumble
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from within, the autonomous hierocracy could rejoice at the prospect of defeating and
subjugating the impiously arrogant state. (p. 87)
Through an interpretive sociological assessment, Arjomand (1984) explains how the
two normative structures produce “clashes, adoptions, compromises, and an eventual
synthesis” (p. 3). He identifies this complex social process as a form of the Weberian notion
of “value rationalization”, which influences and shapes the process of social change in Iran.
Most notably, Arjomand (1988a) explains how Khomeini, having rejected the traditional idea
of religion/politics separation, institutionalized his own interpretation of religion/state
relation in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this connection, he argued that
in the absence of the 12th Imam’s rule, this imperative rests on the qualified ulama. Khomeini
presents his political theory of the “Mandate of the Jurist” as the legitimation narrative of his
argument. The ruling jurist is invested with the authority to rule and “his supreme office is
interchangeably defined as ‘Imamate’ and ‘leadership’ (Arjomand 1988a, p. 195.) In this
sense, according to Arjomand, by eradicating the dual authoritative structure of temporal and
religio-legal spheres, Khomeini revolutionizes shi’ism.
In a study covering the historical period beginning with the descent of Islamic
empires in the seventeenth century to the ascent of Islamic fundamentalism in the second half
of the twentieth century, Mansoor Moaddel illuminates the pattern of stability and change in
the ideological production of a few selected countries. Employing a historical comparative
analysis, Moaddel (2005) explains how the variation in the nature of the discursive context of
the selected countries – “whether it is pluralistic or monolithic and its proximity to power –
had a determinant impact on the expressions of the intellectual leaders as they tried to
address the significant issues facing their societies.” (p. 24) By granting ideological
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production an autonomous status not reducible to class and organizational dynamics,
Moaddel lays out an explanatory model to account for the historical variation in the
production of ideas. His model is anchored on two parameters: “the variation in the
discursive context from pluralistic to monolithic and the variation in the state’s direct
intervention in culture from minimal (i.e., in an ideologically neutral state) to extensive (i.e.,
in an ideological state)” (2005, p. 324). Basing his explanation on this model, Moaddel
argues that Islamic fundamentalism emerged and obtained historical significance in a
dialectical relationship with the discourse of the state. He demonstrates how a shift in the
dynamics of the discursive context from pluralistic to monolithic discourse imposed from
above by an ideological state paved the way for the shift from Islamic modernism to Islamic
fundamentalism in the countries under his study. In the case of Iran, Moaddel paralleled the
shift in “the discourse of the intellectual leaders from anticlerical secularism and
constitutionalism, to economic nationalism, and then to clergy-centered Islamic
fundamentalism” with the change in “the dominant regime of signification from monarchical
absolutism and the ulama’s obstructionism, to British economic domination, and then to
monarchy-centered secular-nationalist discourse” (2005, p. 325).
The liberal discursive vacuum explains in large part how the economically
dissatisfied social classes and groups – especially the bazaaris and middle class that
positioned themselves in support of the secular and liberal-reformist ideas of the 1905
Constitutional Revolution and Mossadeqh’s nationalist movement – found in the religious
institutions a place for political refuge, and in radical shi’ism a unifying slogan.
Ervand Abrahamian has extensively written about the turbulent social history of
contemporary Iran. His book, Iran Between Two Revolutions (1982), gives a detailed
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account of the substantial social transformation that took place between the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-9 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. This book provides a
wealth of impressive primary and secondary data for those investigators who wonder how
Iran stepped into the 20th century with a secular/liberal revolution but ended up with an
Islamic state in the last quarter of the same century. He contends that the historical trajectory
of contemporary Iran is rather paradoxical. Massive doses of social modernization that were
injected into society by the Shahs’ of the Pahlavi dynasty, unlike the conventionally held
expectation, did not secularize Iran and prevent it from slipping into further regressive
religiosity.
Abrahamian classifies his book under the category of political sociology and employs
this approach to analyze the class bases of the Islamic Revolution. He specifically points out
that while the anti-Shah movement cuts across bourgeois and petit bourgeois as well as
working classes, it was the traditional middle class bazaaris with its organic link with the
ulama that provided the fundamental support for the anti-Shah and pro-Khomeini
movements. Despite his emphasis on economic factors and class dynamism, he pointedly
distances his work from the conventional Marxist approach as he maintains that, “the
underlying premise throughout the book will be E. P. Thompson’s neo-Marxist approach that
the phenomenon of class should be understood not simply in terms of its relation to the mode
of production (as orthodox Marxist have often argued), but, on the contrary, in the context of
historical time and of social friction with other contemporary classes” (p. 6).
In documenting the instances of social friction in contemporary Iran, Abrahamian, in
the style of the Thompsonian historical sociology, pays keen attention to the symbiosis of
cultural and material practices. In this sense, a new historicist investigator finds ample
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examples of anecdotes, statistical charts, illustrations such as postage stamps portraying
historical and ideological personalities, brief descriptive biographies, and maps, that on the
surface seem inconsequential, but that within the context of Abrahamian’s Neo-Marxist
political sociology are deeply connected with the discursive dimensions of the enormously
eventful recent social history of Iran. This is particularly evident in his latest book: A
Modern History of Iran (2008). Additionally, in accordance with his method of study, in
Iran Between Two Revolutions, Abrahamian allocates a specific place to the individual’s
conscious efforts to produce social change, and in the case of contemporary Iran, to the
centrality of Khomeini’s role. He likens Khomeini’s position to that of Lenin for the
Bolshevik Revolution, Mao for the Chinese Communist Revolution, and Castro for the
Cuban Revolution. It might be fair to say that this idea forms the drive behind a separate
book he wrote on Khomeini called Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. The title of
the book reveals that Abrahamian treats Khomeini’s religious and political ideas as an
ideological system. Within this frame of reference, he associates Khomeinism with
populism, rather than fundamentalism:
The central thesis of this book is that “populism” is a more apt term describing
Khomeini, his ideas, and his movement because this term is associated with
ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility, with political protests against the
established order, and with socioeconomic issues that fuel mass opposition to the
status quo (p. 2).
Drawing on Weber, he points out that Khomeinism is not a movement for the “rejection of
the modern world”, but rather a movement seeking to actively engage in changing the world.
He therefore identifies Khomeinism as a political movement as not simply a “religious
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crusade obsessed with scriptural texts, spiritual purity, and theological dogma” (p. 3).
According to Abrahamian, in his popular guise, Khomeini resorted to radical slogans that
would inflame “social antagonisms” such as the redistribution of wealth and social classes
egalitarianism. Despite this mixture of ‘populistic’ and ‘socialistic’ rhetoric, in a calculated
way Khomeini expressed his commitment to protect the middle class. On this point,
Abrahamian refers the reader to Khomeini’s Unveiling the Secret, the book under study in
this dissertation: “Kashf al-Asrar favored not only private property but also the propertied
middle class” (p. 40). Abrahamian believes that the above commitment played a significant
role in forcing Khomeini to rationalize his approach to the conflict between the interests of
the state and the clerical establishment. As I will explain in the chapter on the law, this
conflict becomes a crucial obstacle in the institutionalization of the Islamic Republic regime.
To remove the obstacle, by introducing the concept of the ‘state expediency,’ maslahat in
Farsi, Khomeini declared that it was an Islamic duty to stand with the state in its conflict with
the hierocracy’s interest.
Nikki Keddie represents another major contributor to the discussion and
understanding of the contemporary social history of Iran. Her works are the product of
consuming thirst for knowledge of the Muslim world in general and Iran in particular,
extended fieldwork in Iran and the Middle East, and the employment of a comparative
method of analysis. On Iran, her corpus incorporates a broad cluster of socioeconomic ,
religious and cultural topics covering pre and post-Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 to
pre and post-Islamic Revolution of 1979. In her writings, Keddie distances herself from the
conventional method of ‘simply writing history’, instead builds a connection between
specific topics, for example shi’ism, and broader issues such as socioeconomic structure. At
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the same time, she avoids basing her explanations on any deterministic bent that reduces
discursive practices to sole economic factor. In an interview, Keddie explains this
avoidance: “Marxists in fact tend to underrate the differences among societies and cultures,
and this is one reason many intellectuals turned to more nuanced and culturally-oriented
views.” 3
In her studies on Iran’s Constitutional movement, Keddie (1966) points to a mold of
religious-radical alliance that shaped the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.
Delineating the alliance as a recurrent pattern in Iran’s politics since the end of the 19th
century, she characterizes it as a somewhat incompatible liaison of conservative bazaaris and
an important section of the ulama with anti-clerical liberals and radicals, in her words “the
most advanced and westernized political activists” (p. 70) and “leading modernizers” (p. 71).
She traces the roots of this coalition to the movement against the Qajars’ tobacco pact with
the British government in 1890-92. Her writings on this topic are largely an attempt to
explicate this unique grouping of “incompatible bedfellows.”
Keddie (2003) suggests that since the late 19th century certain particular themes have
kept recurring in the minds of Iranian religious and secular intellectuals. She points to their
shared stance against the Western cultural domination and Iran’s economic dependency on
the West. Keddie also speculates that those who rejected liberal and Marxist discourses
found in Islamic discourse a natural choice. This would explain the Islamic nature of much
of the protest movements against the monarchical dynasties. Keddie asserts that the 1979
Islamic Revolution targeted the dynasty and the Shah as its embodiment because of his
3
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subservience to the Western powers. However, in explaining the 1979 Islamic nature of the
rebellion against the Shah, Keddie (1986) maintains that shi’ism is not intrinsically
revolutionary or conservative. Shi’ism has assimilated a diverse set of religious schools
throughout its history; therefore, “it is not surprising that the widest variety of political and
religious doctrines should have been followed under the Shi’i rubric” (p. 113). She
specifically aims at the quietist and revolutionary approaches within shi’ism. She maintains
that after the demise of Hussein, the Third shi’i Imam, the shi’i community split. One line,
known as Ismailis, “generally kept the revolutionary and rebellious traditions of shi’ism”
(114). Following the sixth Imam’s doctrine of the separation of Imamate from caliphate, the
second line assumed a quietist approach. Keddie notes that the history of shi’ism exemplifies
shifts from one line into the other. However, in the case of the revolutionary shift, once the
messianic shi’ite aspiration was culturally institutionalized, shi’ism tends to return “to doing
things largely in the prerevolutionary way, and put down their former “extremist” supporters.
She identifies the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a case wherein the shift from quietist to
revolutionary took place in a fairly rapid sequence (1986, p. 115). In the absence of
revolutionary or conservative predisposition in the shi’i thought, according to Keddie, it was
its distinctive institutional development that led the ulama to assume significant relevance in
Iran’s contemporary historical unfolding. She points to the emergence of the mujtahids and
their binding authority of exercising Ijtihad. She (1986) suggests, “this system gave great
power to living mujtahids, particularly the one or group at the top” (p. 120). The institution
of ijtehad led to the diversity of thoughts in shi’ism, while it secured the centrality of the
organization of mujtahids. The ulama’s financial self-reliance, and the upper handedness of
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the Usuli School over the Akhbaris at the end of the 18th century are additional important
institutions that Keddie attributes to the establishment of the shi’ite hierocratic power.
These major studies of the rise of the shi’ite hierocracy in Iran manifest the symbiosis
of historical narrative and sociological analysis. The authors intelligently use the historical
evidence to conceptualize social change in Iran. Like the first narrative method, their stories
point to the process of change. But instead of simply adding new events as the story
progresses, the authors compare and contrast features of change to a set of stable structural
arrangements underpinning them. In other words, through the unfolding of historical events,
these authors explain the patterns of mutually constitutive interplay of social action and
social structure. In this sense, through “the cumulative succession, connectedness, and
holistic configuration of the event’s actions” (Griffin, 1993), their narratives redefine and
reconstitute historical events, and help the reader comprehend the complexity of this
reciprocal interaction. Therefore, by associating their “narrative construction of the event”
(Griffin, 1993) to an explanatory framework, Arjomand, Moaddel, Abrahamian, and Keddie
successfully demonstrate some of the key causal dynamics underlying Iranian history.
Abbas Milani introduces the distinctive fourth mode of explanation to social
narratives of Iranian history by closely associating individual life stories with different
positions in the contemporary Iranian social reality. Human personality is both a produced
result and producing element of all instances of socialization. The representation of
individual life by means of biographical narrative – or more precisely the construction of a
life history – can become an instrument of the articulation of historical and social reality.
Therefore, through mirroring life processes, biographical narrators unravel individual
particularities as well as broader historical generalizations.
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Through his autobiography and the biographies of the Shah, 150 eminent
personalities of contemporary Iran, and of Amir Abbas Hoveyda (the Shah’s prime minister
from 1965 to 1977), Milani has ventured quite boldly into the political biographical narrative.
Through these writings, Milani has embarked on a social analytic language that existentially
and publically constructs the narratives of social life, social action, and social identities that
culminated in the Islamic Revolution in Iran. He makes this point eloquently in The Persian
Sphinx (2000): “Every biography wants to creatively weave character and context into a
narrative appealing to a wider readership than those afforded academic tracts. The Persian
Sphinx is no exception to this rule. The Pahlavi era, and the pathos and pathologies of Iran’s
socioeconomic development, are no more than the context for the evolution of a man called
Amir Abbas Hoveyda.”
Pondering over the life of a statesman, The Persian Sphinx is the story of “hopes and
aspirations, the accomplishments and the failure” of a generation of Western-trained
technocrats who embarked on the cause of reforming a political system from within and
freeing Iran from “the clutches of tradition.” Hoveyda personified this generation. However,
Milani argues that, in the face of authoritarian rigor, Hoveyda succumbed to the lust for
power and subsequently to disenchantment and passivity, voiding his moral and political
responsibility.
Moreover, by reading this book along with other studies in Milani’s corpus such as
The Lost Wisdom (2004), we can infer an argument. Milani argues that the two forces of
modernization, the Shah reflecting monarchical authoritarianism and secular intellectuals
representing democratic practices, failed to converge despite their common strategic
inspiration for modernity. The Shah’s response to the resulting instability – his insistence on

34
the suppression of liberal and leftist discourses – paved the way for Khomeini, the most
formidable force of de-modernization, to forge an alliance with secular intellectuals and the
middle class against the regime of the Shah: “The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
can in no small measure be seen as the consequence of this rather strange alignment of
forces” (Milani, 2000, p. 194).
In this study, I will argue that the premise of the Islamic state that Khomeini
established in 1979 is derived logically from the concepts that he presented in Unveiling the
Secrets. The above authors’ works bring significance to this connection and facilitate my
effort to trace 1979-Khomeini to 1943-Khomeini.
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Chapter 3
Research Question
The encounter with modernity subjects the contemporary history of Iran to incidences
of radical disruption and discontinuity in all dimensions of social life. This would include
shi’ism, which has experienced its own particular fissures and transformations. Rather than
reflecting submissively, shi’ite discourse has exercised significant agency and actively
negotiated its relationship to new sociopolitical dynamics. It is not the random practices of
the shi’ite movement, but instead the unifying episteme of modernity that has largely
patterned the interaction of shi’ism with the new reality of 20th century Iran as well as within
shi’ism itself. The result has been the formation of two distinct discourses of
fundamentalism and reformism within the shi’ite establishment.
The patterns of sociopolitical transformation that Iran went through in the 20th
century generated episodes of great ideological divergence within Iran’s shi’ite
establishment. This study seeks to shed light on an instance of doctrinal dialogue that took
place in the earlier part of the century – in 1943 – but became the bedrock for subsequent
discursive conflicts within shi’ism notably during and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
In general, this study seeks to identify certain patterns of cultural and ideological
discontinuities that the Iran’s shi’ite establishment experienced as the result of major social
and political change in Iran during the 20 and 21st centuries within shi’ism with respect to
the sociopolitical transformation in the given historical era in Iran. Within this general
framework, this research study will address three specific interlocking inquiries. First, it will
explore and compare the distinctive interpretations that these two shi’ite discourses construct
from their interface with modernity in Iran. In this sense, my analysis deals less with the
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workings of institution and organizational practice of shi’ite discourses, and more on how the
two discursive shi’ite trends speak, write, and make sense of modernity in Iran.
Second, each shi’ite discourse has made an effort to construct a particular knowledge
concerning the advent of modernity. Through their speaking, writing, and practicing they
have defined their own “truth” about the new sociopolitical dynamics in Iran. This attempt
extends to the dismissal of other accounts and truths about the issue of modernity. This is the
point where a discourse produces power effects. An integral part of this study will analyze
the competing shi’ite discourses and how they have shaped the political dynamics within
shi’ism and in the larger social history of contemporary Iran.
In addressing these inquiries, my study focuses on instances of sociopolitical rupture,
breakup, and threshold within contemporary Iran. The depth and scope of these
discontinuities force this study to steer away from traditional historical analyses that, in the
words of Foucault (1972),
turn their attention to long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political
events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks
and balances, the irreversible processes … the movements of accumulation and slow
saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a
thick layer of events (p. 1).
Finally, it should be noted that while the modern sociopolitical dynamics have altered
a wide range of dimensions of traditional social order in Iran, this analysis will specifically
focus on the following interrelated social, political and cultural dimensions of modern life in
Iran: Power/Knowledge, Truth/Ideology, Individual/Subject, and Self/Other
(Identity/Difference). These dimensions outline a set of orientation themes to which my
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analysis of shi’ite discourses frequently returns. I will elaborate on these themes in the
chapter on methodology.
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Chapter 4
Research Design
The goal of this study is twofold. First, it examines the evolution of shi’ism under the
influence of modernity in 20th century Iran. Second, it explains how shi’ism through its two
main discursive practices, the fundamentalist and the reformist, has profoundly influenced
the trajectory of modern Iran. The study compares the divided legacy of shi’ism to stress the
unique features of the two aforementioned dominant discourses, and explain how these
unique characteristics impinge on the general social process of change in 20th century Iran.
In view of this approach, the study treats each discourse as a complex whole in its own right
that represents a distinct social and cultural structure arising within a significant historical
period.
This study’s conceptual design involves an interpretive qualitative approach focusing
on discourse analysis. In this arrangement, various components of design such as purposes,
conceptual context, research questions, and methods are connected to each other in a mutual
pattern of influence and implication at each stage of the study. Thus, in this project, design
was an ongoing function embedded throughout the study, not just at the beginning. The
investigation, moreover, did not begin with preconceived theoretical assumptions and
avoided presenting a set of well-defined hypotheses to be tested through specific analytic
procedures resulting in causal generalizations about patterns of social change.
Instead, in keeping with the logic of interpretive historical sociology, this study
employs broad concepts and themes to draw comparisons between individual cases. As
Skocpol and Somers (1996) note, “themes and questions may serve as frameworks for
pointing out differences between or among cases” (p. 75). Particularly, in the case of shi’ite
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discursive formations in modern Iran, this study draws on contrasts between fundamentalist
and reformist discourses to focus on specific themes and general concepts. These themes and
concepts are used as a comparative framework while striving to maintain the distinguishing
features and historical integrity of each discourse. While I present these concepts in the start
of the study, I leave the possibility open for other concepts to surface as the study progresses.
The Interpretive Turn and Historical Shi’ism
This study selects a specific period of Iran’s social history and attempts to
meaningfully interpret the dynamics of change during this period; in doing so, it does not
attempt to make causal generalizations about patterns of social change. According to
Skocpol (1987), meaningful interpretation entails an account of the culturally embedded
intentions and actions of social actors – in the case of Iran, shi’ite reformists and
fundamentalists in the above given era. Pointing to this cultural shift, Geertz (1980) notes,
“many social scientists have turned away from a laws and instances ideal of explanation
toward a cases and interpretations one, looking less for the sort of thing that connects planets
and pendulums and more for the sort that connects chrysanthemums and swords” (p. 165).
In contemporary Iran, shi’ism has been able to expand the spheres of its authority and
influence from individual moral wellbeing to a collective life of politics and economy that in
recent years has included the state apparatus and corporate business, effectively establishing
itself as a cultural enterprise. The constitutive presence of this cultural enterprise in the
substantive, empirical, and materialistic fields as well as in the domains of subjectivity,
identity, and consciousness formation in 20th century Iran prompts this study to emphasize
the analytic and explanatory sway of the concept of culture.
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Cultural Analysis
The centrality of culture in this sociological analysis, however, is not a rupture from
mainstream trends in social theory or a flight to a new conceptual universe. Within classical
sociological traditions, this approach is consistent with Durkheim’s study of the dynamics of
‘the social’ and ‘the symbolic’ and the notion that social solidarity forms the basis of
religious meanings and experiences. The study relates to Weber’s insightful articulation on
the link between ‘social action’ and ‘meaning’ and the ‘elective affinities’ between various
social strata and systems of meanings, legitimations, and theodicies. While my analysis
disagrees with the Marxian approach which reduces the cultural and the symbolic to mere
reflections of economic base and class interests, this study finds an affinity with Marx’s
notion of the human being as a meaning-making being whose attitudes and behaviors are
directed by discursive practices and grounded in material relations. This is translated in his
observation that the work of the worst architect is superior to that of the best of bees. That is,
this study’s focus on cultural dynamics does not reject the centrality of the material
dimensions of social life, but rather insists that material dynamics always intersect with and
are shaped by processes of meaning-making. Moreover, this study appropriates major
scholarly works in the field of contemporary social theory, which incorporate cultural and
symbolic elements in mainstream sociological analysis. I can point, inter alia, to the writings
of Gramsci and Althusser on ideology, hegemony, and power, and Berger’s notion of a
‘sacred canopy’ that grants religion the quality of a meaningful symbolic order. In continuity
with the same sociological tradition and important for this study’s interpretive analysis is
Foucault’s works. Particularly, this study will make use of the Foucauldian presentation of
the dynamic interplay of discourse, knowledge and power.
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The place that culture has claimed in this study demands an engagement with
concepts of language, meaning, representation, and discourse and their relations to social
object. In sociology these concepts are recognized to belong to the interpretive domain of
human and social life. The crucial question is how social reality is discursively constructed.
Contemporary reformist and fundamentalist shi’ites have been attempting to make sense of
the new social life out of which they themselves have emerged, and in the process have come
to reconstruct social life itself. Before answering the above question, however, a brief
explanation of cultural elements of this interpretative approach seems to be exigent.
Signifying Practice, Representation, and Discourse
At the heart of cultural activity lies the practice of meaning-making. By linking the
two worlds – the ‘material’ and the ‘symbolic,’ any predetermined and rigid distinction
between them are suspended. In other words, besides interpreting objective reality, the
capacity of meaning-making allows for understanding and interpreting anything that is
‘imaginary’ and ‘symbolic’ and beyond the confines of the ‘objective world’ (Hall, 1997c).
Meaning, however, is not inherited in ‘the material world’. Human beings construct meaning
by using concepts and signs. The production of meaning occurs at two levels. At the first
level, we establish a set of associations between things in the world such as people, events,
objects, ideas, etc. and conceptual representations of them. At the second level, we construct
“a set of correspondences between our conceptual map and a set of signs and images,
arranged or organized into various languages which stand for or represent those concepts”
(Hall, 1997c, p. 19). Hence, the production of meaning in language hinges on the mediated
relationship between things, concepts and language. ‘Representation’ is the process that puts
this relationship into practice. Through representation, meaning and language make
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connection with culture. Since the relationship between signs and concepts are made by
cultural codes and social conventions, all signs are arbitrary. On the other hand, a sign itself
cannot establish meaning; rather, it is the relationship between a sign and a concept that fixes
meaning. In this sense, meaning is relational. Meaning is never fixed in a single place or
time, and as noted by Herder (1993), “the chain of culture and enlightenment stretches to the
ends of the earth” (p. 51).
The analysis of meaning-making when deployed to examine the constitutive role of
culture, however, requires a shift from a mere preoccupation with the ‘science of signs’, the
poetics of representation, to the study of the effects and consequences of meaning-making,
the politics of ‘representation’ (Hall, 1997b). In general sociological terms, this is called the
shift from ‘semiotics’ to the ‘discursive’. Thus, the work of representation is implicated in
the production of not just ‘meaning’ but also of ‘social knowledge’, the knowledge about, to
quote Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), “the social, the embodied individual, and shared
meanings” (p. 17) at a particular time and in a particular place. The construction of this
knowledge, however, depends on a larger structure of representation than language. This is
the stage where ‘discourse’ as a system of representation comes into play. The term discourse
entails:
Ways of referring or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a
cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking
about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social
activity or institutional site in society. These discursive formations, as they are
known, define what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices
in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is
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considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sorts of persons or
‘subjects’ embody its characteristics. (Hall, 1997b, p. 6)
This notion is exemplified in Foucault’s investigation of the development and
practice of three institutions of internment: the asylum, the clinic, and the prison (Cousins &
Hussain, 1984). Foucault demonstrates how the modern subjects of sexuality, madness, and
punishment are constructed within the medical, psychiatric, legal discourses, and institutional
machinery of the Western societies in the 19th century. In the same way, in their discursive
attempts to make sense of modernity (in constructing their own historical subjectivity in the
face of modernity) in 20th century Iran, competing shi’ite discourses have produced a
repository of books, novels, stories, periodicals, essays and articles, and treaties of varied
genres such as jurisprudence (fiqh), philosophy, mysticism, sociopolitical, cultural and
economic, psychology, literary, aesthetics. They have invoked formal and informal debates,
conversations, dialogues; they have instituted training regimes for clerics, missionaries, and
propaganda purposes; and they have set in motion action plans for resistance and subversion,
regulations for control and constrain, and so on.
Discourse conceived along these lines has far-reaching implications for the notion of
social activity. Every social action or institution, whether political, economic, administrative,
legal or cultural, has a meaning-making orientation, produces its own unique realm of
meanings, and therefore possesses a discursive character. As Hall (1997c) observes, “every
social practice has cultural and discursive conditions of existence” (p. 226). This argument
suggests that the aforementioned question of the discursive construction of reality, in fact,
boils down to the relationship between cultural or ‘discursive’ and material or ‘nondiscursive’ practices.
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Discursive Practice and Social Action
Social reality is the product of collective activities of human beings. These activities
are culturally specific and historically conditioned. As pointed out above, discourse is
central to these activities. From this perspective, social reality consists partly of a complex
and dynamic network of discourses, which themselves sometimes conflict and sometimes
coincide in their definitions of reality. This does not necessarily imply that no society exists
outside of discourse; rather, society becomes meaningful, and subsequently, an object of
knowledge not by itself but through a discursive practice. It is through this constructive
process that the ‘social’ and the ‘discursive’ enmesh. As Geertz (1973) pointedly states:
To undertake the study of cultural activity – activity in which symbolism forms the
positive content – is thus not to abandon social analysis for a Platonic cave of
shadows, to enter into a mentalistic world of introspective psychology or, worse,
speculative philosophy, and wander there forever in a haze of ‘Cognitions’,
‘Affections’, ‘Conations’, and other elusive entities. Cultural acts, the construction,
apprehension, and utilization of symbolic forms, are social events like any other; they
are as public as marriage and as observable as agriculture (p. 91).
As a representational system, thus, discourse entails not just a mental activity but also
complex structures, social relations, institutional developments, strategic practices. This is
clarified in Shapiro’s observation (1992):
Statements are situated in structured interpersonal relations … intelligible exchanges
are always situated. This claim is much more than the banal assertion that there are
rules for language use which are dependent on the immediate context of the utterance,
for the context-meaning relation subsumes a complex history of struggle in which one
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or more ways of understanding contexts and their related utterances has vanquished
other competing possibilities” (p. 38).
Needless to say, it is the burden of social actors to carry these representational
activities, to make sense and produce knowledge about social reality, and to engage in
negotiation and exchange with other social actors in a meaningful way.
Social Change and the Use of Text
The collapse of the theoretical distinction between the discursive practices and nondiscursive practices unshackles critical analysis from the impulse of an inflexible
deterministic causal relationship between the two realms of material and culture. The social
sciences identify the field of ‘material’ and the universe of ‘culture’ in varied ways. One
variation points to them as “physical object and labor” and “discourse and signification”
respectively (Wetherell, 2005, p. 390); in another variation, they are placed side by side as
“system, totality, or hegemony” and “strategy, practice, or agency” (Montrose, 1989, p. 21),
in the same order. Departing from conventional Marxism that posits material practices as
determinant to cultural practices, this study considers neither of these two practices in a
deterministic position to the other. Thus, it avoids pointing where one stops and the other
begins. The analytical construct of this study attempts to capture the agency of culture and
discursive practice in a macro-structural process of social change involving, specifically,
contemporary Iran. More concretely, this study investigates the midcentury discursive
practices of the two critical historical protagonists, fundamentalists and the reformists, in
order to understand their subsequent capacities for action. I will argue that their capacities to
impact the social relations in which they were enmeshed are the result of enduring cultural
practices in 20th century Iran. In this way, this dissertation will take a “discursive turn”, to
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quote Hall, which explains the emphasis I will place on language, text, and meaning in my
social analysis of change in contemporary Iran.
As a public form of representation, texts are not just the utterance of word sequences
or in the word of La Capra (1983), “a situated use of language” (p. 26); rather, they play a
part in the shaping of a culture. Texts “are cultural and psychological products, constructed
in ways which make things happen and which bring social worlds into being” (Wetherell,
2001, p. 16). This assertion makes clear that it would be pointless to view things as purely
inside or outside texts (La Capra, 1983). A text is situated within and is a response to the
network of interactive discourses in a historical time; therefore, it is the site of contesting
ideas and institutions, and contingent social practices. The quest for a text’s meaning, thus,
should feature the relations of the text to this discursive matrix out of which it emerges. In
other words, like any other cultural expression, its significance lies in its double
relationships: (a) to other texts with which it communicates and from which it differentiates
itself; and (b) to the material dynamics of the society in which it is embedded. This is a
dynamic and incessant interpretive process that will never be complete (Bressler, 1994) as
interpretation breeds interpretation and interpretation again.
In Islam a great sense of authority is bestowed upon the textual manifestation of
‘divine truth’ (Milani, 2000). According to Brown, Islam enters modernity with the mystique
of the Book: “the logos is not made flesh; it is a Book.” (Brown, 1991, p. 63). The primacy
of text in Islam is evident by the place of hadith, in addition to the Qur’an, as the ultimate
source of guidance in shaping a Muslim’s life. Hadith presents the traditions of Mohammad
as patented in his deeds and articulated in his words. While the Qur’an is considered a
revealed source by Muslims, hadith communicates ethics and codes of conduct on which the
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Qur’an has no saying (Küng, 2007; Goldziher, 1971). The collection of hadiths contains a
hefty number of textual narratives of the prophet’s remarks and actions. The content of these
narratives are founded on oral discourse; merely by its prophetic attribution, it gains a divine
authority. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to note that Shi’ism, moreover,
extends the traditions of the prophet to those of the twelve Imams. By basing their statements
on the Qur’an and hadiths, these narratives claimed divine sanctity and were treated as such
by Muslims. In addition to the Qur’an and hadith, a number of Muslim scholars created
various texts to cover legal concepts and norms contributing to the development of Islamic
jurisprudence by practicing personal opinion and critical reasoning.
New Historicism and the Study of Culture
To review these texts, I will draw on an emerging literary and cultural school of study
known as “New Historicism” or more accurately defined “Poetics of Culture” 4. Influenced
by cultural and sociological studies, New Historicism redefines the association between
cultural codes and sociopolitical formations and offers a new orientation to textualism.
According to Montrose (1989), “the writing and reading of texts, as well as the processes by
which they are circulated and categorized, analyzed and taught, are being reconstrued as
historically determined and determining modes of cultural work” (p. 15). Text, in this
approach, is on one hand a form of language by means of which social reality is discursively
constructed; and on the other it is an expression of subjectivity (values, ideals, and
experiences) that is itself socially and materially constructed and constrained.

4

Defining New Historicism as a critical practice with a specific interest in Renaissance
studies, Greenblatt (1988) terms “this general enterprise – study of the collective making of
distinct cultural practices and inquiry into the relations among these practices – a poetics of
culture” (p. 5)
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This view of text questions several orthodox fallacies regarding the reciprocal
relationship between text and context, the verbal and the social. The first is the ‘formalist
fallacy’ that supposes a text to be an autonomous work through which one can arrive at a
correct and true meaning. Accordingly, by transcending the shifting necessities of history,
the social context and material base from which it springs, a text assumes a “paradigmatic
form in which the problems of making meaning become manifest” (Gallagher & Greenblatt,
2000, p. 14). Abstracted from its contemporaneous surroundings, it is clear that a text of this
kind does not serve specific and precise interests. Its meaning and purpose lies within itself.
These texts are self-justified, autonomous, and autotelic. The object of their textualism
constitutes a self-enclosed and self-validating corpus of representations that evades “the
period eye.” 5
The second is the “historicist fallacy” that involves the conventional notion of
historical accounts that limit their narratives to simply “a collection of inert discursive record
of real event” (Montrose, 1989, p. 23). While this literature tackles the standard elements of
historiographical investigation, that is to say society, religion, state, and culture, they scarcely
introduce an unequivocal argument and simply log in recorded instances of the above
elements to build a coherent story (White, 1972). The advocates of this kind of textualism
usually segregate an event and the representation of that event. For them, a historical event is
merely ‘background’ data with no representational function, which should be immediately
reflected in a text as it was.

5

I borrowed this analogy from Greenblatt and Gallagher (2001) in their reference to Michael
Baxandal’s assertion in Painting and Experience in Fifteen-Century Italy that drawing is not
independent from “the period eye” to argue that linguistic skills cannot be abstracted from
broader expressive domain in language.
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The third is the “base/superstructure” fallacy. Inspired by the orthodox Marxian
historical materialism, this fallacy entails a mode of determinism that regards a text as
cultural superstructural event merely reflecting economic base. The basic idea of this
materialistic determinism maintains that the nature of ownership and mode of production
lead to the inevitable societal division of antagonistic classes, which in turn influences and
shapes the minds of authors. Authors’ products, be it a text or any other form of social
consciousness, accordingly, echo social divisions. Therefore, the constituents of a text, in
‘the final analysis’, are class interests that are, in fact, situated outside of the text. From this
point of view, any cultural and critical practice intrinsically carries a political cause. In
reading texts, the practitioners of this fashion of textualism seek to quintessentially expose
the emancipatory or oppressive traces concealed within the text.
Textual Approach to Culture
In its attempt to decode the multiple ways by which culture and society interact, new
historicism is characterized by a mode of evaluation of historical phenomena and processes
of social change that is unbound by the pressures of the above fallacies, namely, idealist,
empiricist, and materialist (Montrose, 1992). Rather, it places emphasis on the historical
relativity of the subject matter, the social subjectivity of the construction of the world, and
the notion that the essential core of humanness is a product of social history. In narrating a
people’s drama in an era, new historicism orients its textualism not only toward how a people
“was ruled and how it was wiped out” but also toward “its way of thinking, its desires and
wants, the ways it rejoiced, and the ways it was guided either by its principles or its
inclinations” (Herder, 1993, p. 143). A text or any form of narration, in this account, is
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considered culture in action; or as Montrose (1992) observes, “culture as lived in the
performances and narratives of individual and collective human actors” (p. 399).
In treating cultures as texts, New Historicism follows Geertz in the symbolic
anthropological orientation to culture. Man, unlike other hominids, is born genetically
flawed. He needs an extragenetic apparatus to survive. He develops his mental power. He
gains knowledge. He adopts law and morals. He communicates and negotiates meaningfully
with his fellow men. He builds culture (Berger, 1967; Geertz, 1973).
This web of communication and shared significance is precisely what Geertz holds to
be ‘culture’ – “the culture concept to which I adhere…denotes a historically transmitted
pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in
symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their
knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89). Texts, thus, are cultural representations
within which ideological and material structures of society find are made manifest.
Study of Text and Implications for This Study
The idea of culture as text entails several implications for this conceptual framework.
First, it posits text as a social sphere wherein various social discourses such as history,
politics, literature, sociology, art, or economics interact and compete (Barry, 1995; Bressler,
1994; Greenblatt, 2000). It is alongside such complex interrelations and interconnectedness
of discourses that new historicists define social change. New historicist textualism does not
privilege one discourse over another, as each discourse reveals a specific aspect of social life.
Within this textualism, discourses that are cultural and artistic, and discourses that are
political and social receive equal fascination. When they interact, these discourses shape
culture and pattern human activities – including everything from writing, reading, and
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interpreting to political action. The abandonment of the primacy of a specific discourse
demands the study of such discourse to open itself up to a broader range of expressive traces
of a culture. The new historicist critic argues that
To wall off for aesthetic appreciation only a tiny portion of the expressive range of a
culture is to diminish its individuality and to limit one’s understanding even of that
tiny portion, since its significance can be fully grasped only in relation to the other
expressive possibilities with which it interacts and from which it differentiates
(Greenblatt, 2000, p. 13).
In this sense, a critic’s domain of interest expands to include texts and authors that are
conventionally positioned at the margins. This new historicist insight is foremost valuable
for the study of shi’ite culture in which a diverse range of expressivist modes of language is
present. Specifically, this study benefits from this insight since it involves a comparative
analysis of textual traces of “marginal” and “central” trends, namely reformist and
fundamentalist, in shi’ite culture. I will further elaborate on this point in the methodology
chapter.
Second, this notion of culture reemphasizes writing and authorship as modes of social
action. I have pointed in the preceding paragraphs to the interactional function of discourse
as an element of culture. For an obvious reason, this function includes the use of language.
In this sense, the use of language is a social act and the user of language engages in social
interaction. Although these actions possess distinct properties, they all are parts of a social
network of communicative actions. In other words, authors as well as texts serve the
function of social actors. Their actions are, nevertheless, socially and culturally specific.
Authors are parts of diverse social categories and their products, such as texts, bear their
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distinctive social roles and identities. At the same time, by writing and reading, as Van Dijk
(1997) suggests, “language users construct and display such roles and identities” (p. 3). In
other words, they perform and exercise social agency. By taking the stand that history is not
an unbending process and leaving aside the idea of historical inevitability, new historicism
resolutely asserts the pervasiveness of agency in shaping the course of history. As Greenblatt
(1990) observes, “every form of behavior, in this view, is a strategy: taking up arms or taking
flight is a significant social action, but so is staying put, minding ones business, turning one’s
face to the wall. Agency is virtually inescapable” (p. 164). Under this argument, by shaping
the subjectivities of human factors, discourse in general and text in particular display their
capacity to impact social change. New historicism, at the same time, acknowledges the
historical, social, and institutional positioning of any discursive practice – writing, reading
and interpreting; and accordingly, it subjects the agency to structural factors such as religion,
gender, class, national identity, or language. (Greenblatt, 1990; Montrose, 1989).
This assertion would inevitably lead to the classical binary formulation of
structuration and subjectification, which is a key to understanding the two aforementioned
historical anachronisms in Iran in which two clerics performing as “switchmen,” Majlesi in
the 17th century and Khomeini in the 20th century, make use of shi’ism as an ideological
instrument derailing the trajectory of modernization in Iran. While the Iranian experience
tends to prescribe an insistence on the agency of human subject, my explanatory design
views structuration and subjectification not as a binary opposition, but rather as mutually
constitutive social and historical processes (Swell, 1992; Montrose, 1989; Giddens, 1987).
More concretely, my study will draw on this analytic framework to assess how the two
central historical shi’ite characters – fundamentalist and reformist – attempt to reexamine and
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restructure their understanding of modern social life in Iran, and in the process come to
reconstruct the social life itself.
The third implication treats text as the negotiator between the past and the present.
Because of its importance to this conceptual design, the third implication necessitates greater
articulation in this section. The analysis of the traces of a culture, remote in time or space,
resonates meaningfully with certain aspects of the present condition. To understand the
social, the political, the psychic, and the material reality of a people is to reconstruct the past
in a way that enters into a continuous and self-conscious interchange with the historical
present. Viewing the Renaissance as a transitional age marked by rupture and conflict,
Greenblatt (1980) asserts that “we are situated at the close of the cultural movement initiated
in the Renaissance; the places in which our social and psychological world seems to be
cracking apart are those structural joints visible when it was first constructed” (p. 175).
The critical view of history, in general, holds the familiar view that the events of the
past are irrecoverably lost and no longer available to perception in their entirety and
authenticity. Historical events and attitudes, consequently, are accessible in written
documents, which constitute the ground on which historians construe the reality of a
historical period. One way of speaking of history, therefore, would be as a textual construct
characterized by multiplicity in meaning and heterogeneity in nature (Montrose, 1989;
White, 1978; Howard, 1992; Lentricchia, 1980). When textualism becomes a domain within
which various social discourses, whether they are aesthetics, sociological, political, literary,
etc., intersect, the resulting textual analysis transcends the boundaries of the past and the
present. In light of this argument, text becomes a part of history that actively engages in
“constructing a culture’s sense of reality” (Howard, 1992, p. 28). On this ground, text is a
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viable concept by means of which social discourses can be mediated and compared. I will
discuss the application of this point to my study in the methodology section.
The dialogue with the past does not necessarily mean an undeviating projection of the
present into the past. This awareness is conducive to the fourth and last implication, which
views history as the result of multifarious interfaces of discursive and non-discursive social
forces. Against this insight, however, the ‘materialist’ understanding of history contends that
non-discursive forces, such as political, social, economic, gender, and religious, function in a
hierarchical relation of super-ordination and subordination to determine the pattern of
historical sequences. In this way, history progresses in a law-like and codified display. On
the other hand, the theological presumption of history in general and the shi’ite position in
particular attributes historical developments to the function of ‘mysterious’ and ‘unseen’
forces that transcend the capacity of human perception.
While the two interpretations compete on highly contradictory epistemological
grounds, both arrive at an identical ‘metaphysical’ and ‘repressive’ conclusion: history
presents a trajectory that is predictable and knowable, whether via the progression toward the
‘classless’ and ‘stateless’ society in the ‘materialist’ interpretation; or toward the utopian
“end of time” under the supreme rein of the “revealed” twelve Imam in the shi’ite
interpretation. In their narration of history, both interpretations overlook historical breaks
and lay emphasis on continuities. Inspired by Foucault’s theory of episteme, scientists in all
strands of social thought, including the new historicist, have long abandoned the teleological
and monolithic understanding of history and underline radical ruptures and discontinuities in
their narratives of social change. This contains important implications for social research on
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Iran where historical sequences in the past 500 hundred years, since the inception of shi’ism,
exhibit considerable disruptions, fissures, and breaks.
Following new historicist critique, my study tries to do away with the primacy of
non-discursive forces or mystified agents of change. It seeks to identify those aspects of
history, “poetics” in the word of Greenblatt, that challenge, disregard, and breach the
dominant materialist and theological “codes” of historical interpretations. Hence, it is
interested in cultural and discursive elements, “the episodic, anecdotal, contingent, exotic,
abjected, or simply uncanny aspects” (White, 1989, p. 301), of the contemporary historical
register of Iran.
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Chapter 5
Research Method
The aim of this study is to explain how the two contemporary shi’ite discourses,
while deeply influenced by the vision of modernity in Iran, attempt to redefine their
relationship with the sociocultural field from which they have sprung, and to engage in the
effort of remaking this field on their own terms. Hence, the purpose of the study is to
produce knowledge about and make sense of the cultural work done by these two shi’ite
discourses. The production of this knowledge will be undertaken by way of comparative
reasoning of various textual traces of fundamentalist and reformist shi’ite discourses.
Methodological Strategy of Textuality and Social Change
Far from claiming a universal application or generating sweeping causal
generalizations and an overarching theoretical envelope, this dissertation professes that this
knowledge is partial, situated, and relative. It is partial in the sense that it does not claim to
capture the total “truth”; no work of history or historical sociology can convey the whole
story (Skocpol, 1987). It is situated since it depicts a specific historical context - 20th century
Iran; and it is relative for it is a reflection from my own vantage point, itself influenced and
biased by cultural forces.
This study’s methodological strategy pursues a two-tier approach. First, it draws on
the textual understanding of culture (see previous chapters) to develop a specific means for
analyzing shi’ite discourses in 20th century Iran. Second, in seeking to interpret the patterns
of change in this period of Iran’s social history, it selects specific themes and concepts
against which the textualism of two principal social actors, namely shi’ite fundamentalists
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and reformists, can be distinguished and compared. I will explain both methodological
elements in the following section.
Text and cultural interpretation. I argue that knowledge or meaning is produced
through the interaction of a range of discursive and non-discursive social forces, and the
mutual embeddedness of history and text. Accordingly, this study’s method of analysis
avoids drawing a fixed line that demarcates the discursive and other dimensions of social life
such as social structure sociopolitical power, social classes, social organizations, etc.
Following the new historicist insight that no text has in itself all the necessary elements to
arrive at full interpretation, and the abstraction of a text from sociocultural context leads to
the loss of understanding of the very same text, my analysis invokes a broader vision of the
practice of cultural interpretation and aims at surveying a diverse group of texts. Reading
within this textual continuum, each text is related to other written texts and cannot be
decoded in isolation.
Exploring a culture through textualism invites an expansion of the range of texts
considered for interpretation and comparison. This, in turn, gives rise to a couple of
methodological propositions with respect to the selection of texts and authors, and the
strategy of interpretation. Regarding text, broadening the field of interpretation tends to
disband the conventional notion of the hierarchy of textuality in which certain texts are
positioned as “central” or “major” and some others as “marginal” or “minor”. In the
conventional sense, some texts are “canonized” and “privileged”, and therefore open to
interpretation, while others are reduced to decorative history simply facilitating the practice
of interpretation. As Greenblatt (1988) suggests,
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History cannot simply be set against literary texts as either stable antithesis or stable
background, and the protective isolation of those texts gives way to a sense of their
interaction with other texts and hence of the permeability of their boundaries” (p. 95).
Avoiding the dual analytical composition of literary foreground and historical
background, my analysis looks at each cultural trace of an historical era in Iran as part of an
archival of written texts, which has contributed to defining, reflecting, and constituting the
cultural environment of that period, therefore deserving to be interpreted in its own terms.
The collapse of the textual pecking order, by extension, extends to the classification
that divides authors into “major” or “canonical” and “minor” or “non-canonical” as well.
This classificatory system disputes the inventiveness of “minor” authors’ works and judges
them as entirely isolated achievements, therefore, unmerited of the same attention as works
of “canonical” authors. As Greenblatt (2000) explains, “new historicism helps raise
questions about originality in art and about the status of ‘genius’ as an explanatory term,
along with the status of the distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’” (page 10).
This methodological rationale leads my analysis to track textual traces that are
situated in varied discursive zones from the realm of high culture to the world of everyday
life. It also leads my investigation to navigate between center and margins to identify authors
suitable for analysis. For example, for my analysis, I have selected a pamphlet, Asrar-i-hizar
sala (The Secrets of a Thousand Years, Martin 2000, p. 104) written by Ali Akbar
Hakamizadeh, published in 1943. Deemed “minor” and “marginal” to the canonical
discourses of shi’ism, both the author and the text have been neglected by the contemporary
Iranian “community of interpreters.” I found this document appropriate for my analysis
because Hakamizadeh, an ex-cleric, outlines the idea of state/religion differentiation and
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challenges ulama “to respond to specific questions on, for example, the precise nature of the
authority of the mujtahids and the legitimacy of man-made laws” (Martin, 2000, p. 104). It is
interesting to note that the publication of this pamphlet did not remain unnoticed by the Qum
seminary; as a result, Khomeini, a minor cleric at the time, assumed the task of responding to
Hakamizadeh. This response came out in his publication of Kash al-Asrar (Solving
Mysteries, Milani, 2010) or in Martin’s translation, The Revealing of Secrets (Martin 2000), a
“non-canonical” work at the time of publication, which is another selected text for my study.
Without directly naming Hakamizadeh in his response, Khomeini refutes the idea of a
quietist and apolitical Islam, and roughs out the foundation of a shi’ite theocratic state. I
have selected these two documents for my analysis for three main reasons. First, while both
texts were located in the periphery of the shi’ite canon, they possess significant interpretive
implications in this study. Second, they display characteristics that link profoundly yet
differentially with social, political, cultural, and economic relations surrounding today’s Iran.
Last, the two documents are representations of two shi’ite discourses targeted for my study,
namely reformist and fundamentalist.
In outlining my strategy of interpretation, I drew on a technique used by Geertz in his
anthropological fieldwork, which is widely applied in new historicist works: “thick
description.” Geertz borrows the notion of “thick description” from philosopher Gilbert
Ryle 6 to expound the intellectual attribute of the practice of ethnography. Geertz (1973)
begins with an explication of his semiotic approach to cultural studies,
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Gilbert Ryle, “Thinking and Reflecting” and “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le
Penseur’ Doing?” in Collected Papers, vol. 2 of Collected Essays, 1929-1968 (London:
Hutchinson, 1971), pp. 456-96
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Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance
he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in
search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social expressions on their
surface enigmatical (p. 5).
He goes on to assert, “analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification …
and determining their social ground and import” (p. 9). For him, thick description is a
component of this cultural analytical exercise that aims at not thinning the argument down to
matters of mute behaviors and isolated actions, but giving an “account of the intentions,
expectations, circumstances, settings and purposes that give actions their meaning”
(Greenblatt, 2000, p. 23).
For methodological purposes I consider the notion of thick description coextensive
with the notion of culture as text. Within this purview, textual traces are largely amenable to
interpretation and explication because of their association with those webs of significance.
As Schneider asserts, “culture is everywhere textual, everywhere telling a story that needs to
be deciphered and interpreted” (p. 809). While description of a culture induces the act of
interpretation, it entails interpretations of other interpretations, “in short, anthropological
writings are themselves interpretation and second and third order ones to boot” (Geertz,
1973, p. 15). What this statement deploys is that the quality of “thickness” cannot be limited
to the explication alone, but should be extended to the text that is analyzed (Greenblatt,
2000). Methodologically, this extension suggests that among all textual traces open to
interpretation, some are “thicker” than others which create a continuum, one end of which is
empirical observations that are text-like, i.e. ethnographic accounts. These thicker traces
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may be deemed “marginal” or “simple evidence,” but they are “comments on more than
themselves … Small facts speak to large issues, winks to epistemology, or sheep raids to
revolution, because they are made to” (Geertz, 1973, p. 23) 7.
To maintain its critical faculty, my methodology must not select its texts based on a
rigid principle presupposing the ultimate value of a text is contingent on its position at the
margin or in the center. While these texts may be marginal to the dominant canonical works
of their time, they link deeply with the ideological, discursive, and material structures that
shape the relations of power and subordination in the present Iran.
Interpretive history and contrast-oriented themes. The logic of my historical
interpretive framework calls this study to develop an argument that is neither idealist nor
materialist, neither deterministic nor voluntarist. It encourages a comparative analytical
work that integrates cultural construction and material structure. This constitutes the second
element of this study’s methodological strategy, which involves the employment of an
interpretive historical comparison. The aim of this approach is to improve the knowledge of
the sociocultural context from which the two competing shi’ite discourses originate, try to
make sense of this context, and strive to alter it. This study’s comparative analysis will not
engage in making causal inferences or full-fledged explanation due to the insufficient number
of cases and the lack of sizeable set of independent variables. Instead, it will base its
methodological approach on what Skocpol and Somers (1996) called “Contrast-Oriented
Comparative History” (p. 75). The focus of this approach rests on stressing the distinguishing
characters of cases and the way these particularities have influenced the shaping of general
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Geertz points to “winks to epistemology” to refer to Gilbert Ryle’s reference to a twitch and
a wink to distinguish between thick and thin descriptions.
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social processes. The use of comparison, especially the assessment of contrasts, enhances
our understanding of each case and the patterns of historical change in which they are
situated and involved. The pertinence of the contrast-oriented comparative method to this
study is evident in Skocpol’s apt depiction of its essence. According to Skocpol (1987), the
scholars of this strategy,
Seek meaningful interpretations of history, in two intertwined senses of the word
meaningful. First, careful attention is paid to the culturally embedded intentions of
individual or group actors in the given historical settings under investigation. Second,
both the topic chosen for historical study and the kinds of arguments developed about
it should be culturally or politically “significant” in the present; that is, significant to
the audiences, always larger than specialized academic audiences, addressed by the
published works of interpretive historical sociologist. (p. 368)
Typically, the practitioners of this approach avoid engaging in direct and immediate
narratives of the nature and historical dimensions of each case. Instead, they develop their
comparative narratives through the mediation of broad themes and ideal-type concepts, as
Skocpol and Somers (1996) indicate, in two intertwined ways: “Themes and questions may
serve as frameworks for pointing out differences between or among cases. Ideal types may
be used as sensitizing devices – benchmarks against which to establish the particular features
of each case” (p. 75). Following this interpretive rationale, I have singled out four general
conceptual binaries to base and orient my comparative investigation of shi’ite discourses in
20th century Iran: Power/Knowledge, Truth/Ideology, Individual/Subject, and Self/Other
(Identity/Difference). While these concepts are mental constructs in an abstract form, they
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nevertheless represent certain elements in the discursive formation of modernity in
contemporary Iran.
Power/Knowledge. As explained earlier, knowledge as a view of the human
condition is the product of discourse. It is, therefore, historically and culturally specific.
This knowledge has consequences and effects upon discursive practices. Through these
practices and within certain institutional settings knowledge takes on an instrumental role, or
to Foucault (1980) an institutional apparatus, for regulating individual and social conduct. In
that sense, knowledge is inscribed with power because it leads to disciplinary practices and
entails real constraints. This is the case with the Iranian contemporary shi’ite discourse,
which has persistently and manifestly attempted to rationalize its theological tenets and
convert them into an authoritative knowledge, a knowledge that has become effective in the
real world. Through this effort, shi’ism has become an integral part of the underlying
principle of order and contributes to the organization and regulation of the relations of power
in Iran.
Truth/Ideology. In a conventional sense, ideology is perceived as a system of beliefs
and set of social actions that supply the existing order, including the relations of power, with
legitimacy. This legitimacy is grounded on the claim that ideology owns the total and allinclusive “truth.” Furthermore, religious belief systems assume an ideological function when
they are portrayed as explanatory instruments for all dimensions of human and social life on
the basis of an a priori truth free from any error and illusion (Kolakowski, 1999). The vision
of Islam as “all-encompassing praxis” is the product of this endeavor.
When religious beliefs are put to work to regulate social life, they frequently get
involved in explaining empirical facts, which is the requirement for scientific theories. Faith
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tenets, then, become testable hypotheses. This runs contrary to their cognitive makeup,
which cannot be subjected to scientific verification. Where the boundaries of theoretical
ideologies and scientific theories are crossed, religion and ideology converge. As
Kolakowski (1999) reminds us, “they want the facts to confirm them in the same way that
scientific hypotheses are confirmed, being thereby compelled to distort and conceal
unfavorable facts … They are supposed to possess absolute truth and to be testable at the
same time” (p. 234). Within the network of contemporary shi’ite discourses in Iran, I will
compare fundamentalist and reformist representations of this paradoxical paradigm and the
way they attempt to build a bridge between faith and reason on the level of epistemology and
practical applicability.
Individual/Subject. From the above two binary systems a third one emerges which is
associated with the individual/subject relation and its influence on social processes. In the
conventional account the individual refers to a whole and undivided entity that is the source
of conscious action and, therefore, determining. The subject, however, is the object of
dominant forces such as ideology and power and, therefore, determined. On an empirical
sense, however, this hypothetical opposition loses its ground, since the whole and integrated
individual is always subject to various discursive modes such as ethnic, gender, family. As
Smith (1989) indicates,
These multifarious subject-positions must be considered part of the ‘individual’ who
exhibits or inhabits them; yet they never cohere to form a complete and noncontradictory ‘individual’ – let alone an ‘individual’ who determines the character or
constitution of his/her own subjectivity. In this light it may be useful to stress the lure
that is offered in the very word ‘individual’: in its etymology it suggests one that
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cannot be divided and, by extension, one that is plenipotent. Thus it offers a fiction
of cohesion that bears as its symptom a belief in a fully enabled and self-conscious
power. (p. xxxiv)
Ideological systems have always attempted to construct such a model of individual
perfection. These systems contend that the individual falls short of shaping his/her own
identity. As Saint Augustine declared, “Hands off yourself …Try to build up yourself, and
you build a ruin.” 8 In this model the individual is no more than a representation of the social
or the ideological, or both (Smith, 1989). This effort often takes an eschatological
orientation which pretends that the construction of this total replica would be merely possible
within a utopian future. This is the case of the Mahdistic society in shi’ism and the classless
society in communism. In the words of Greenblatt (1989), “a philosophical claim then
appeals to an absent empirical event. And literature is invoked at once as the dark token of
fallenness and the shimmering emblem of the absent transfiguration” (p. 3). Dispensing with
this theoretical disposition, the term individual/subject employed in this study thus embodies
a notion of a human agent who possesses the characteristic of a subject and an individual
simultaneously.
Self/Other (identity/difference). The hierarchical vocabulary of power relations
tends to represent difference as otherness. Like every regime of representation, this one is
also inscribed with power/knowledge dynamics. The “bi-polar” couplet of Self/Other
exemplifies the center/periphery edifice of domination and inequality, and the knowledge and
values that validates it (Rutherford, 1990). Within the terms of this polarity, identity
represents shared historical experiences and fixed symbolic and cultural codes that transcend
8

Quoted in Greenblatt (1993), p. 2
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the discourses of history and culture. In constructing the self, ideological structures, whether
secular or religious, tend to identify with this fixed origin or the once-for-all transcendental
cause. This identification process characteristically implies the exclusion of some others.
Criticizing this essentialist notion of identity, the relational view, however, asserts the
over-determined and heterogeneous nature of identity. As Rutherford (1990) points out,
“identification, if it is to be productive, can never be with some static and unchanging object.
It is an interchange between self and structure, a transforming process” (p. 14). In other
words, identity is not a fundamental core, rather a positioning (Hall, 1990). Within the
context of this study, this positioning is understood as the product of the intersection of the
past with the actual social, cultural, and political relations of hegemony. Multiplicity in
subject positions inevitably results in multiplicity of identity. In this sense, the effort for
identity formation, or in the words of Greenblatt (1993, p. 1), “a sense of personal order, a
characteristic mode of address to the world, a structure of bounded desires”, does not center
on the inertial frame of reference of self/other or center/margin.
Conclusion
I conclude this chapter by writing about the rigor of my research methodology. As
mentioned above, the interpretive nature of this study claims to produce a knowledge that is
partial, contingent, situated, and reflexive. This assumption implies that this study shuns the
conventional method of analysis that places the rigor of a research on three criteria reliability, validity, and replicability. Instead, it employs different standards of evaluation,
namely, relevance, coherence, and depth and consistency.
This research project claims to connect with some aspects of sociopolitical change
underway in present Iran; in this sense, it stresses relevance. The study also furthers the
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sense of relevance by tracing its findings in relation with previously published works.
Moreover, this study attempts to offer a coherent, rational, and persuasive argument. Finally,
far from any claim to full and total interpretation, this study makes an effort to provide the
reader with richness of detail and consistent explanation of the course of analysis (Taylor,
2001). Through these criteria, this research hopes to stick to principles of best academic
practice, and achieve valuable and meaningful findings.
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Chapter 6
Main Analysis
Prologue
In 1943, the publication of a pamphlet called Secrets of a Thousand Years 9, or Asrare
Hezar-Saleh, aroused uproar within the Iranian shi’ite orthodoxy for calling into question
some of the most essential and revered principles and ethics of shi’ism. The author, a former
cleric named Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh, was the founder and editor of a reform-oriented
journal called Humayun in the mid-1930s. He published 10 issues before closing it down
under the pressure of the shi’ite hierocracy.
In a terse text of 42 pages, with a clear-cut tongue and through common parlance,
Hakamizadeh touched upon various shi’ite fundamentals, such as norms of authority and
legitimacy including Imamate and mujtahid; the place and role of the shi’ite hierocracy in the
public and political sphere; religion and temporal power relations; and rational reasoning
versus the authority of the hadith. He framed these subjects into six discourses: God/human
relations, Imamate, the Clergy, the State, Law, and Hadith. In discussing these discourses, he
upholds a rational appeal that would unshackle shi’ism from the fixed codes of the
established hierocracy. The Secrets of a Thousand Years discloses and cancels out those
factitious shi’ite practices – sham rituals, superstitious sacraments, incongruous stoicism,
bibliomancy and oracles, submission and obedience that, as he argues, the clergy uses to
transform a shi’ite into a blind idolater. As Milani (2011) observes, Hakamizadeh
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Translated by Richard (1988, p. 160). Milani (2011) has adopted a different translation,
that is Thousand-Year-Old-Mysteries (p. 57).
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“advocated a Shiism without the obscurantism of the clergy, and a polity guided by the rule
of law and reason” (p. 57).
At the end, Hakamizadeh posed 13 unambiguous questions bearing upon the above
discourses, and challenged the ulama to address them. Richard (1988) has reliably
summarized these questions as follows:
(1) The value of prayers for intercession made at the tombs of the Imams and the
Prophet; (2) the value of bibliomancy and other oracles (istikhara); (3) the actual
place of Imamat 10 among the beliefs, as God had not judged it necessary to speak of it
in the Qur’an; (4) the Traditions (hadith) which maintain that pilgrimage and
mourning ceremonies are more worthy than martyrdom; (5) the limits of the power of
the doctor of jurisprudence (mujtahid) as representative of the Hidden Imam; (6) the
effort of the ulama to be independent and free in their preachings; (7) the legitimacy
of secular power; (8) the legitimacy of taxes imposed by the secular state; (9) the
legitimacy of laws written by men; (10) the justification for the imposition,
universally and without change, of the Sacred Law, which was itself in part abrogated
during the years of its revelation; (11) the explanation as to why God, after having
created the best of His creatures, forbade him the use of his intelligence to understand
His commandments; (12) the Traditions which are incompatible with human reason;
and (13) the reason for the current lack of interest in religion (p. 160).
The circulation of the Secrets of a Thousand Years was one of numerous similar signs
of the moral fracture within shi’ism at the time. But the text possessed the power to unsettle
the equilibrium of the shi’ite orthodoxy. Compounded with the fact that it was written by a
10
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former cleric who had cut off his bond with the shi’ite hierocracy by rejecting its cloak, the
Secrets of a Thousand Years won the enduring enmity of the clerical establishment.
In reaction to the publication of the Secrets of a Thousand Years, a group of bazaar
merchants, in congruence with the ulama, implored Khomeini (Martin, 2000), then a midrange cleric, to give an all-inclusive response to Hakamizadeh. In a voluminous 334-page
text, called Unveiling the Secrets, Khomeini made an effort to counter Hakamizadeh’s 42page text discourse-by-discourse, chapter-by-chapter, and point-by-point. As a prologue to
the upcoming comparative assessment of the discourses presented in the two texts, I shall
emphasize two distinct elements that set these two writings apart from each other, and
provide insight into the substance of the two documents.
First, the immense disproportionality in length – 42 pages as opposed to 334 pages suggests the shi’ite establishment’s experience of angst and distress for what Greenblatt
(1993) correspondingly ascribes to the established Church of the 16th century: “the great
unmooring … their sense that fixed positions had somehow become unstuck, their anxious
awareness that the moral landscape was shifting” (p. 88).
The tormented sense of nerve-racking within the shi’ite establishment was deeply
embedded in the massive material and cultural transformation Iran was going through at the
time. Emanating from the inroads that modernity was making in Iran, the changes generated
an unsettling liminal state in the midst of which the publication of these two texts took place.
The socioeconomic and cultural reforms initiated and forcefully implemented under the
reign of Reza Shah (1924-1941), the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, were largely modeled
after the Western-styled reforms of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, and pushed Iran onto the path
of industrialism, commerce, urbanism, nationalism, secularism and state capitalism. As a
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result of these reforms, traditional social structures as well as modes of life experienced a
significant dislocation. Additionally, in 1941, the Allied Forces forced Reza Shah to abdicate
and leave Iran to exile. The transition of power to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, imposed
a period of increasing sociopolitical instability and strife on Iranian society from which, at
the same time, a certain measure of political openness ensued. 11 The shi’ite enterprise was
not off the hook from these ruptures. In the growing ideological and intellectual market of the
time, the shi’ite hierocracy refused to stay on the sideline and aimed at making itself
competitive. Voices of reform also resonated in a meaningful fashion within the shi’ite
establishment. A number of clerics and shi’ite intellectuals broke with the traditionalistic
core of the institution of shi’ism, and fostered, instead, an interpretation of the faith that
would match up with the humanistic spirit of modernity.
For these clerics and intellectuals the practice of faith was a self-conscious act,
shaped by private judgment that represented an individuated identity. The individual seizes
the truth, as he or she perceives it. For orthodox shi’ism the notion of faith is predicated
upon the pervasive presence of a thick institution, communal rituals, and traditions
descending by generations, within which the practice of a faithful is situated. The principle
of total obedience to the spiritual authority of the Mosque, in this sense, compels total
immersion into this communal entity.
Thus, for the orthodox shi’ite clerics, fostering an individualized religious conscience
is synonymous with decentering the shi’ite communal body and paving the way for centering
on the individual: the locus of modernity. To this effect, Hakamizadeh’s monograph
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represents a subversive discourse that would unavoidably seep into the canon of the shi’ite
orthodoxy. This is the underlying moral shift that kindled much anguish and melancholy in
the campsite of the established shi’ism.
Second, in contradistinction to the vernacular (colloquial) Farsi of the Secrets of a
Thousand Years, the Unveiling the Secrets, Khomeini’s first published book (Martin, 2000 &
Milani, 2011), exploits a sophisticated parlance while justifying the position of the shi’ite
orthodoxy. Far from simply a rhetorical differentiation, this distinction marks out
meaningful historical and doctrinal demarcations that inform the two accounts.
Hakamizadeh attempts to propagate and promote his idea of reform not by
considerable institutional work, but by the power of the word. The Secrets of a Thousand
Years is not a blueprint for laying out a vanguard organization that echoes and advances the
interests of particular social classes and status groups. It is the work of an individual seeking
to prop up unaided individuals in using their own judgment, without the mediation of the
clergy, to discern the word of God. However, Khomeini would not shrink before this
argument, and by accusing Hakamizadeh of demagoguery states, “you claim that the faith is
a guide to reason, and whatever our intellect understands is the faith” 12 (Unveiling the
Secrets, p. 7). He contends that this streak of reasoning would leave no place for Islam, the
Qur’an, God, and the prophet. Throughout the centuries, the shi’ite establishment has
sermonized Islamic scriptures with a sense of hidden wisdom and truth that can only be
decoded by means of certain proficiency and craft. Access to this craft is made possible
through training and teaching that is the undivided domain of the community of the ulama.
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This is my own translation. Cited otherwise, all Khomeini and Hakamizadeh’s statements
throughout the dissertation are my own translation of the original texts.
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Khomeini himself insists that since “regular people don’t know the craft” it is the imperative
duty of the clergy to make known these demagogues “who have not read the Qur’an once;”
moreover, “historical evidences are testimony to the fact that ever since the demise of the
prophet, ulama have been the only ones to preserve people’s faith and exclude libertines’
rant” (p. 8). Hence follows the ulama’s prescription for an unenlightened populace: the
avoidance of the abyss of disbelief and doubt and the embrace of the eternal bliss, achievable
solely through a devoted deference to the clerical monolithic hermeneutic authority. As
Milani (2004) states, “since salvation only comes from this sacred fount of wisdom, it is
incumbent upon the majority to assume a posture of total submission to the will of these
select interpreters” (p. 29). This compulsory obedience is nowhere more apparent than in the
formulation of Khomeini’s political theory of the “Mandate of the Jurist”. He maintains that
the formation of the Islamic state is the obligatory duty of the community and just jurist. “If
one such succeeds in forming a government it is incumbent on the others to follow him.” 13
In contrast to the ulama’s claim, Hakamizadeh argues that the meaning of the holy
writ is readily accessible to the intellect of an individual Muslim. Within their independent
mental faculty, Muslim individuals are reasonably capable of comprehending the word of
God. He states, “they (ulama) always wanted to direct people toward ignorance, and since
reason 14 would resist their effort, they inexorably proclaim that your intellect is imperfect, so
you need to reckon the total intelligence, that is to all lies that they construct” (Secrets of a
Thousand Years, p. 10). He palpably belittles ulama’s claim to total intelligence and
unambiguously validates the autonomous judgment of individuals, “about the intellect’s

13
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Translated by Calder (1982)
Italics are mine.
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shortcoming it can be said that they (ulama) coat different things with a made-up reason and
name it intelligence. They do the same with faith as well as feeling; even though with little
inquisitiveness we can lay bare their fabrications” (p. 10). In other words, no clerical
intermediacy is needed for the diffusion of the divine truth in the realm of the public.
It is helpful to draw on an historical parallelism to elucidate this argument further.
The English translation of the Bible in the 16th century is considered to be a turning point in
the popular access to the Holy Scripture, and the expansion of literacy in England; hence, the
thawing of the absolutistic intellectual command of the Catholic Church. Considering this
development as an act of heresy, Sir Thomas More (1981) prescribed true believers, “to give
diligent hearing, firm credence, and faithful obedience to the Church of Christ concerning the
sense and understanding of Holy Scripture, not doubting but since he hath commanded his
sheep to be fed, he hath provided for them wholesome meat and true doctrine” (2:112-3). In
these words, Sir Thomas More is trying to preserve the external authority of the Catholic
Church, as keenly depicted by Pizzorno (1978):
Indeed, the use of Latin as the language capable of transcending the localboundedness of unwritten vernaculars, as well as the specific cultivation of writing
and record keeping, allowed the ecclesiastical class to mediate any type of extralocal,
and therefore all “political,” communication and discourse as well as any
communication through time, either from the past (the cultural tradition) or to the
future (the language of salvation, of ultimate ends) (p. 36).

75
But this authority becomes the subject of increasing public scrutiny as the production
of the English Bible copies increases. 15 The growth of the public access to the Bible, in the
words of Greenblatt (1993) implies:
It is easy to understand Scripture, its meaning lies directly in front of us, competing
interpretations are perverse mystifications. There is no need of advanced degrees, the
mastery of difficult languages, the juggling of arcane symbolisms, prodigious
memory, and expensive library; the truth is as accessible to a shoemaker as to a
theologian, perhaps more accessible, for the latter has been poisoned by popish
sophistry. (p. 100)
The masses’ engagement to the meaning of the Bible insists that the language of the
faith be vernacular. The same is also true in the case of the Qur’an and hadith in Islam.
The vigorous back and forth between the two interpretative approaches illustrates an
instance of how language and discourse are transformed into a form of power. The textual
exchange over representing the faith as simply a persuasive system to deter the individual
from harmful deeds on the one hand, and as a divine regulatory system to codify the standard
of ethics and manners on the other, undoubtedly reflects relations of power. Almost 70 years
after the above textual swap between Hakamizadeh and Khomeini, this association is
significantly functional in Iran, where under the theocratic reign of the shi’ite clergy faith has
found itself pressed into the realm of national policy. Shi’ism today has become a key
instrument in controlling and balancing political power, programming social well-being,
shaping family life, regimenting personal conducts, regulating all forms of expression,
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It is estimated that 200 copies between 1521 and 1600, 480 copies between 1601 and 1700,
and over 500,000 copies in the early 18th century were printed. See Greenblatt (1993), p. 98.
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punishing dissent, and myriad dimensions of social and public life. In 1943, Khomeini
resorts to the force of ideology to proliferate his own faith, and in large part with the help of
that force seizes the power in 1979. But soon after, he found that the ideological apparatus
was not adequate to uphold worldly power. He, therefore, chained the practice of faith to the
mechanism of punishment. Similarly, a 1617 speech by Francis Bacon to a group of judges
reminds us of the necessary marriage between ideology and coercion:
Next for the matter of religion. In principle place, I recommend both to you and to
the justices the countenancing of godly and zealous preachers … For there will be a
perpetual defection, except you keep men in by preaching, as well as by law doth by
punishing … Cicero, when he was consul, had devised a fine remedy, for he saith:
those that trouble other’s quiet, I will give them quiet (p. 213).
Predictably today, under the reign of Khomeini’s successor, Khamenei, the power of
the word is infinitely masked by the sway of the sword.
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Chapter 7
First Discourse: The God-Human Relation
As observed earlier, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1907, and the
ensuing sociopolitical dynamics led to an intellectual and doctrinal polarization inside the
shi’ite establishment culminating in the publication of the aforementioned contending texts.
These texts brought into sharp focus competing issues that had hitherto been largely evaded
by main shi’ite discourses. At the core of this doctrinal dispute rests the issue of the control
of interpretation. The modernist shi’ite trend represented by Hakamizadeh strives to institute
the word of God beyond the realm of ‘skill and craft’ into the personal grasp of the individual
observer. To the established traditional clergymen such as Khomeini, on the other hand,
Hakamizadeh’s writing subjected their interpretive legitimation to doubt, question, and
subvert
The public circulation of these two texts, nonetheless, led afterward to a shift in the
treatment of these contentious ideas within the institution of shi’ism. The competing shi’ite
factions began to take these controversial and conflictive visions with seriousness and
diligence. Moreover, when these writings were absorbed back into the shi’ite community, as
a necessary consequence, they gained an institutional import which has become one of the
continual motifs in the practice of the shi’ite authorities since. Over the years, the advocates
of these ideas transformed them into cultural practices and social institutions. It is believed
that the subversive force of an idea depends not merely on its cognitive content, but on the
context of its enunciation. The post-1979-revolutionary Iran where shi’ism assumed political
expediency and became an instrument of political legitimation provides the context in which
the above contending ideas engage in full-fledged cultural and institutional sparring. The
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locus of the new contention around the authority of interpretation resides in questions of the
obedience of the individual in a metaphysically ordained order.
The debate on the first discourse centers first on the notion of God’s providence and
His exercise of authority on the universe. As argued below, on this point the two texts
disclose a relatively similar pattern of understanding of the idea of providentialism. The
argumentative debate, however, starts when the above writings turn to the second and third
points. These address God’s stand in relation to the notion of order in general including
nature as well society, and the place and role that God assigns to the individual in His
providential design.
The Providential Idea and God’s Authority
The underlying sameness that runs through the first discourse in both texts is the
belief in the providence of God shared in Abrahamic monotheistic faiths that God has
created the universe with order and meaning. The order of things in the providential design
is established from eternity on an immutable and purposeful connection that is coextensive
with the order that governs nature. The operation of this metaphysical apparatus, for the
most part, is not subjected to human understanding and intellectual scrutiny (Thomas,
Dollimore, 1989; Swedenborg, 1986; Thomas, 1971). For Hakamizadeh (1943), “God has
made the universe on the basis of a fixed and total order and won’t ever alter it” (p. 9). He
asserts that the human being is incapable of accomplishing God’s work, and any claim to the
contrary is false and a likely pretext for accumulating wealth and acquiring power (p. 9).
In the same vein, Khomeini (1943) argues “it is proven to human conscience that all
creatures, from the shining sun to materials, plants, animals, and all other ingredients of this
divine manufacture are in God’s command and made by him to benefit the human being” (p.
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71). For Khomeini, God’s hand and permission is behind all undertakings in the universe:
“everything in this world and in the other springs from God. He would bestow his grace and
apply his wrath to any body and anything He wishes” (p. 82). God performs with “absolute
independence” and “free from any assistance”; Khomeini contends that “power and might are
intrinsic to God and do not stem from another source” (Unveiling the Secrets, p. 28).
Moreover, Khomeini affirms the finality and irreversibility of God’s decision.
Both Hakamizadeh and Khomeini affirm the authority and authenticity of the Qur’an
but differ in their interpretation of the book. A close reading of the two texts reveals that the
emphasis on the centrality of God’s judgment is nowhere near as consistent and unwavering
as portrayed in the above excerpts. This takes prominence when the notion of providence is
extended to the social world and particular situations of the individual.
The belief in Providence in traditional shi’ism inclines to underpin and sanction some
extant moral codes and traditions including political attitude and behavior. 16 Within the
naturally ordered universe, God has encoded social life with a system of statutory and
regulative laws. These laws are inscribed in the Qur’an, the Prophet’s Sunna, and hadiths. 17
Aberration from these laws is synonymous to transgressing God’s sanctioned order; as
Thomas (1971) indicates, “in place of unacceptable moral chaos was erected the edifice of
God’s omnipotent sovereignty” (p. 107). Providentialism, in this sense, is a ground for the
traditional shi’ite clergy to determine the legitimacy or the lack of legitimacy of the social
world.
16

On the relation between the concept of providence and moral codes, see Thomas (1971)
pp. 78-112.
17
In the Islamic tradition the authenticity of a hadith and the extent of its usage have been
subjected to much debate and controversy. It is an important subject that requires separate
study.
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Providentialism and Social Order
Approach to the status of the existing social order and ethics by our two authors,
however, is dissimilar and takes a complex form. For Khomeini, social life under the Pahlavi
dynasty epitomizes the aberration from divine legitimation. He faults Reza Shah’s
governance for the ongoing social maladies, and privileges the clergy with the godly task of
uncovering and resolving them. He proclaims that the clergy is the sole social force that
providentially “encounters his (Reza Shah) poisonous intents, and protests his policies that
are harmful to the country’s wellbeing and religious interests” (Unveiling the Secrets, p. 9).
Hakamizadeh, on the other hand, places the above-mentioned aberration on the shi’ite
hierocracy itself. He introduces the Secrets of a Thousand Years with the following
statement,
It has been over a thousand years that our leaders and rulers [italics are mine] have
manipulated and exploited faith to advance their personal and political aims.
Consequently, faith, nowadays, has become a titular entity with no true identity.
Monotheism and piety, which are the truth of faith, are no longer in command and
have been replaced by idolatry and lie. Faith that is supposed to be a divine guidance
has become an obstacle to the divine’s path and life. The absence of this path itself is
the reason for all these troubles we are facing … Now, if we want to serve our faith,
we inevitably need to get rid of all these lies or a thousand years of rubbish in order to
shed light on the path forward. (p. 4)
There are two distinct lines of argument from the preceding passages: order and value. In
Unveiling the Secrets, Khomeini tends primarily to erode the legitimacy of the existing
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secular order, and replace it with a sacred order whose defining structure licenses the clergy
for healing sociopolitical illnesses.
The Secrets of a Thousand Years, on the other hand, dwells upon the practice of piety
and observance of moral laws, which are naturally embedded in the divine providence.
Hakamizadeh attributes the commonness of immorality to the ulama, who camouflage habit
and imitation with the garb of reason to swindle uninformed individuals. This captures a key
tenet in the Secrets of a Thousand Years: stress on value.
Shi’ism and social action
The above discourses of providentialism direct the practice of faith toward two
conflictive tracks within the shi’ite establishment. It is evident that the Unveiling the Secrets
ranks faith under the class of ideology. The text perceives Islam as a “be-all and end-all”
practice exceeding all human actions. It then attempts to insinuate the clergy into the
existing order and exploit its sociopolitical, religious, and psychological structures, to
privilege the clerical group. This type of insinuation has been the trait of shi’ism in Iran
since its public inception in 1501.
The shi’ite practice of insinuation parallels a Renaissance manner of behavior that, in
Greenblatt’s (1993) words, is called improvisation and refers to “the ability both to capitalize
on the unforeseen and to transform given materials into one’s own scenario” (p. 227).
Greenblatt depicts the practice of improvisation in an instance of European colonialist
expansion in 1525 in which “the Spanish in Hispaniola began to raid neighboring islands” (p.
226), due to the shortage of manual labor for working in gold mines. When the Spanish
reached an island in the Lucayas (presently Bahamas), “they learned through their
interpreters that the natives believed that after death their souls were first purged of their sins
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in icy northern mountains, then borne to a paradisal island in the south, whose beneficent,
lame prince offered them innumerable pleasures” (p.226). Upon understanding of these
imaginations, the Spanish made an effort to “persuade the natives that they are coming from
those places, where they should see their parents, and children, and all their kindred and
friends that were dead: and should enjoy all kind of delights, together with the embracements
and fruition of beloved things.” Unaware of the trickery but certainly feeling thrilled, the
Lucayas population “passed onto the ships and were taken to the gold mines of Hispaniola.
The Spanish, however, reaped less profit than they had anticipated; when they grasped what
had happened to them, the Lucayans undertook mass suicide” (p. 226). Greenblatt draws on
the Lucayas incident to demonstrate, “European’s ability again and again to insinuate
themselves into preexisting political, religious, even psychic structures of the natives and to
turn those structures to their advantage” (p. 227).
The traditional clerics, represented by Khomeini, appear to be conscious that they
could not simply eradicate the dominant ideology of monarchism in order to substitute for it
their own regime of truth. The practice of insinuation, as Greenblatt (1993) explains,
Is made possible by the subversive perception of another’s truth as an ideological
construct, that construct must, at the same time be grasped in terms that bear a certain
structural resemblance to one’s own set of beliefs. An ideology that is perceived as
entirely alien would permit no point of histrionic entry: it could be destroyed but not
performed (p. 228).
In the context of contemporary Iran, the structural resemblance is reflected in an emerging
symbolic structure’s displacement of a pre-existent symbolic structure or, in the perceptive
words of Amir Arjomand (1988b), the substitution of “the Turban for the Crown”. In reality,
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the hierocratic shi’ism with Khomeini as its Supreme Head inserted itself into the existing
secular power relations and established its supremacy. In this instance, the shi’ite insinuating
practice assumed a new distinction by converting the structure of monarchical absolutism
into its own favorable scenario, notwithstanding the two absolutisms, the monarchical and
clerical, differ in nature and application. In this way, the absolutism of the jurist becomes a
mandate following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.
The theory of the “Mandate of the Jurist” preserves the absolutist character of the
kingship as the embodiment of the above structural likeness, close enough to ensure the
progression of the shi’ite’s insinuation practice, but adequately distanced to uphold shi’ism in
its unspoiled orthodoxy and avoid its portrayal as an alterable human construct. In this sense,
while inexplicit about his political goals, Khomeini uses providentialism subversively and
conservatively at once. It is an irony that this situation comes close to what Dollimore
(1989) observes, “it is true that providence was thought to operate through evil agents, that
God would use the sinful to destroy the sinful” (p. 38). In fact, the assemblage of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic embodies the secular epiphany of the above dynamic in
which the rationale of secular state, reflected in the Republic insignia, is situated in the
periphery, while the providential apparatus, reproduced in the doctrine of the “Mandate of
the Jurist”, captures the center, a point which will be the subject of further examination later
in this study.
To elaborate, it is fair to state that the debate between the two above texts suggests an
early expression of such discursive practice that later in the century it became the locus of
power relations, and which today so potently infuses social life in Iran. While the traditional
clergy were venerating divine providence with “the celebration of power”, the secular logic
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of modern state was gradually and playfully creeping into the providential machinery
knowing well that providentialism can hardly function in a secular atmosphere. What is left
of providence years later is merely a mystified façade in the name of the “Mandate of the
Jurist”, yet is increasingly becoming demystified under the shifting pressure of objective
reality. A parallel to these dynamics existed in early modern England: As Greenblatt (1993)
aptly argues in recounting the relation of Tudor power to Catholicism, “indeed, as here, the
sacred may find itself serving as an adornment, a backdrop, an occasion for a quite secular
phenomenon” (p. 230). I leave a further elaboration on this structural tension in the analysis
of upcoming discourses, especially on the discourse of the state.
In contrast, Hakamizadeh’s stress on value in the Secret of a Thousand Years tends to
preserve providentialism but strictly within the domain of the private whose chief locus
consists of the individual intellect. He differentiates between “God’s affair” and “God’s
path” and insists that, “God’s affair is his own” but “God’s path is for us, and rather than
following others thoughtlessly, we must perceive it first and then move forward … There is
no place for the ignorant to argue with the enlightened” (p. 10). He further argues, “our
intellect, like our eyes, is in need for guidance…. In other words, it is like mathematics laws,
discovering of which requires teaching; but the teaching itself must correspond with reason
in order to be acceptable” (p. 10). In these remarks, while leaving God’s affair
unapproachable, Hakamizadeh palpably lays out God’s path for human reasoning and critical
judgment: “they [the ulama] say that human intellect is imperfect because of so many
religions that have been around and still exist in the world, while in truth there is only one
religion [Islam] (p. 10). On this point, directly addressing the ulama, Hakamizadeh further
articulates, “it is on the basis of the above reasoning that you claim to know God and
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establish your life. If the rule of reason is imperfect, you will have to put aside faith and life
altogether. It is as if you are cutting off the root to hang on the branch” (p. 10). To advance
his argument, he specifically aims at the practice of superstition. He reflects on this practice
as a cause for Iran’s lagging behind in progress. To elucidate his point Hakamizadeh
maintains, “every year in this country, thousands books are published about how to perform
praying or commemorating religious martyrs… but only few people show interest in the
publication of a book about the science of agriculture” (p. 11). In this respect, he claims that
the ulama try to justify the act of superstitions by saying that “superstitions are
everywhere…. or the practice of superstitions is better than acting immorally” (p. 12). To
him: “This adage is like to say that since illness is everywhere so let it be. The practice of
superstition is a mental illness and the more a nation is inflicted by it, the more
underdeveloped is that nation. To understand my point, just compare Iran versus Turkey,
China versus Japan, or India and Russia” (p. 12). Hakamizadeh, indeed, denotes the power of
the intellect and importance of speculation by rejecting a passive conviction in faith. While
sticking to his rationalistic emphasis, he seems to avoid implicating the superiority of reason
over faith: “We can be neither superstitious nor immoral, but rather a disciple of truth. This
exemplifies the same path the early community of Islam followed” (p. 12).
Providentialism and the Individual
The medieval notion of providentialism implies that God has assigned a defined and
predetermined place for each individual in the order of things, with which the individual
identifies. To transcend this place is to transgress divine teleological design by the
individual. Providentialism in this sense connects logically with the static nature of the
medieval society. Social life in this formation is informed by a conservative mode of thought
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and managed by a religious authoritarian mode of governance. The emergence of the
Renaissance, however, paves the way for the birth of a rational and sovereign individual who
could acquire a sense of self with full personality that is “indivisible” and “singular,
distinctive, unique” (Williams, 1988, pp. 161-165: Individual). To elaborate,
The emergence of notions of individuality, in the modern sense, can be related to the
break-up of the medieval social, economic and religious order. In the general
movement against feudalism there was a new stress on a man’s personal existence
over and above his place or function in a rigid hierarchical society. There was a
related stress, in Protestantism, on man’s direct and individual relation to God, as
opposed to this relation mediated by the Church. But it was not until C17 and C18
that a new mode of analysis, in logic and mathematics, postulated the individual as
the substantial entity (cf. Leibniz’s ‘monads’), from which other categories and
especially collective categories were derived. The political thought of the
Enlightenment mainly followed this model. Argument began from individuals, who
had an initial and primary existence, and laws and forms of society were derived from
them: by submission, as in Hobbes; by contract or consent, or by the new version of
natural law, in liberal thought. In classical economics, trade was described, at some
starting point, to enter into economic or commercial relations. In utilitarian ethics
separate individuals calculated the consequences of this or that action which they
might undertake. (Williams, 1988, pp. 163-4)
Although the different historical contexts make it difficult to draw precise parallels
between European and Iranian history, the debate between Khomeini and Hakamizadeh
regarding providentialism and the individual represents a similar struggle to establish shi’ite
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underpinnings for modernity. To the author of the Secret of a Thousand Years, the centrality
of God is embedded in the action of each human being who is endowed with the faculty to
reason; “reason is God’s close herald and for human beings is identical to eyes which serve
them to see the steps they take” (p. 10). By insulating God’s affair and approaching God’s
path, Hakamizadeh attempts to merge two axes of a paradoxical conceptualization. By the
former, he situates the Providence at the center and places an obedient subject on the
sideline. By the latter, he depicts an individual subject who, by virtue of his rationality,
consciousness, and intellectual capacity, “synchronizes with this teleological design and
discovers within it the main principles of his own moral law” (Dollimore, 1989, p. 42).
Sticking to his own teaching, Hakamizadeh puts the discourse of God’s affair aside. For him,
however, in observing God’s path, the ‘sovereign individual’ enjoys a measure of agency
without which the providential scheme becomes untenable. Perhaps he sees himself as a
sovereign agent and assails certain false practices by the clergy, which undercut
providentialism. Superstitious rituals, absurd habits, factitious ceremonies, bibliomancy are
among many activities Hakamizadeh identifies as factors that disrupt the naturalness of the
God-human relation. He states that the Prophet “spent 23 years of his precious time” (p. 11)
to unmask and tear down these practices. He specifically points to bibliomancy and
prophesy that “have become a notorious sedition for us” (p. 7). Thus, Hakamizadeh
constructs a shi’ite understanding of the Providence-human relationship that he believes can
underpin a modernizing Shi’a Islam. This is the point that Khomeini picks up and uses to
counteract Hakamizadeh.
Khomeini’s belief in a different version of providentialism as the defining tenet of the
God-human relation is expressed throughout his text, explicitly and implicitly. However, his

88
expression of legitimacy for the practice of bibliomancy seems to counter this claim and
fracture his support of providentialism. He states, “one meaning of bibliomancy is that when
an individual is helplessly stuck in a problem … and if God has no definite instruction and
injunction [my emphasis] for how to solve that problem”, the Qur’an becomes “the source of
assurance” and “the practice of bibliomancy shows him the right direction” (Unveiling the
Secrets, p. 91). Shi’ism portrays the divine providence as the root of ultimate and allencompassing knowledge and wisdom.
However, the above statement pictures a God whose judgment is blighted and
displaced by an external source, which is the Qur’an. It is true that in the traditional strand of
shi’ism, the Qur’an is God’s words, an expression of the ultimate reason, and a source of
conduct. But, in accordance with Khomeini’s argument, the practice of bibliomancy shifts
the cause of the Providence from God to the book; in other words, God is the Book; in the
practice of bibliomancy God is decentered and replaced by text. To the traditional clergy, the
centered text in this instance is the Qur’an, which is a mystified body of verses with
boundless meanings. As Khomeini indicates, “not everybody can understand the sciences of
the Qur’an and hadith, and they are not out there for everybody to perceive them; but rather
they contain metaphors and allegories through which the author relates to a special group” (p.
322). In the words of Milani (2004), “every verse in the Qur’an has infinite layers of
meanings. In this labyrinth of meanings, the devout shi’ite can at most grasp the outermost,
superficial layer … Only the Prophet and his progeny are empowered to find the allegorical
meanings of the text and unravel the mysteries of its inner layers” (p. 29). The Unveiling the
Secrets is stuffed with the assertion, directly or indirectly, that posits the ulama as the
progeny of the Prophet and sole proprietor of the knowledge of Qur’anic hermeneutics. In
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other words, understanding the Qur’an, a non-vernacular text, requires a didactic mediation,
which is exclusive to the ulama. Khomeini seems to make the same point when he states,
“there are sciences in the Qur’an and hadith the knowledge of which is privy to a group of
high-minded of scientists and nobody else…. Scientists like the great philosopher Sadr-elMotealemin and his exalted disciple Fayze Kashani can infer rational sciences from the same
Qur’anic chapters that you hardly understand” (p. 323). The claim to the above interpretive
authority demonstrates that the pattern of decentering in the Unveiling of Secrets is not
confined to God. It is, rather, stretched out to include the Qur’an itself. Now, it is the clergy
that occupies the center.
Conclusion
In conclusion, an initial shared belief in the function of divine providence as the
foundation of the universe leads our authors to two quite distinct conclusions, both based in
the shi’a tradition and the Qur’an, yet simultaneously contradictory and inescapable within
the respective writer’s underlying ideology. While Hakamizadeh arrives at a paradoxical
impasse as explained above, the idea of centering the ulama logically leads Khomeini to
displace the idea of providentialism in God-human relation. Moreover, the power of
claiming the center directs the ulama to demand obedience from every member of the shi’ite
community. In the discursive practice of the Secrets of a Thousand Years versus the
Unveiling the Secrets, this demand is widely manifested in Khomeini’s attempt at
discrediting Hakamizadeh’s discourses and disparaging his personality. In the later political
practice of the post-revolutionary Iran, this demand takes the shape of imprisonment, forced
abjuration, public disgrace, and even elimination.
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Chapter 7
Second Discourse: Imamate
The notion of the management of the religious and temporal affairs of the Muslim
community sits in logical association with the doctrine of ‘providentialism.’ Whether to
perceive social and political life as unavoidable and natural – the product of the Providence,
or as subjectively constructed are key contentions related to the issue of leadership within the
Muslim community. This may be the underlying motive behind both authors’ take on the
Imamate, which is associated with the discourse of leadership.
The discourse of the Imamate has been the main recurring motif in the historical
development of shi’ite thought. Today, this discourse has gained further currency and weight
due to: (a) the establishment of a shi’ite theocracy in Iran; and (b) the ascription of the label
of Imam to Khomeini and the attempt to do the same with his successor, Khamenei. The
concept of Imamate relates to the question of succession and continuance of the Muslim
community’s leadership after the demise of the Prophet in 632 A.D. This issue rose to
immediacy in an assembly called Saqifah, in which, as a result of a heated dispute, the fate of
the Prophet’s successor was eventually determined. During the altercation, one group of
Muslims representing the majority, who came to be known as the ‘sunnis’, maintained that
the Prophet confers the selection of his succession on the Muslim community. Opposing this
stance, another group representing the minority posited that the Prophet actually designated
his son-in-law and cousin, Ali (d. 661), as his successor. This group, who came to be known
as ‘shi’ites’, argues, “it was inconceivable given God’s justice and benevolence towards
human beings that he [the Prophet] should have left the issue of the leadership (Imamate)
undecided” (Enayat, 1991, p. 5). However, it was the Sunni view that eventually prevailed
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and the Saqifah assembly selected Abu Bakr, a close companion of the Prophet, as first
Caliph, or the successor of the Prophet. Subsequently, the aforementioned Ali was appointed
as the fourth Caliph in 656 A.D. The assassination of Ali ended the circle of early caliphate,
commonly known as the ‘Rightly Guided’ Caliphs.
Imamate and Otherworldly Salvation
The dissection of Islam into two main groups of sunni and shi’i, moreover, goes
beyond a historical event relating merely to the unique and complicated procedure of the
Prophet’s succession. It gradually becomes intertwined with the doctrine of salvation in
Islam. According to Sachedina (1981), “the basic emphasis of Islamic salvation lies instead
in the historical responsibility of its followers, namely, the establishment of the ideal religiopolitical community, the umma, with a worldwide membership of all those who believe in
God and His revelation through Muhammad” (p. 2). It is, for the most part, the variation in
the interpretation of the notion of salvation and the nature of the umma that underpins the
sectarian differences between the sunnis and the shi’ites in the aftermath of the Prophet’s
death. To the former, the allegiance and fidelity to an ideal Muslim community, a
community that fully adheres to the observance and execution of the Shari’a regardless of its
leadership, ensures salvation. To the Shi’ites, the realization of an ideal Islamic society in
the absence of the Prophet revolves around the leadership of the Prophet’s rightful successor,
who is qualified to uphold the continuity of the Prophet’s charismatic authority.
Focusing on the shi’ite interpretation, the emphasis of this study, this leadership is a
privilege bestowed upon a designated member of the Prophet’s Household in the track of a
line of inheritance that exclusively comes down from the Prophet to Ali and from Ali to 11
more successors. As Sachedina (1981) explains, “the notional exaltation of the Prophet and
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his rightful successor as a second cause… gave rise to the very concept of messianic
leadership from among the descendants of the Prophet, an Imam, who could save the
believers” (p. 5). The Imamate is the institution that facilitates the succession of charisma
and warrants the umma’s salvation. In the shi’ite view, it is therefore the allegiance to the
Imamate that ascertains salvation. From a shi’ite perspective, the Imamate is an integral part
of Islam and equally important as the principle of prophecy. Specifically, this shi’ite group
came to be known as Imamis, who later on became the Twelver shi’ites.
In early debates around the question of succession after the demise of the Prophet,
there was a general consensus among shi’ite scholars that the divinely ordained Imam,
following the Prophet’s tradition, is in charge of the twin leadership tasks—the temporal and
the religious—of the Muslim community. In principle, these shi’ites did not draw a line
separating temporal and religious authority. In practice, however, the authority of the Imam
never exceeded the realm of the religious. It was the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq, who at last
penned the theory of the Imamate and placed the institution of the religious leadership in a
differentiated sphere from the political. Through the action of Ja’far, the authority of the
Imam became depoliticized (Arjomand, 1984; Hodgson, 1955). Since then, the discourse of
the Imamate has played an overriding role in the development of the very nuanced social
manifestations and practices of Iranian shi’ism: from a sacrosanct messianic leadership
manifested in centuries of political quietism and isolation to the revolutionary political
activism of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to the ideological radicalism underpinning the polity
of the Islamic Republic of Iran today.
This trajectory did not remain out of Hakamizadeh’s limited but keen sight
(observation) and he acknowledges:
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An unbiased view of the Qur’an and history of early Islam shows us that, at first, the
Imamate had been a simple political affair about which the Qur’an and Muslims were
silent; however, later on, our leaders in Iran have customized the Imamate for
mustering public support for their resistance to Arab and Turkish Caliphs’
dominance. (p. 15)
In the following pages, I shall examine the evolution of the theory of the Imamate as
represented by Hakamizadeh and Khomeini. This examination revolves around three
concepts: (a) historical Imam; (b) the Imam’s knowledge; and (c) the practice of Taqiyya
(prudential dissimulation).
Universal Imam Versus Historicist Imam
In the elaboration of the Imamate theory, the sixth Imam consecrates the Imamate as
a covenant between God and mankind (Jafri, 1979). In this contract, the Imam is the chosen
supreme and infallible authority to which “God has ordained obedience” (Qur’an, 4:59).
Drawing on this Qur’anic verse about authority, Ja’far declares, “God has delegated to the
Imams spiritual rulership over the whole world, which must always have such a leader and
guide” (Arjomand, 1984, p. 35). Subordination to Imams’ absolute authority is central to an
individual’s piety: “whoever dies without having known and acknowledged the Imam of his
time [my emphasis] dies as an infidel” (Jafri, 1979, p. 294). The notion of the ‘Imam of the
time,’ the historical Imam, invokes two conflictive perspectives from Hakamizadeh and
Khomeini.
Hakamizadeh questions the extreme devotion Iranians have granted to the Imamate:
“Iranians have dedicated their life, their country, their wealth and time to the Imamate” (p.
16). He refutes some of the existing interpretations of the Qur’an that improperly draw on
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few Surahs to justify the idea of the Imamate: “many books interpret some Qur’anic chapters
as the proof of the Imamate. … If the Imamate was so attractive to the Qur’an, why is it not
explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an, which could have prevented all wars revolving around
this subject?” (p. 14). He goes on to criticize the Iranian people for sacrificing God and the
Prophet to Imams and takes on the notion of the Imam of the time: “whoever is the Imam, he
is the Imam of his time and not of other times” (p. 16). In these statements, Hakamizadeh
points to the historical specificity of the Imam and obliterates the teleological tenet of the
theory of the Imamate upon which the shi’ite orthodoxy represented by Khomeini so
compellingly insists:
According to a legitimate hadith [Kafi], for every epoch there is an Imam from the
Prophet’s household, and this means not to deny the Imamate, rather to prove that the
Imamate exists at each era … and even though each Imam is the guide of the time in
which he lives, his command remains valid after his demise … since his commands
stem from the Prophet whose commands, in turn, are purely from God. (Unveiling
the Secrets, p. 163)
In this orthodoxy Ali inherits all the Prophet’s distinguished characteristics, which are
passed lineally from Ali to his successor. The Imams’ commanding qualifications are
universal because they originate from the same providential force in which the Prophet’s
inherent privileges are embedded. Khomeini observes, “rationality, which is God’s close
associate, implies that for the same reason that obedience to God is obligatory, the obedience
to His messenger and Imams (those in authority) is” (p. 176). Hakamizadeh, on the other
hand, as aforementioned, partially calls into question the notion of the Imamate due to its
conspicuous absence in the Qur’an; to that he adds, “today, while our faith considers the
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Imamate inferior to the principle of prophecy, in practice the Imamate is regarded much
higher, however” (p. 13). As if being insufficiently satisfied with his own observations,
Hakamizadeh levels a reformative knock at the doctrine of the Imamate: “not only the
Imamate, the very Imam also should not be regarded as part of the faith, for Imams are the
faith’s guide not its elements” (p. 17).
In response, Khomeini draws on numerous Qur’anic verses to infer that, “Imamate is
a principle of Islam” (p. 136) and “it is with the Imamate that faith becomes complete and
proselytisation ends” (p. 135). In another instance, he points out that “the Imamate, which
means the guardianship of the faith, must be considered an absolute and immutable principle
in Islam” (p. 134). The phrase, ‘absolute and immutable principle in Islam,’ underlies
Khomeini’s doctrinal approach to the Imamate. He tends to generalize the Imamate by
extending it beyond shi’ism onto Islam. Also, by presenting the notion of the Imamate as
totalizing and unchanging, he indubitably lodges this principle in the realm of the eternal law
aligned with the doctrine of providentialism.
Transhistorical Versus Discursive Knowledge
Closely associated with the theory of the Imamate, is the unique position of the Imam
with reference to ‘knowledge.’ Central to the Imami theory of the Imamate is the
irreplaceable role of the Imam in transmitting God’s knowledge, once possessed by the
Prophet. In the absence of the Prophet the Imam is assigned to become the repository of the
divine knowledge and the sole authority in the hermeneutic interpretation of God’s revealed
and transmitted texts. Thus, the Prophet confers his divinely revealed knowledge to Ali, the
first Imam, and through him to the incumbent Imam. Such transference takes place by means
of inheritance within the circle of the Prophet’s household (Arjomand, 1984; Jafri, 1979;
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Kohlberg, 1988; Lambton, 1981; Milani, 2004). When one Imam dies, his chosen son
inherits and is entrusted with the ‘special knowledge’ of the scriptures and mysteries of the
faith. Such knowledge is, thus, denied to ordinary individuals, and no Imam possesses
knowledge independent from his predecessor or, logically, from the Prophet. In this sense,
the Prophet’s knowledge becomes the source of unrivalled authority for Imams. This raises
questions on the relation between the institution of prophecy and the Imamate with respect to
the issue of ‘knowledge.’ I will look at this problem in the two texts under study.
The first question raised is whether the Imam is entitled to change or alter the nature
and scope of the knowledge that he inherits. The prevailing view within the Imami theology
stresses on the immutable nature of this knowledge and that Imams cannot hold more
knowledge than the Prophet. The rationale is that any action to this effect would disrupt the
procession of authority that descends from the Prophet to his successors. This rationale is
unequivocally manifest in Khomeini’s assertion, “inescapably, the flow of laws and God’s
decrees is not confined to the Prophet’s time; this course must continue after the Prophet as
well” (p. 134). To achieve this, he suggests, God has to designate a successor “who knows
His and the Prophet’s word in its entirety and word-by-word” (p. 134). He declares that
these qualifications were present solely in Ali, the first Imam. The same rationale applies to
circumstances following the demise of the first Imam. This approach is anchored in two
interconnected arguments in shi’ite theology: (a) the Imam who personifies the Prophet’s
knowledge is inferior to the Prophet in terms of knowledge; nevertheless, (b) in principle the
Imamate is identical to that of the principle of prophecy.
Hakamizadeh, on the other hand, rids the Prophet of possessing the power of ‘special
knowledge’ and shrinks his status to that of the everyday individual: “according to the
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Qur’an, the Prophet is a human being like others who has no knowledge of the unseen, does
not cure the blind, and is not the provider of all needs. The only thing that makes him
different is the revelation” (p. 16). Muslims believe that God’s words are transmitted to
humanity through ‘revelation.’ His will is inscribed in the heart of Prophets ever since
Adam. In this sense, shi’ite theology deems revelation and prophecy as two complementary
mechanisms that impart divine law to humans, and the cycle of revelation and prophecy
reaches its closure with Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam (Bill, Williams, and Alden, 2002;
Nasr, Dabashi, & Nasr, 1988). Implied in Hakamizadeh’s argument is that in the absence of
the knowledge of the unseen—or ‘special knowledge’ in Imami shi’ism—something else
must be present to denote the prophecy of Muhammad. This is where revelation comes into
play. In the above passage, Hakamizadeh dislodges ‘special knowledge’ as the source of
authority and replaces it by revelation, a point that the shi’ite orthodoxy never negates.
However, since ‘revealed knowledge’ cannot be hereditary, the knowledge of textual traces
of the revelation, the Qur’an and hadith, supposedly can. But then the question becomes, if
the Prophet lacks ‘special knowledge’ to transmit to his descendants, how can Ali inherit it?
This leads to the next issue that further problematizes the doctrine of the Imamate as
represented in the texts under study.
The manner in which knowledge is acquired, mobilized, and communicated are
cardinal concerns related to the concept of knowledge, and appropriately applicable to the
case of the Imamate. Intriguingly, both authors are either silent or implicit on this subject.
As the above quote indicates, Hakamizadeh rejects the notion of ‘special knowledge;’
therefore, he shears the concept of the Imamate from one of its most essential elements. Ipso
facto, one might conclude that from this point it is only a short step before Hakamizadeh
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discards the very concept of the Imamate. This matter will be addressed later in this chapter.
As for Khomeini, he seems to be in a state of double bind on this question.
As a member of the shi’ite hierocracy, Khomeini is bound up in the doctrine of the
Imamate; hence is his belief in the inevitability of the transhistorical and inherited knowledge
of the Imam. The Imami shi’ite theology, for the most part, postulates that the corpus of the
knowledge that is transmitted by the Prophet is immutable; therefore, there is no difference
between the nature and scale of the Prophet and Imams’ knowledge (Kohlberg, 1988). On
the other hand, as a scholar and practitioner of the shi’ite jurisprudence, Khomeini is
expected to learn that the acquisition of knowledge is a cumulative process and appreciate the
provisional and uncertain status of knowledge as it is embedded in cultural and discursive
practices. Thus, it might be unavoidable that an Imam discards some elements of the
knowledge passed on to him by the previous Imam (s) and thus by the Prophet. Logically,
this leads to the idea of the superiority of the Imam over the Prophet in the domain of
authority—an idea unsettling to orthodox shi’ism. As noted above, in his text, Khomeini
does not doubt the vision of the Imam’s unchanging and unalterable ‘special knowledge’.
But he shuns from addressing whether, in the process of transmission, an Imam can add to
the knowledge inherited from the previous Imam. This issue has led to a long and divisive
controversy in the history of shi’ite thought (Kohlberg, 1988). Given that doubt is the motor
of reason, and despite that Khomeini constantly associates faith with reason, in the above
dialectical paradigm of faith and doubt—‘special knowledge’ versus historicist knowledge—
he chooses to represent not doubt but Truth, the eternal Truth.
While Khomeini refrains from addressing the status of the Imam’s knowledge in this
text, he is quite explicit about the Imam’s inferior authority: “Imam does not issue a decree
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on his own … all his rules come from the Prophet whose injunctions, in turn, derive
completely from God. So, with the demise of the Imam, God’s laws don’t die” (p. 164). In
other words, the Imam does not have an independent hold on the embodiment of authority;
that is, the issuance of decrees. He simply follows God’s order. Khomeini, on the one hand,
assents to the shi’ite hierocracy that places the Imamate by the side of the principle of
Prophecy on doctrinal classification. On the other hand, he significantly limits the Imam’s
authoritative power. Khomeini tends to fill this authoritative vacuum with the clergy, an
issue that is going to be the subject of my analysis later in this study.
Prudential Dissimulation Versus Tactical Dissimulation (Taqiyya)
The practice of dissimulation or concealment of beliefs is not alien to human
behavior. It is included in wide-ranging religious teachings, political handbooks, and
ideological manuals. The rationale that necessitates the act of dissimulation lies in the
common-sense norm of self-preservation. In Islam, the practice of dissimulation is known to
be a normative behavior associated in large part with shi’ism. The formulation of this
practice is credited to the fifth and sixth shi’ite Imams, and by virtue of centuries of
commonplace practice, it has developed into a fundamental of shi’ism (Arjomand, 1984;
Enayat, 1991; Kohlberg, 1975). The development of Taqiyya, I will argue, is a logical
corollary of the doctrine of the Imamate. By definition, the Imamate is conceptualized by the
sixth Imam to give Muslims access to a transhistorical truth. While it bears a tinge of private
judgment and personal longings, and providence of its author, in a deeper sense it is an
expression of historically rooted social, political, cultural, and discursive configurations of
the time.
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To elaborate, within decades following the death of the Prophet, the Arab-Muslim
community spread its supremacy over much of the Middle East from underdeveloped
peripheries to more developed central areas. With the conversion of non-Muslim populations
(Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian) to Islam, new communities emerged, within which
Arabs and non-Arabs together advanced the reach of the Islamic empire and culture. This
Islamization of the Middle East kept the old social and institutional structures unbroken
while representing them with a new discursive shape. According to Lapidus (1991), the
Islamization of the Middle East “seems to have infused inherited institutional forms with a
new vocabulary, concepts and value preferences, and a new definition of personal, social,
and political identity” (p. 121). Through this process, Islamic discourses were constructed to
define, rationalize, and legitimize the emerging institutional forms. Similarly, novel elites
began to surface and eventually dominate the religious and political spheres of Arab
societies. The new communities did not, however, form a unified and monolithic block.
Rather, they “embodied, not one but a number of conflicting orientations” (Lapidus, 1991, p.
121). Among them, the sunni and shi’ite groups constituted the two major orientations. In
their construction of the discourse of succession, both groups laid emphasis on power
relations: each orientation linked its discursive practice with contestation over power. Each
group attempted to rule-in its own truth about the post-prophetic governance and limit and
discredit that of the other. In this dynamic, it was the sunni discourse that possessed the
power to make itself true; and this making, in large part, resorted to a path of violence. The
interplay of faith and power ultimately pushed the shi’a orientation to the periphery. Under
these circumstances, distantiation from politics became an imperative practice for the shi’ite
group. The formulation of the theory of Imamate by the sixth Imam legitimized this recourse
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and transformed shi’ism into an organized sect (Arjomand, 1984; Hodgson, 1955; Kohlberg,
1975).
The differentiation of the religious sphere from that of the political according to the
doctrine of Imamate accommodated the shi’ites with a norm of conduct that enabled them to
deal with their violent treatment by the ruling sunnis—political quiescence. The sixth Imam,
who personified this conduct, allowed his followers “to engage in normal intercourse with
the larger community, and to acquire property and possessions that have passed through
impure hands. The shi’ites were also permitted to serve the illegitimate government”
(Arjomand, 1984, p. 36). Under keen and heartless sunni vigilance, this practice could be
made possible solely by concealing one’s faith and this reflects on the state of affairs that
imports the conduct of Taqiyya. In the words of Jafri (1979), “thus arose the famous doctrine
of Taqiyya (dissimulation) on which Ja’far [the sixth Imam] put the utmost emphasis, raising
it almost to the status of a condition for Faith” (p. 298).
While disputing the English standard translation of Taqiyya as “dissimulation or
(expedient) concealment,” Enayat (1991) asserts, “both may be necessary to guard oneself
from physical or mental harm on account of holding a particular belief opposed to that held
by majority” (p. 175). Explaining the shi’ite’s perspective of Taqiyya, Enayat states:
The necessity of Taqiyya is based on a commonsense ‘counsel of caution’ on the part
of a persecuted minority. Since for the greater part of their history the Shi’is have
been a minority amidst the global Islamic community and have lived mostly under
regimes hostile to their creed, the only wise course for them to follow has been to
avoid exposing themselves to the risk of extinction resulting from an open and defiant
propagation of their beliefs (p.175).
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Hakamizadeh builds a direct link between the theory of Imamate and the practice of
Taqiyya. As explained above, he professes ambivalence over the validity of the Imamate,
but he seems unambiguous in discarding Taqiyya. Without an explicit reference to Taqiyya,
he frames his revulsion towards this practice in this manner:
There is a hadith from an Imam’s companion who says, I asked the Imam a question,
he answered. Another person came and asked the same question, the Imam answered
differently. The third person came and asked the same question, the Imam replied
differently again. Then, I asked the Imam that three shi’ites asked you the same
question, but how come you responded differently? The Imam responded, I wanted
them to disagree with each other so that nobody could identify the ‘truth’ (p. 14).
Hakamizadeh adds that according to the account present in other hadiths, “the Imam replied
that this was the authority that has been bestowed upon us” [Imam] (p. 14). Ostensibly
baffled, Hakamizadeh also indicates, “What can I say about truth, if these hadiths are true?!!”
(p. 14).
Furthermore, Hakamizadeh equates Taqiyya with a conservative and prudential
attitude and about this he is quite explicit:
They [the ulama] say that the Prophet avoided talking about the truth with people
since he was afraid that they would not follow his command. However, the Qur’an
and the Prophet’s life are the proof of the fact that the Prophet never practiced
conservatism (or Taqiyya) … The Qur’an is the proof of the Prophet’s truthfulness”
(p. 14).
In other words, the relation of the Prophet to the Qur’an is underpinned by the practice of
truth, which leaves no open space to fill with Taqiyya.
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Khomeini, on the other hand, puts forward a vigilant defense of Taqiyya. Based on
his customary method, he relates Taqiyya to rational mindfulness: “This is a clear dictate of
rationality, and anybody who even possesses minimal intellect understands that Taqiyya is
God’s preemptory diktat; it is deemed that a person without Taqiyya has no faith” (p. 129).
His definition of Taqiyya hints at the prudential attribute of this conduct. He suggests, “the
practice of Taqiyya means that individuals need to talk untruthfully or act contrary to the
principles of the Shari’a in order to protect their life, wealth, or chastity” (p. 128).
Khomeini employed the context of Taqiyya to validate the Prophet’s “conservative”
stance toward an equivocal mentioning of the Imamate in the Qur’an: “Earlier in this
discourse, we proved that the Prophet evades the explicit mention of the term Imam in the
Qur’an because he fears that after him people would alter the Qur’an or create rift among
Muslims, which may result in Islam’s disappearance [my emphasis]” (p.130). This
explanation manifestly marks an effort to place the Prophet’s action within the confines of
Taqiyya. Subtly, it insinuates a shift in the impulse of exercising Taqiyya; that is, the
impersonal providential preservation of faith takes center stage at the cost of decentering the
drive for personal safeguarding—protecting personal life, wealth, and chastity. At first
glance, this shift seems to be simply rhetorical. But, as I will discuss later, in actuality,
Khomeini was able to cause a discursive shift whose material effects, nearly four decades
later, profoundly shaped the trajectory of sociopolitical dynamics in Iran.
In Unveiling the Secrets, Khomeini unequivocally fosters the acceptance of the status
quo or relations of power that were in place. To elaborate, he states that the ulama have no
intention to aim at political power. In his word, “no faqih has ever said or written that being
the Shah or the monarchy is our right” (p. 186). He even specifies that “this class [the
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clergy] has never opposed the foundation of the monarchy; rather, many of the ulama have
cooperated with various Shahs” (p. 187). He alleges that there are individuals who “are
trying to provoke the government’s distrust towards the clergy; there is nothing but devilish
purpose and sedition behind these acts, which intend to create strife and disrupt the unity on
which the foundation of the country is based” (p. 187). Needless to say, in 1979 Khomeini
mobilized a massive political action to eradicate the very monarchical government that he
allegedly supported. Between embracing the foundation of the state and obliterating that
foundation, and between professing the mosque/state divide and rising above that divide lies
an enormous moral gap that supposedly only Taqiyya can traverse. Practicing Taqiyya is an
act of vigilance, and Khomeini seems to be conscious when he preaches on this recourse after
seizing power in 1979:
Before the Revolution, I believed that once the revolution succeeded then there would
be honest people to carry out the task. … Therefore I …stated the clergy would leave
and attend to their own profession. But I later realized that … most of … [the honest
people] were dishonest. … I later stated … that I had made a mistake. This is
because we intend to implement Islam. Accordingly … I may have said something
yesterday, changed it today, and will again change it tomorrow. This does not mean
that simply because I made a statement yesterday, I should adhere to it. Today I am
saying that … the ulama should continue with their jobs 18
This instance of Taqiyya represents a curious aberration from shi’ite orthodoxy. A
comparative look at Taqiyya as enacted by Imam Ja’far elucidates this digression. For Ja’far,

18

Broadcast on 11 December 1983, Khomeini made these remarks while discussing
Guardian Council tasks. I borrowed the quotation from Brumberg (2001).

105
Taqiyya works in tandem with ‘special knowledge’ that is solely privy to the Imams, and
“this affair [the Imamate and the esoteric meaning of religion] is occult and veiled by a
covenant, and whoever unveils it will be disgraced by God”. 19 In this sense, as a means to
immunize the divine knowledge against unrefined publicity, on the practice of Taqiyya, the
sixth Imam cultivates a work of theological virtue. Moreover, on the scale of importance and
urgency, he gives precedence to the task of developing the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence.
He was in need of his companions to move forward with this task; therefore, he cautioned
them to hide their religious identity to survive the brutal suppression of shi’ites by sunni
governments (Arjomand, 1984; Kohlberg, 1975). In this stance, Ja’far prescribes Taqiyya as
a practice of prudence. In the practice of Taqiyya, Ja’far finds a rationale to steer the
institution of religion clear of the institution of the state. He even rejected the proposition by
the existing caliph that “espoused the restoration of theocratic caliphate under any branch of
the house of the Prophet” (Arjomand, 1984, p. 34). In the binary of power/knowledge Ja’far
sides with knowledge.
In this binary, however, Khomeini sides with power. For him, Taqiyya suits, for the
most part, the hidden intent for power. In contrast to Ja’far, he uses Taqiyya to fuse the two
institutions of religion and state. Khomeini’s version of Taqiyya bears no prudential attribute
of dissimulation; it reflects, instead, in the words of Kolakowski (1999), “a built-in necessary
of lying” (p. 234), hence a ‘tactical or political dissimulation’ of belief. Khomeini uses
Taqiyya for what Greenblatt (1993) articulates, “the pretense necessary to achieve an
agreeable social presence … idea of the sugarcoated pill of political virtue” (p. 163). As a
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result of this pretense and the semblance of virtue created by Khomeini’s Taqiyya
unenlightened individuals and masses embraced his ascendency to power in 1979.
Conclusion
I shall address the mode by which the theory of Imamate is represented by our
authors. Despite approaching the Imamate with a veil of doubt and uncertainty, Hakamizadeh
demonstrates a touch of what might be called an involuntary take (prostration) on the
Imamate when he views it through the eyes of history. He asserts:
Once, due to political exigency and for the sake of Iran’s independence and protection
from its two arch enemies-the Ottomans and Uzbeks- it became necessary to mobilize
people by means of mourning, pilgrimage, visiting Imams’ shrines, etc. But, these
politics and politicians are long gone, and the modern world has made enormous
progresses; however, we are still investing in these innovations and nobody knows
how long we have to be preoccupied with them” (p. 15).
It should be noted that practices such as ‘mourning’, ‘pilgrimage’, and ‘visiting Imams’ etc.,
represent popular ritual conducts to commemorate and venerate a few selected Imams of the
shi’a. Therefore, in shi’ite vernacular, these conducts allude to and is intermingled with the
principle of Imamate.
In this statement, Hakamizadeh briefly explains the time-bound unfolding of an
action, the practice of the Imamate, to unmask the ideological tenet that the shi’ite hierocracy
attaches to it. His ideological critique is simply tied up with an event— “to mobilize people
by means of mourning, pilgrimage, visiting Imams’ shrines”— and its consequences—“ we
are still investing in these innovations and nobody knows how long we have to be
preoccupied with them”— that come about in a particular historical episode. Thus, he pulls
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away from delineating the theory of Imamate per se. As if, he reduces the meaning of
Imamate to the presence and importance of historical agents who enact it and to stories in
which it is veiled. As quoted earlier in this chapter, Hakamizadeh, in general terms, faults
the actions of religious elites for converting the Imamate from a simple belief in messianic
role of Imams in the aftermath of the Prophet’s demise to a complex dogma that plays into all
facets of shi’ite theology. However, he evades criticizing the Imamate and characterizes it as
a historical exigency without offering any supportive factual evidences. In this sense, it is
fair to assume that he extends a contextual assent to this theory. Nevertheless,
Hakamizadeh’s text under study is not substantive enough to determine whether his assent is
an act of faith or merely an attempt to advance his polemical purpose. 20 In either case, this
implies that Hakamizadeh has not taken the short step that would have led him to discard the
entire premise and theory of the Imamate.
Khomeini, on the other hand, draws on a theological approach and represents the
Imamate in structural and institutional terms, rather than in narrative historical terms:
Despite their shortcomings, these rituals and ceremonies for commemorating martyrs
are the source of faith’s commands and ethics, and the flow of virtues and respects.
God’s faith and the divine laws that represent the very sacred shi’ite faith … have
been in place and will be as a result of these rituals, which in appearance are about
mourning; but, in truth, they are God’s rules and proliferation of faith…. Given that
shi’ites have always been a minority, if it was not for these institutions, which are
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among important institutions of our religion, shi’ism would have long disappeared.
(p. 163)
In this doctrinal formalist statement, Khomeini takes in stories and symbolism of the
Imamate to represent it as a system of abstract visions and relations. In this mode of
representation, he stresses on eternal structures and sanctifies the ritual, formal, and showy
display of these structures. He inverts Hakamizadeh’s take on the Imamate to disallow the
temporal embeddedness of the doctrine of Imamate. It is as if the Imamate, to borrow from
Greenblatt (2001), “had something to lose by history, as if any determinate location and time
would invalidate its claim to eternal efficacy, as if any record of struggle and process and
change would necessarily threaten its universal validity” (p. 80).
While Hakamizadeh depicts the Imamate as commonsensical story accessible to
everyday understanding, Khomeini represents it in a form of esoteric doctrine whose
understanding is the exclusive possession of the clerical elite. Khomeini, as we will see in
the next chapters, reflects on this doctrine as a means to relocate the clergy to the position of
center as the main agent of social change in contemporary Iran.
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Chapter 9
Third Discourse: The Clergy
The multifaceted issues that gather around the discourse of the clergy are entrenched
in the larger context of the doctrine of Imamate. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the
beginning of the discursive exchange between Hakamizadeh and Khomeini on the notion of
the clergy. In questioning the role of the clerical establishment, Hakamizadeh suggests that,
“today, according to our clergy, during the period of occultation [emphasis added] the jurist
[faqih] is the Imam’s successor…. If this vicegerency is for interpreting religious creeds,
obviously then, it differs from your [the clergy] purpose; and also if it is for governing and
guardianship (velayat), then there are going to be several shahs in each district and perhaps in
every house” (p. 17).
In his response, Khomeini instantly takes notice of the issue of the clergy and after a
relatively lengthy discussion on the state’s raison d’être confronts Hakamizadeh: “The
question of the mujtahids’ guardianship has been the subject of discussion among the ulama
since day one. This discussion includes the legitimacy of the ulama’s rulership and its
contour and scope” (p. 185). The dissection and analysis of the above statements demands in
the first place an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the ulama in
Islam in general and in shi’ism particularly.
In the early days of the formation of the Muslim community, religious and political
institutions cohered under the unique leadership of the Prophet. The Prophet possessed the
religious and political authority of the community as a whole and embodied the umma.
Because of his religious authority, loyalty to the Prophet along with membership in the
Muslim community constituted the necessary ingredients to manifest belief in Islam; and as
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Lapidus (1975) observes, “in this case, religious and political values and religious and
political offices were inseparable” (p. 346). This original sociopolitical arrangement
continued in the absence of the Prophet under the leadership of his successor, the Caliph.
The Caliph consequently displaced the Prophet as the personification of the umma and
embodied the fusion of religious and political aspects of social life.
However, this structural unison ceased to function after about four hundred years of
the Islamic empire. The management of an unrestrained policy of imperial expansion forced
Islamic rulers to concentrate their efforts on the political side of communal life (Arjomand,
1979). The concentration of political tasks in the hands of a ruler who was also in charge of
religious undertakings did not aptly serve the interests of an expansionist state. Thus, the
political affairs of the Islamic polity became less the focus of the Caliph, and as Lapidus
(1975) suggests:
From the middle of the tenth century effective control of the Arab-Muslim empire
had passed into the hands of generals, administrators, governors, and local provincial
lords; the Caliphs had lost all effective political power. Governments in Islamic lands
were henceforth secular regimes – Sultanates – in theory authorized by the Caliphs,
but actually legitimized by the need for public order. Henceforth, Muslim states were
fully differentiated political bodies without any intrinsic religious character, though
they were officially loyal to Islam and committed to its defense. (P. 364)
In other words, religion and politics as well as religious and political communities
began to develop along two differentiated paths. Thus, in this period, a relatively
independent institution of religion incorporating groups of learned Muslim scholars – the
ulama – gradually emerged. The ulama assumed the function of religious advisers and
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regulators of the umma. They put together local apparatuses of administrators, educators,
and judges whose preoccupations, for the most part, focused on the practice of Islam. In this
sense, a communal identity separate from the caliph began to take shape within the tradition
of Islam. According to Arjomand (1979), “with the growth of religious activities
independent of the state and the emergence of the Schools of Jurisprudence, the Caliphate
was no longer the sole identifying symbol of Islam. In fact, the emergence of the ulama as a
distinctly religious elite marked the disjunction between the caliphate and the institution
embodying the Islamic Revelation” (p. 63).
In shi’ism, the ulama emerged in conjunction with the formation of shi’ite sectarian
communities during the imamate of the fifth and sixth Imams. Under these Imams’
guidance, shi’ite religious elites initiated the task of compiling shi’ite rites, hadiths, and
practices. The ulama gradually developed a shi’ite law distinctive in its understanding of the
Qur’an and hadiths, in which the notion of the Imamate constituted a key component.
In their characterization of the clergy, both Hakamizadeh and Khomeini implicitly
associate the clergy with the notion of Imamate, while explicitly linking the clerical function
to an era that is singled out by the absence of the Imamate – the ‘period of occultation.’ Both
authors maintain the occultation as an a priori assumption on which their engagement with
the discourse of the clergy is based. This makes it all the more necessary to elaborate on the
concept of occultation and its implications for the evolution of the institution of the clergy
consequent to its consolidation in the tenth century.
The Concept of Occultation
Upon the death of the 11th Imam in 874 without leaving an apparent heir, the cycle of
successive Imams reached its end and the chain of transmission suffered a rupture, which
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forced the shi’ite establishment to undergo a major crisis of succession. In approaching the
crisis, the shi’ite community laid out diverse solutions ranging notably from chiliastic
extremism to more rationally oriented prescription. As a result, the Imami community
submerged into sectarian divisions (Arjomand, 1984, 1979; Sachedina, 1981). Some sects
opted for the chiliastic belief in either the immortality of the eleventh Imam or his imminent
return as the ‘redresser of wrongs’ (the Qa’im). Against these orientations, a few groups
promulgated the idea that the Imam had actually left behind a son who went into hiding to
avoid the tyranny of the ruling Abbasids (750-1258) and to save the institution of the
Imamate. Sachedina (1981) presents this stand as the earliest formulation of the shi’ite
doctrine of the messianic hidden Imam by the Imamis who maintain that
There is a proof (hujja) for God on earth among the descendents of al-Hasan b. Ali
Askari [the eleventh Imam]. God’s decree is in effect and he is the legatee (wasi) of
his father in accordance with the method laid down by the previous traditions…. All
that has been mentioned above is attested by the reports of the two Sadiqs [the fifth
and sixth Imams]…. The earth cannot be void of a hujja. If the Imamate disappeared
from the world even for a moment, the earth and its inhabitants would perish….
We have conformed to the past tradition and have affirmed the Imamate [of
al-Hasan al-Askari] and accept that he is dead. We concede that he had a successor,
who is his own son and the Imam after him until he appears and proclaims his
authority…. God allowed this to happen because the authority belongs to him….
It is also unlawful to mention his name or ask his whereabouts until such time
as God decides. This is so because if he is protected, fearful, and in concealment, it is
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by God’s protection. It is not up to us to seek for reasons for what God does. (P. 4950)
According to the doctrine of the occultation, the concealment of the twelfth Imam
took place through two processes, which impacted the formulation of this doctrine with
divergent implications. The first process, the lesser occultation, started immediately after the
death of the eleventh Imam in 874 and lasted until 940. During this period, the Imam, while
in temporary concealment, was in contact with his viceroy at the time, who on his behalf was
in charge of the management of the affairs of the Imami community. Initiated by the sixth
Imam, the Imams had assigned plenipotentiaries as their deputies to assist them with the
administration of the mundane of their communities. Throughout the first occultation, these
representatives remained in the position of vicegerency and exercised authority over the
shi’ite communities on the Imam’s behalf (Arjomand, 1984).
Four deputies managed the era of the lesser occultation. The impact of the second
and third deputies on the adoption of the theory of the occultation by the Imami community
is noteworthy. Coming from a wealthy family in Baghdad – the Nawbakhti family – both
deputies, a father and son, had the respect and support of the elites of the shi’ite community.
Arjomand (1979, 1984) maintains that during their tenure, the Nawbakhti father and son
were able to win over the opposition of the Imami chiliastic extremism and develop the
Imami theological dogma of the occultation. Also, by overcoming the plebian resistance of
the extremist dissidents, “the aristocratic outlook of the prominent shi’ite families prevailed
in the shi’ism of the ensuing three centuries” (Arjomand, 1984, p. 41).
It is the second process, the greater occultation, however, that marked the turning
point in the formulation of the doctrine of occultation. This process comes with the
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vicegerency of the fourth and last agent, al-Samarri. It is documented that in 940, six days
before his death, al-Samarri put forth an authoritative command from the Hidden Imam
stating that his occultation was deemed to continue until the end of time (Arjomand, 1984,
1979; Kohlberg, 1976; Sachedina, 1981). According to this ordinance, the Hidden Imam
declares to al-Samarri:
So take care of your affairs and do not appoint anyone in your place, since the
complete occultation has taken place. I will not appear until God permits me to do so
and that will be after a long time and after the hearts become hard and the earth is
filled with wickedness. In the near future there will be those among my followers
who will claim to have seen me…. Whoever claims seeing [me] before the rising of
Sufyani and the [cosmic] battle cry [Saiha – signs of the end of time] is deceitful and
calumnious. (Arjomand, 1984, p. 43; Sachedina, 1981, p. 96)
The complete occultation implies that the cycle of the Imamate ends with the twelfth Imam;
with that the Imami shi’ism assumed the label of the Twelvers.
The doctrine of the occultation experienced an era of great theological polemics
between various shi’ite sects in the ninth and tenth centuries. In the course of these debates,
the dogma became further rationalized and eventually incorporated into the doctrine of the
Imamate. As Arjomand (1984) indicates, “Thus from the tenth century onwards, the
development and systematization of the shi’ite sacred literature rested on the premise of the
absence of the Imam, with little provision being made for his return” (p. 44). It is now
evident that the idea of occultation intended to put an end to the crisis of succession
subsequent to the death of the eleventh Imam, in which shi’ite extremism found an opening
to consolidate its position within the shi’ite community.
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At the same time, the dogma of occultation raises the prospect of another potential
crisis: the relation between the religious and temporal authority in the Imami community
during the period when the Imam is not physically present. It is within this context that the
role and function of the clergy assumed prominence, thus becoming the subject of polemical
arguments among the ulama, extending to the present time to include Hakamizadeh and
Khomeini.
Ulama and Social Division of Labor
The point of contention between the two discourses revolves around the dimensions
and scope of the ulama’s function. Hakamizadeh, at first, gives an implied recognition to the
notion of social differentiation of labor. To make his point, he suggests, “every person is
made for a specific task. The work of the clergy and the practice of governance are like the
work of a physician and a mechanic; that is devoid of interdependence” (p. 18). That is, he
limits the ulama’s occupation to a specific domain, “the cleric means the doctor of the
soul…. The job of a cleric is to grapple with beliefs, to get brains rid of superstitions, and to
cleanse the faith from lies” (p. 20). Hakamizadeh makes this specification with no reference
to the notions of Imamate and the occultation. Instead, he positions the clergy’s task within
the realm of the everyday mundane through which lay people live, thus relieving the
functional specialization of the clergy from mystified legitimation. He wonders at such a
cleric “who can prepare himself to take on daily tasks and become accountable for his
family’s subsistence” (p. 20); because, as he argues, “the cleric is God’s creature too and not
outside of the natural law … he learns his own lesson when he sees that wealth and respect
reach those clerics who pretend to be more credulous, or when he sees that those clerics who
fabricate lies, while on the altar, receive more audience” (p. 20).
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Khomeini, however, portrays a complicated and somewhat paradoxical image of the
function of the clergy. On the one hand, he demonstrates a tinge of awareness of the
normative implications of occupational specialization. He declares, “when we claim that the
government and guardianship in this period [occultation] is the ulama’s responsibility, we do
not imply that the faqih functions as the shah, the minister, the military, and the garbage man
at the same time” (p. 185). On the other hand, he continues to urge on the function of general
guardianship for the ulama. He associates the clerical task with being a proxy for the Hidden
Imam. In this sense, the clergy’s function assumes universal legitimacy and, accordingly,
blurs the boundaries of the differentiated spheres of social labor, especially the religious and
the political. To promote his argument, he draws on an authoritative hadith from Shaykh
Saddooq, one of the major mujtahids of the tenth century, who states, “for every incident you
must refer to the narrators of our hadiths because they personify my proof and I am, in turn,
God’s proof” (p. 188). This leads Khomeini to conclude, “during the occultation, for all
their affairs [my emphasis], people are obliged to refer to the narrators of the hadiths and
obey their ordinance because the Imam has made them his own proof and successor” (p.
188). It is no secret that the “narrators of the hadiths”, in this insinuation, are the ulama.
Furthermore, Khomeini refers to another hadith from the same mujtahid and asserts, “it is
clear that those who narrate hadith and the Prophet’s traditions are his successor; therefore,
they are entitled to whatever the Prophet is entitled to, including obedience, velayat and
rulership” (p. 188). And he finalizes his argument by making a conspicuous induction, “it
appears … that the execution of all affairs should be in the hands of the ulama, who are
conscious of what is permissible and what is banned” (p. 188). It seems that his initial
recognition of religiopolitical separation was a tactical manipulation of this traditional shi’ite
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dogma. In reality, the construction of the Islamic Republic of Iran three decades later reveals
his true contempt for this principle.
How do these functions, assigned distinctly by Hakamizadeh and Khomeini to the
clergy, operate? While both authors claim to have based their explanations on reason and
rational thinking, unsurprisingly, they offer two different operations. Consistent with his
vernacular rhetoric and in an astoundingly forthright manner, Hakamizadeh outlines in
unrefined language his recommendations through several observations of the status of the
shi’ite clerical establishment. He complains that the ulama’s status has been so inflated that
they would hardly accept any idea of reform. He maintains that, “on the surface, this issue
[inflated status] may be beneficial to the ulama, but in fact it has caused them great harm,
surely because when the way of critique and questioning is blocked, the way of corruption
opens up” (p. 19).
The Ulama’s Autonomy and Hierocratic Reform
The idea of reform of the clergy gains particular weight in Hakamizadeh’s discourse.
He believes that reform must come from within the clerical institution: “reform must be done
by the ulama themselves, not by Reza Shah or Nader Shah” (p. 21). However, only an
autonomous institution of ulama would be capable of accomplishing this important task, an
autonomy that, according to Hakamizadeh, is quite alien to the actual status of the clergy.
Hakamizadeh faults two crucial institutional practices in shi’ism that have been in place since
the 18th century for the absence of clerical independence.
The first practice instituted a functional hierarchy between religious elite and ordinary
followers. In this hierarchical relationship, based on certain qualifications, a jurist becomes
the source of emulation for ordinary people who are seeking legal guidance. In the second
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practice, under the guise of religious tax, the followers would allocate part of their income to
the jurist whom they emulate for their religious duties. These two practices created a shi’ite
ecclesiastical enterprise with: (a) extensive juristic authority; and (b) massive financial
resources independent from the state. In Hakamizadeh’s view, this hierarchical arrangement
has become a site of corruption in the shi’ite hierocracy. He states, “another epithet added to
the clergy that has caused this institution to thrust into corruption is that today the clergy
receive their income directly from people and as a result they feel obliged to talk in
accordance with or at least not against popular longings” (p. 20). He contends that this
practice “has two major shortcomings. First, the general public has many wrong ideas, which
do not tend to last. But they become a conviction when the ulama approve them or maintain
silence about them…. Second, instead of people emulating the ulama, the ulama would
emulate the masses” (p. 20). The distantiation between the ulama and general public
suggested in the above statement seems to imply that the ulama have no scope for populistic
practice. But for Hakamizadeh the rejection of populism does not necessarily entail a push
into elitism. While the members of the clergy are entrusted to seize upon the truth, they are
enslaved by the necessities of everyday existence such as market pressure, similar to
members of the masses. As Hakamizadeh states, “if the clergy were not afraid of losing their
continued subsistence, these secrets would no longer have to remain in secrecy” (p. 21).
Thus the question becomes, what is the source of income for the clergy?
Generally, Hakamizadeh rejects the idea that the interpretation of religious rulings
should be compensated by materialistic incentives. He equates the interpreters of religious
rulings, the ulama, with government agents who receive their income from the state: “these
individuals [the jurists] can receive their salaries not from people, but rather from the
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national budget, as we know that the state employees work for people but get paid by the
state” (p. 21). Hakamizadeh, however, is aware that this practice interferes with the
independence of the institution of the clergy: “Make no mistake, it would be wrong for the
state to interfere with clerical affairs” (p. 21). To resolve this paradox, he proposes to use
religious endowments, under simultaneous supervision of the clergy and the state, for
providing the ulama’s livelihood (p. 21).
In the meantime, for Hakamizadeh the arrow of independence between the state and
religion must run both ways. He even denies the ulama a consultative role with the
government. He urges as follows:
Some people say that there is no need for the ulama to head the government. Rather,
the rulership can remain in the hands of whoever is the ruler, but the ruler should
obtain the ulama’s approval like many kings have done and as is written in the Iranian
Constitution. I would say that … if this recommendation is intended to improve the
nation’s affairs, it cannot actually happen because law and the parliament become
dependent on the ulama’s permission, and with the presence of the ulama the practice
of both law and the parliament won’t make any sense (see the section on government
and law)” (p. 18).
To elaborate his reasoning, Hakamizadeh identifies the role of the clergy as the
betterment of social life: “if the ulama could express what they know, our life and our faith
would be in a better situation” (p. 21). In Hakamizadeh’s discourse, however, this agency
does not emanate from the position of center. Rather, it is placed in the context of
commonplace practices by means of which ordinary people live their own lives independent
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from others. In such a discursive practice, the clergy loses its position of centrality in human
and social affairs: in other words, it is politically decentered.
Hakamizadeh’s marginalizing discourse does not go unnoticed by Khomeini’s keen
perception. He maintains, “those of you who try to weaken and discredit the clergy commit
the greatest treason to the country. When the clergy is undermined, the nation will suffer
from irreparable damages” (p. 202). Intensifying this perception, he defensively insists that,
“we know that you and the likes of you are targeting God’s ruling, reason, and the clergy;
that you are trying, even though in vain, to charge the ulama with your own or others’ faults;
hence to scare off people from them” (p. 214). With this perception in mind, Khomeini
shapes his response around counterclaiming every facet of Hakamizadeh’s discourse with an
underlying motif of bringing back the ulama to the center.
In several statements, Khomeini considers the welfare of the Iranian nation to be at
the locus of the clerical class. In an unmistakable manner, his rhetoric seeks to relocate the
clergy from the margin to the center. While his statements are dispersed, a close reading of
his text can depict a pattern of the ulama’s centrality as their common bedrock. As he
declares, “despite all flaws, imperfection, and despairs that mete out upon this class [the
clergy], their work for the betterment of the country and people is far more efficient than
hundreds of military regiments and police” (p. 202). With a special fervency, he links the
importance of the shi’ite hierocracy to the interest of the country and political management of
society: “alas, unreasonable people, a faithful country constitutes the heaven on earth, and
this can only be established by the clergy. Yet, even the actual impaired clergy, which straws
like you attempt to further undermine, is still silently running two-thirds of the country’s
affairs” (p. 202). He continues, “by means of the clerical force the preservation of the
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country’s independence and greatness on the face of foreign politics as well as the protection
of internal security and peace can be effectively provided” (p. 208). His rhetorical
articulation of the centering of the ulama reaches its climax in the following statement: “To
separate the hierocracy from the state is tantamount to separating head [my emphasis] from
body; this would cause the state to lose its hold on the nation’s independence and internal and
external security, as well as the exhaustion of the clergy” (p. 208). The crude analogical
equivalent of the term ‘head’ to the shi’ite hierocracy signifies the clergy as the site of
expediency and reason. Naturally, if this metaphor holds, the state must pay heed to the
clergy, just as the body responds to the orders of the head.
Khomeini does not hesitate to underpin his argument with theological legitimation.
He draws once again on his longstanding preconceived cliché and over-inflated form of
reasoning warning all men that he who judges the clergy judges the Prophet and God; he who
opposes the clergy opposes the Prophet and God:
The apostate is the one who denies God or the Unity of God, or denies the Prophet, or
denies any of the faith’s requirements … since the denial of the faith’s necessity
entails the denial of the Prophet. So, the rejection of an Islamic prerequisite results in
blasphemy as it leads to the denial of the Prophet…. In this sense, if somebody
affronts a cleric in the pretext that he is affiliated with the Prophet and if this person’s
action leads to the negation of the Prophet or animosity toward the Prophet and God,
he is an infidel not because of the act of slur, but due to his denigration of the
prophecy (p. 200).
Khomeini simply jumps from the power of God over human beings to the power of clergy
over subjects. He centers the ulama and totalizes them from that center.

122
Khomeini exemplifies the inclination toward the totalization of the clergy in his
various rejoinders to Hakamizadeh’s discourse on the clergy. He totalizes the ulama most
visibly and pervasively in approaching the clergy/state relations. He begins with a
reassertion of the common sense rationale of the raison d’être of the government. But for
him, this rationale contains certain exclusive qualifications. He states, “only God’s ruling is
entitled to possess and appropriate people’s life since He is the true owner of the universe
and all creatures” (p. 181). Consequently, as he observes, “nobody but God has the right to
rule and to legislate. The practice of reason demands that God has to determine who rules
and makes law” (p. 184). However, Khomeini reduces God’s ruling to that of a
transcendental subject who surpasses the influence of the environment and the shifting ways
of perceiving and thinking. In his words, “yet, law is the very Islamic law that is made by
God and is made for everybody and for all time. When the Prophet and Imam were present,
the responsibility of the state was theirs. But our discussion is about today” (p. 184). In
other words, on whom does the responsibility of the state lie when no Imam or Prophet is
present?
As mentioned above, for Khomeini, the responsibility rests on the guardianship of the
mujtahids. He begins with embodying ‘authority by God’ in an all-enclosing faith:
This law whose rule encompasses all related matters from general aspects of all
nations in the globe to specific dimensions of individuals’ lives to social life of
human beings to the fate of a person who lives in a solitary cave … is God’s law,
which is Islam…. I clearly announce that this [Islamic law] is a comprehensive law
that offers a blueprint for the process of government formation, adoption of the
system of taxation, enactment of penal and civil laws, and anything related to the
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regimen of the country from building military to establishing administrative apparatus
(p. 184).
While Khomeini affirms that the responsibility of putting law to work necessarily rests on the
government, he reminds the reader that the enactment of this law [Islamic law] is the Prophet
or Imam’s mandate. However, in the absence of the Prophet and Imam, responsibility for the
enactment lies within the general guardianship of the clergy.
From Theory to Practice
This leads the reader to wonder how the clergy will fulfill this responsibility. In an
unequivocal account, Khomeini exempts the ulama from the role of the Shah [ruler] and
asserts the clergy’s loyalty to the regime:
The mujtahids never opposed the country’s regime and did not dispute the
independence of an Islamic nation; and if they believe that the existing system of law
runs contrary to the divine’s law and perceive the government oppressive, they do not
oppose them and never will because of the belief that the presence of this rotten
regime is better than no regime” (p. 186).
In this statement, Khomeini classifies the clerical responsibility within the confines of the
existing regime and specifically delineates two institutions that according to him, “have been
formed by force”:
In this country the constitutional assembly [my emphasis], which is constituted by the
very people of this nation taking up the task of forming a government and selecting a
monarch. In the same manner, there is a parliament [my emphasis] that consists of
incompetent members who keep ratifying such bills that are adopted from Europeans
and have no compatibility with our domestic conditions” (p. 185).
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Khomeini, then, proposes his own blueprint, “what we say is that the constitutional
assembly should consist of the mujtahids who know the divine law, who are just and devoid
of ego … and the parliament should be formed of or supervised by pious jurists as the law
dictates” (p.185). The two proposed institutions constitute the core of the mechanism
through which the clergy can exercise their influence on the state. In them, one can fairly
observe the kernel of the structures that Khomeini established several decades later under the
Islamic Republic of Iran: the Assembly of the Leadership Experts, the Islamic Parliament,
and the Guardian Council. In this sense, his emphasis on the constitutional assembly and the
parliament in his discourse is deliberate and purposeful.
Thus, Khomeini’s quest for assigning the ulama to a unique center tends to totalize in
two distinct manners. First, for Khomeini, the process by which the constitutional assembly
and the parliament are formed is of no importance. It is, rather, the membership combination
of the two assemblies that assumes significance for him. In his discourse on the clergy, he
points to but does not object to the formation of the assemblies by force. Furthermore, he
never refers to an alternative democratic procedure for building his proposed institutions. If
we accept that “totalizations are always reductive” (Poster, 1993, p. 110), then Khomeini’s
blueprint for centering the ulama exposes a totalized discourse in which the legitimizing
function of the assemblies is reduced to the activities of a small number of selected
mujtahids. These mujtahids, as we shall see later in the discourse of law, do not make law;
rather, they exclusively engage in describing and interpreting the divine law.
Second, the totalizing link in Khomeini’s discourse takes a jurisprudential turn when
he draws on the concept of ijtihad to justify his approach. In shi’ite literature ijtehad is
construed as the practice of independent reasoning to extract law from the Qur’an, the hadith,
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and the tradition of Muhammad (Arjomand, 1984; Lambton, 1981). Khomeini states,
“ijtehad means the knowledge of such divine laws that relate to all social and private matters.
This practice that is extremely far-reaching cannot be mastered even in 50 years” (p. 204);
only few mujtahids whose “numbers may not exceed ten” (p. 203), can reach this level.
Khomeini associates the wellbeing of the Iranian nation with the work of these mujtahids
who are exquisitely privileged to superintend the “management of the faith affairs, operation
of divine laws, invitation of people to piety and truth, and deracination of treason, crime, and
lack of self-inhibition” (p. 205). In this connection, Khomeini totalizes the execution and
operation of the country at the locus of the clerical oligarchy.
For Hakamizadeh the fundamental mandate of religion is for the individual’s welfare.
For Khomeini, however, the quest for religion is tied to the quest for ‘total human liberation’
including the social and the private, the religious and the political; thus the mandate is
fundamentally implicated in the question of order. He states, “religion is necessary for the
organization of the government, the country, and life” (p. 236). Khomeini centers the
fulfillment of this quest on Islam:
Islam wants to triumph over the world in the interest of the world’s inhabitants….
Islam conquers the world to promote justice and to establish Gods’ wise rulings….
Islam’s intention to gain control of the world is to provide people with otherworldly
salvation … and to eradicate the roots of injustice and dictatorship (p. 229).
But in Khomeini’s discourse, knowledge of Islam is the distinctive property of a few
mujtahids; hence, alien to the shared knowledge of common people. Therefore, the locus of
Ijtehad – the knowledge of Islam – is the site of the authority of a handful mujtahids.
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Furthermore, as if the centering of the clergy is not enough to assure the ulama’s authority,
Khomeini totalizes it by envisioning an institutional framework for their authority:
It has become clear now that for putting our faith in action there is a need for
religious functionaries [the clergy]. The clerics’ voice would not bear effect unless
they form a unique party to accentuate their import…. We keep insisting that this
party be exclusively a clerical party whose superiority must be respected (p. 205-6).
On the basis of the prescribed totalization of the role of the clergy, Khomeini defends
the ulama’s financial dependence on popular religious taxes. At first, he draws a parallelism
between two models of taxation: the state and the hierocracy. The state tax is legal but
arbitrary: “the parliament ratifies a tax bill and implements it by force and spends it on
government employees … this is the characteristic of all governmental taxes, that is people
do not pay voluntarily” (p. 207). The religious tax is legitimate and non-arbitrary: “however,
with satisfaction, people will bring this godly tax to the center of knowledge and submit it to
those who are selected by God to distribute among the seekers of knowledge” (p. 207). He
intensifies his attack on Hakamizadeh and insists on this financial structural dualism:
We know what your problem is. You object to divine laws; you are averse to the
Qur’an; you are fighting conscience and reason; you are against the principal essence
because it disfavors your desires…. Alas this unreasonable perception considers
lawful and rightful the bill that is ratified in the parliament by a few scumbags … but
construes a godly law that people greet by their own free will as parasitical …
ignoring the fact that the ulama use this money to serve the country and nation” (p.
208).
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Khomeini seems to recognize the importance of the clergy’s financial independence from the
state in establishing the shi’ite hierocracy. He directs the reader to read his discussion on the
state in the next chapter in which he further elaborates on the issue of taxation.
In his response to Hakamizadeh who maintains that the clerical establishment is
intransigent to reform, Khomeini, at first, admits to the existence of corruption within the
clerical body. According to him, “we never say that this class is entirely good and pure and
in no need for improvement” (p. 201). Khomeini refutes Hakamizadeh’s assertion that the
clergy’s state of ego-inflation precludes “anybody from approaching this enterprise to reform
it” (p. 19). However, he agrees with Hakamizadeh to exclusively qualify the ulama for the
task of reforming the shi’ite establishment. While Hakamizadeh is quiet about the
qualifications of reformers, Khomeini privileges the exclusive knowledge and practice of
Islam as a necessary instrument for reforming the clergy. To him, a person who takes up the
task of reforming the hierocracy must possess several qualities:
(a) Expert knowledge on the science of religion; (b) piety and fondness for the clergy
as well as believing in the necessity of the clerical establishment for the country; (c)
intent that is pure and devoid of personal interest; (d) wisdom and common sense and
the ability to discern goodness from perversion; and (e) influence over clerical
establishment that enables him to implement his agenda” (p. 201-2).
Khomeini detects these qualities “solely in the high ranked ulama; therefore, others are
exempt from this task” (p. 202). In the case of reform within the clerical establishment
Khomeini finds another context to advance the objective of centering the clergy, an objective
that in his eyes is crucial for the formation of the shi’ite independent structure.
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Furthermore, Khomeini adamantly rejects Hakamizadeh’s suggestion that direct
religious tax makes the ulama the captive of populist sway. Khomeini seems to be well
aware of the threat of populism to the clerical centering: “the ulama have already told people
that no cleric even a high ranked one … can accept plebeian views against God’s laws
because once the ulama consent to the thoughts of common people they will lose their
position in the eyes of the same people” (p. 210). At every point in his text, Khomeini
unreservedly places emphasis on the elitist character of the clergy. In the preceding
statement he reasserts this belief and stratifies the shi’ite community into the elite and the
masses. His insistence, in the text (he repeats this appeal in his discourse on the state), to
embed clerical authority in extant political institutions such as constitutional assembly and
parliament indicates his aversion to an unmediated relationship between the state and
population. Khomeini, at the same time, demonstrates no affinity for constitutionalism:
Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional. It is not
constitutional in the current sense of the word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in
accordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the
rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the
country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Summa of the Most
Noble Messenger. It is the laws and ordinances of Islam comprising this set of
conditions that must be observed and practiced. Islamic government may therefore
be defined as the rule of divine law over men. 21
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In 1979, against the regime of the Shah, Khomeini was able to band together a wide range of
groups, associations, and organizations into one mass. After the fall of the Shah, while
Khomeini maintained his commitment to institution building, he employed this one “mass”
to severely restrict civil society and the public sphere in Iran, a practice that, as indicated by
Cohen and Arato (1997), characterizes populism.
Conclusion
Both authors share the belief that religion in general and Islam in particular are for the
betterment of the human condition. However, they differ significantly in explaining the
nature and usage of religion. Hakamizadeh sees religion as the inner impulse and an instance
of personal conscience that contributes to the ordering of the individual life. Within his
personal conscience, the individual possesses the faculty for understanding the truth of God’s
words in its own right. Consequently, in Hakamizadeh’s argument, as put aptly by Gay
(1966), “religious institutions [including the clergy] and religious explanations of events
were slowly being displaced from the center of life to its periphery” (p. 338).
In Khomeini’s discursive reasoning, the regulatory systems of Islam are provisioned
to manage the individual as well as the country’s affairs. The working of these systems is
contingent upon a particular way of knowing Islam. This specific knowledge of Islam allows
certain individuals – the clerical elite – to speak for Islam and to assume the position of
dominating subject while reducing others to the position of subordinating subject.
Khomeini’s discourse, in this way, exemplifies the constitutive role of knowledge and
practice in the formation of social relations of power. Khomeini transforms the message of
salvation into an ideology. In Khomeini’s vision, Islam assumes two major functions. First,
it serves as the defining concept in the procedure of perceiving, thinking, and speaking.
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Second, it develops into the principle that organizes systems of power relations. A historical
parallelism might give insight into Khomeini’s ideological grasp.
Not far from where Khomeini wrote his text in Russia, the Soviet State was
experimenting with the project of “total human emancipation” that according to Marx was
centered in the liberation of the working class. As Poster (1993) phrases it, Marx “finds the
key to human emancipation in the organization of labor and in the potential critical praxis of
the working class” (p. 108). Lenin, in turn, found the organization of labor too expansive and
ineffective, and thus narrowed the center of liberating activities down to the locus of the
leadership of a few professional revolutionaries. In the same manner, Khomeini positions his
version of human salvation at the locus of the leadership of a few clerics. As Kolakowski
(1977) observes, “in both cases the overriding ideology stressed the idea of social justice and
proclaimed that some chosen parts of mankind (a superior race or nation, a progressive class
or vanguard party) had the natural right to establish uncontrolled rule by virtue of historical
destiny” (p. 125).
Both Salvationist projects, the secular socialist and the sacred Mahdistic shi’ite,
produced the same result: the slippage of the theory of human emancipation into a totalizing
bureaucratic control, for orthodox Marxism in the form of the Soviet totalitarian state, and for
orthodox shi’ism, the absolutist Islamic Republic of Iran.

131
Chapter 10
Fourth Discourse: the State
In a well-known passage about the relation of the sacred to political power and
legitimacy of the temporal authority, Weber (1978) maintains, “everywhere state and society
have been greatly influenced by the struggle between military and temple nobility, between
royal and priestly following” (p. 1160). It is believed that all world religions make an effort
to establish their autonomous authority drawing from a transcendent deity, desacralize
temporal authority, and pave the way for the formation of hierocratic order. In this sense,
“they introduce an element of dualism into the normative order” (Arjomand, 1993a, p. 47).
The form and nature of the struggle between political and religious systems of domination
have been subject to variation depending upon who exercises the ultimate authority. Weber
(1978) depicts secular and clerical power relations in three separate ideal types “depending
on whether we deal with 1) a ruler who is legitimated by priests, either as an incarnation or in
the name of God, 2) a high priest who is also king – these are two cases of hierocracy – or
finally, 3) a secular, caesaropapist ruler who exercises supreme authority in ecclesiastic
matters by virtue of his autonomous legitimacy” (p. 1160). Weber (1978) defines hierocracy
as “an organization which enforces its order through psychic coercion by distributing or
denying religious benefits “(hierocratic coercion)” (p. 54). Murvar (1979) incorporates
Weber’s characterization of hierocratic organization into the framework of power relations
and redefines the term hierocracy as “a relatively independent religious power structure
coexistent with another (political) power structure within the same society or larger social
order (such as the medieval polity in the West)” (p. 78). It is logical to assume that as an
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independent structure, ecclesiastic power attempts to exercise its authority, and thus,
immerses itself into the relations of domination. As Eisenstadt (1973) explained:
On the whole the level and extent of political participation of the religious
organization and of their support to the political regimes of the historical bureaucratic
societies was greatly influenced by the extent of development of those of their
characteristics in which the autonomy of the religious field was most manifest….
Thus the extent to which the religious institutions were organizationally autonomous
greatly influenced the degree to which they could participate in the central political
struggle (p. 191)
Inescapably, as I explained above, this produces a tension between political and sacred orders
that, in the course of history, has resulted in the steady formation of a dualistic and diffused
structure of domination (Arjomand, 1984; Murvar, 1979). In Murvar’s account, a resolution
to this tension:
Is achieved by subordinating religious or priestly power to the political rulership or
by subordinating political to hierocratic rulership:
1- The unity of power structure under a political head – political monism
2- The unity of power structure under a hierocratic head – hierocratic monism (p. 79).
Yet in Iran, since the inception of shi’ism as the official religion in the 16th century,
the relation of power between the secular and the ecclesia has produced a distinct
institutional co-existence of domination between the state and hierocracy that has
significantly influenced the historical trajectory of the country until today. In their reflection
on the social forms and roles of the state, Hakamizadeh and Khomeini offer disparate
outlooks of this institutional arrangement. This chapter traces the distinctive features of both
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views focusing on several issues such as the notions of structural differentiation and
dedifferentiation, the shi’ite practice of improvisation and accommodation, displacement, cooptation, and absorption.
Hakamizadeh starts with charging official shi’ism with a bold claim: “today, our
religion says that every state before the stage of Parousia of the 12th Imam is illegitimate” (p.
23). Khomeini’s reaction to Hakamizadeh’s charge is twofold. He starts with a repetition of
his previous assertions that “the only rational state is God’s state” (p. 223), or only an
“official Islamic state can embody God’s state” (223), and “the duty of our actual state is to
follow the path of this Islamic state and it is upon our parliament to ratify laws that
incorporate the very God’s law” (p. 223). On these bases, Khomeini affirms that all states in
the pre-Parousia era are illegitimate and unjust. He further grounds his affirmation on an a
priori assumption that “no government before the coming of the 12th Imam tends to be
dutiful” (p. 225). He exempts, however, one state from this sweeping generalization: Ali’s
government (656-661) as the single legitimate and righteous state in the post-Mohammad era
(p. 225). In the second aspect of his answer, Khomeini rejects Hakamizadeh’s claim that
cooperating with illegitimate governments is an act of blasphemy, but he conditions the
validity of that cooperation as follows: “we say that working with the same dictatorial
government with the purpose of preventing corruption, reforming the country, and improving
people’s livelihood is not only a good deed but also sometimes obligatory” (p. 227). To
validate his point, Khomeini makes a reference to shi’ite Imams who “despite of the
oppressive character of the governments at the time, dealt with them and provided them with
advice, assistance, and resources in order to protect the Islamic nation” (p. 226). Needless to
say, in a different political context, Khomeini reversed his injunction as Abrahamian (1988)
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indicates “in his exile in Turkey from 1964 to 1965, in the section on ‘forbidden
occupations’ Khomeini forbade his followers from entering the service of ‘the tyrant’ in
positions in ‘the army, security forces, government of towns, etc.” (p. 147).
Hakamizadeh argues that the clerical establishment is well aware that classifying
governments under the general category of illegitimacy during the occultation is too absurd
and impractical to sell to the public (p. 23). Therefore, he insists, the clergy tries to
“camouflage its intent with different outfits” (p. 23). To him, the clerically camouflaged
objective consists of three fundamental structures, (a) “a jurist must be at the helm of the
state”; (b) “the state must be religious”; and (c) “the state must be run on justice” (p. 24).
Hakamizadeh rebuffs this camouflaged clericalism and renounces any correspondence
between the functions of a jurist and a political ruler. In his customary simple and casual
language, he draws on the complex theory of structural differentiation to prove his point. In
his phrase, “it is true that an engineer needs to know mathematics or a judge must be jurist”,
but “it is preposterous to say that an engineer must be a jurist for there is no relevance
between jurisprudence and geometry” (p. 23). He contends that a jurist cannot be a king
since the king must, first of all, “have an intrinsic talent for this job and then possess a good
historical and military knowledge” (p. 23). In making his case, he implicitly points to the
entrenched shi’ite tradition of the differentiation between state and religion: “furthermore, the
country is like a ship in need of a navigator to steer it to its destination, whoever this
navigator might be. Our clergy is not able or does not want [emphasis added] to take this
job; but life goes on and the country cannot move forward without a government [navigator]”
(p. 23).
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With this in mind, Hakamizadeh extends his objection to the vision of the Islamic
state. He maintains that, “they [the clergy] claim that state must be religious [Islamic]. If
they talk about a faith that coheres with life, then the idea is attractive. Any state will
welcome such a faith because religion is the best supportive constituent for the state” (p. 23).
Hakamizadeh, however, included a caveat “but if they talk about the faith that is available to
us today, I must say that it is similar to a page of a book that is only there to be seen; and if
one day they want to extract that page from the book and put it to work, this will be
detrimental to people’s life as well as the country’s interests” (p. 23). Thus it is fair to say
that in revealing the above clerical objectives, Hakamizadeh displays an explicit aversion to
hierocratic monism; but only ambiguously affirms political monism.
On the question of a ‘just state’, Hakamizadeh seems to be sympathetic: “they [the
clergy] say that government must be fair and evenhanded. Of course, this is a condition to
which no body objects” (p. 24). However, he is quick to portray the clerical profession as an
example of, in Greenblatt’s (1993) phrase, the “divorce between the tongue and the heart” (p.
228). He maintains that the clergy pleads to so-called “just government” to conceal their
subversive intent: “we all know that these sayings are just another excuse to disguise the
main ambition” (p. 24). He speculates that an all-inclusive religion as represented by the
ulama, must have “an agenda for a system of governing, which is considered the foremost
basis of life to which people refer all the time” (p. 24). For Hakamizadeh, being tacit about
the form of government cannot obstruct the fundamental hierocratic subversive principle for
which, “no matter how dutiful or undutiful, the existing state is an accomplice of oppression
and an associate to blasphemy” (p. 24).
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Thus, in his response to Hakamizadeh, Khomeini exposes this subversive intention
and idealizes the hierocracy’s preferred system of domination turning to a paradoxical
approach. On one hand, he reiterates his commitment to the status quo. On the other hand,
he tries to tilt the stability between two competing hierarchies of domination to the
hierocracy’s favor.
We discussed in the previous chapter Khomeini’s conservative penchant for
preserving the status quo; that is the status of patrimonial monarchism. According to
Arjomand (1984), “after the advent of Islam, the ruler could no longer be a god but before
long assumed the exalted title of the Shadow of God on Earth. Much of the political ethos of
sacral kingship was retained” (p. 7). Al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) the eminent Islamic theologian of
medieval ages, describes the above duality:
Know and understand that God has chosen two categories among mankind, and place
them above all others: the prophets and the kings. He has sent the prophets to His
creatures to lead them to him; and He chose the kings to protect men from one
another, making the common weal dependent on them…. The ruler is the shadow of
God on earth. 22
With the weakening of the position of the caliph and its eventual decline in the 11th century,
the notion of kingship, inherited from the pre-Islamic era was established and became an
instrument for the legitimacy of the temporal domination. In adapting the pre-Islamic
Persian theory of the state (Farah Izadi), the principal objective of the rulership of the
Shadow of God was to establish justice on earth. As Lambton (1962) eloquently articulates,
22
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The divergence in practice and theory from the ideal of the early caliphate increased
as time went on. From Sasanian sources [the last pre-Islamic Persian dynasty] came
the theory of the ruler as the Shadow of God upon earth; to this was assimilated the
Hellenistic idea of the philosopher-king. From both Sasanian and Greek sources
came the doctrine of the 'mean', which was to be achieved by the maintenance of
equipoise, and which tended to express itself in a tendency towards conservatism.
These borrowings, however, are permeated by Islam. Obedience to the just ruler, the
Shadow of God upon earth, is equated with obedience to God and His prophet. The
philosopher-king is interpreted to be the imam; and the law, which, in the theory of
the philosophers, preserves equipoise, as the shari’ a. Justice, rather than right
religion, became in the medieval theory the foundation of righteous government, but
the purpose of government remained the establishment of conditions in which, under
the just ruler, the right religion could be lived and Islamic virtues practised. The
ruler's task was to maintain the balance of mundane society giving each group within
society its due place and function. The reign of justice was seen, not in legal terms,
but as the harmonious relationship of society in a divinely appointed system, the
component parts of which were in a perfect equilibrium (p. 119).
Khomeini adheres to this worldview as noted in the discourse of the Imamate: “this class [the
clergy] has never opposed the foundation of the monarchy; rather, it is in the record that
many of the ulama have cooperated with various Shahs” (p. 187). Khomeini’s position in
support of the ethos of patrimonial monarchism converges with the normative postulate of
the traditional shi’ism translated in the differentiation of the two spheres of authority, the
political and the religious.
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However, in articulating his vision for the role and function of the clergy within this
dualist structuration, he moves away from the position of upholding the harmonious discord
between political and spiritual orders to favor hierocratic superiority. This shift is manifest
in Khomeini’s text in which he subjects “the just king” to the “divine law;” that is to the
Shari’a: “We never said and do not say that the Shah must be a faqih or he must have
knowledge of the jurisprudence. The Shah could be a military man but he must not
contravene the jurisprudence, which is the nation’s official law” (p. 233). In principle, by
differentiating the Shah and faqih in the first part of the preceding statement, Khomeini
seems to sanction the distinctness of the political and the religious. In this sense, he seems to
echo Tabatabai, one of the most authoritative shi’ite theologians and interpreters of the Koran
in contemporary Iran, who unequivocally limits the exercise of political authority to the
Prophet and Imams:
Therefore “those in authority” must refer to the individuals from the umma who are
infallible, whose recognition depends on the explicit designation of God or his
Messenger, and to whom obedience is incumbent. All this corresponds only to what
have been related from the Imams of the House of the Prophet, may peace be upon
them, as “those in authority”.
As for the assertion that “those in authority” are the rightly-guided caliphs, the
lords of the swords (emirs), or the ulama who are followed in their sayings and views,
it can be completely refuted.” 23
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In an analytical reversal, however, in the second part of the same statement,
Khomeini makes an effort at dedifferentiation of the twofold domain of authority subjugating
the authority of the political to that of the religious and converting the former into a property
of the latter, thus wholly contradicting Tabatabai. In this respect, he follows Najm al-Din
Razi, a Sunni theologian of the 13th century, who appropriates the earthly transient king for
service to the divine eternal king:
There are two classes of kings: Kings of the world and kings of religion. Those who
are kings of the world are the form for God’s attributes of favor and wrath, but they
are imprisoned within their form and unable to recognize their attributes…. As for
those who are the kings of religion, they are both the manifestation of the divine
attributes of favor and wrath and the recipients of that manifestation…. They have
penetrated to the mystery of the treasure of “he who knows himself, knows too his
lord,” (Qur’an 76:20) and have mounted as rightful owners the throne of eternal
kingship and abiding monarchy. 24
In major world religions and especially in Islam as a religion of law, the subjugation
of the political to the religious ethical prescription or in Luhmann’s version (1982), “the
identification of the political code with a moral code” (p. 187) represents a dedifferentiation
process. For Iran, as we will see later in this study, this process entails significant
consequences. In the same vein, Khomeini insists on the ‘uncompromising’ and
‘uncorrupted’ characteristics of the ulama that make them best fit to control the state
24
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apparatus. In this respect, he holds as exemplary the jurist Modarress who “was a pious
cleric and for a number of years assumed the speakership of the parliament…. After his
death, Modarress left no inheritance but a legacy of dignity and nobleness. We say that
people like Modarress must take the helm of the legislative, executive, and judiciary
branches of the regime” (p. 234).
Khomeini’s propensity to locate the ecclesiastical authority at the center of the
relation of power is not a matter of choice specified to one individual voice within the shi’ite
hierocracy. It is rather intrinsic to the logic of hierocracy, as vividly expressed by Weber
(1978):
Whenever hierocratic charisma is stronger than political authority it seeks to degrade
it if it does not appropriate it outright. Since political power claims a competing
charisma of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan; time and again
the most consistent ethico – hierocratic trends in Christianity have tried to impose this
view point (p. 1163).
However, when neither power structure is strong enough to eliminate or decisively
subordinate the other one, they co-exist and compromise by necessity. Weber (1978) is
direct on this point:
As a rule, priestly charisma compromised with the secular power, most of the time
tacitly but sometimes also through a concordat. Thus the spheres of control were
mutually guaranteed, and each power was permitted to exert certain influences in the
other’s realm in order to minimize collisions of interest; the secular authorities, for
example, participated in the appointment of certain clerical officials, and the priests
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influenced the educational institutions of the state. These compromises also
committed the two powers to mutual assistance (p. 1161).
As explained earlier, the belief in the principle of de jure illegitimacy of all pre-Parousia
governments does not prevent the ulama from seeking a concordat with the state. Once
established as an autonomous authority, the shi’ite hierocracy designed a “modus vivendi”, in
Calder’s (1982) phrase, with political power, on the basis of a de facto recognition of the
state. Calder maintains that the ulama made continuous efforts at exploring juristic
improvisation to accommodate the political structure of domination. He writes:
One of the most significant advances was made by Kashif al-Ghita' in the early
nineteenth century. Acting in response to the threatened Russian invasion of Persia,
and relying on the by now well-established theory of clerical authority he indicated
his support and sanction for the defensive activities of the Shah. He thus provided the
Shah with a temporary, partial and derived legitimacy (p. 6).
Calder postulates that Ghita’s decree set a precedent in the Imami jurisprudence for the de
facto recognition of the legitimacy of a secular ruler.
Parallel to the Spanish recourse to improvisation to exert colonial dominance over the
Lucayans as accounted in the first discourse of the present study, it has been through a
continual operation of improvisation that the shi’ite hierocracy has accommodated the state
in order to influence relation of power. Among various characteristics of the practice of
improvisation, Greenblatt (1993, p. 230) delineates “displacement and absorption”, which,
appear to be applicable to the dynamics of dual order of power in shi’ite Iran.
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Displacement and Absorption
Greenblatt defines displacement as “the process whereby a prior symbolic structure is
compelled to coexist with other centers of attention that do not necessarily conflict with the
original structure but are not swept up in its gravitational pull” (p. 230). The manner in
which the shi’ite establishment approaches the monarchical state exemplifies the act of
displacement. In principle, for the shi’ite hierocracy all governments during the period of
occultation are illegitimate. However, they never refused to co-exist with these governments
even as they resisted abandoning their institutional autonomy. Moreover, under various
conditions such as an external threat to Islam – the case of Kashif al-Ghita – or the degree of
the perceived justice of the actual ruler, the ulama do not desist from lending their support to
and even cooperate with the very illegitimate state. Khomeini’s de facto recognition of the
monarch’s rulership coexists with his de jure consideration of the illegitimacy of the Shah’s
authority. At the same time, for practical purposes, he recommends cooperation with these
states, as stated above: “working with the same dictatorial government with the purpose of
preventing corruption, reforming the country, and improving people’s livelihood is not only a
good deed but also sometimes obligatory” [italic is mine] (p. 227). However, by making the
obliteration of the secular regime of the Shah in 1979 obligatory, Khomeini stripped off this
mask of cooperation and made obvious that his suggestion was simply a tactical
manipulation of this entrenched Islamic dogma.
What’s more, the coexistence of the two power structures tends to grow into formal
or informal alliance as observed by Weber in the case of bourgeois and religious powers in
the Orient (Weber, 1978, vol. 2). This is especially true when the necessity of domesticating
a subject population arises. Murvar (1979) formulates such alliance as follow:
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If the hierocracy is willing to legitimize political rule through domestication of the
people by using religious, sacred, and supernatural means, the political rulers will in
return extend uniformity over the entire country by removing dissenters and heretics
and forcing other religious groups to accept the officially approved religion (p. 79).
In Iran, in two periods of 1678-1722 and 1785-1850, the emerging shi’ite hierocracy and the
Safavid and Qajar states forged an alliance to suppress “Sunnism, extremist millenarianism,
philosophical dissent, and Sufism” (Arjomand, 1984, p. 258). In contemporary Iran, the
instance of alliance took place when the Shah’s repressive policy against leftists and liberals
between 1953 and 1979, received a lip service from the already established shi’ite
hierocracy. During this period, the Shah’s coercive apparatus systematically suppressed
secular leftists and infrequently targeted individual shi’ite intellectuals and members of the
ulama while, for the most part, left non-militant Islamic groups to organize and operate with
minimal or no restraint.
Parallel Taxation: Example of Displacement
Since its formation and establishment, apart from the period of the reign of the Reza
Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), the shi’ite hierocracy has been successful in obtaining the license
of the secular state to collect religious tax as, in Weber’s (1978) phrase, “the external means
of enforcement for the maintenance of their power or at least for the collection of church
taxes and other contributions” (p. 1161). In exchange, the ulama reward secular taxation
with their de facto legitimation. The hierocracy’s submission to the existence of a secular
structure paralleling a religious structure for tax collection typifies an act of displacement. It
is logical to expect that this parallelism becomes a contentious element in the discourses of
Hakamizadeh and Khomeini.
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As indicated in the previous chapter, Hakamizadeh expresses his objection to the
religious tax, arguing that it enchains the clergy to plebian’s judgment and erodes the ulama’s
capacity for objective and independent reasoning. In the discourse of the state, however, he
incorporates the issue of secular taxation into a broader perspective and states ulama’s
contention is, “whoever gets taxes, whether little or large, is forbidden (haram)…. We should
avoid paying tax [secular] in every possible way since, once paid, it is gone like a bird flying
out of a cage” (p. 24). Within this context, Hakamizadeh regards the system of taxation as a
measure for accountability. He maintains that, “the first condition to protect a nation is to
design a right system of taxation” (p. 27). While crediting modern taxation procedures for
securing the ability to recompense the nation’s expenses, he discredits religious taxes as
outmoded systems that “do not correspond with modern life…. Not only do they [religious
taxes] have no benefit for the country, but also they produce and perpetuate poverty” (p. 27).
On this ground, he equals religious taxes with clientism and patronage:
Helping young and healthy people is to provide jobs for them and encourage them to
be paid in exchange for work…. Handing them money gratuitously will make them
idle and harm the country; and if we take a careful glance we will notice that these
unnecessary alms and benefactions [religious] are the very source of the presence of
so many beggars and parasites (p. 27).
Seeing this travesty partly as the function of the shi’ite institution, he praises Reza Shah for:
“passing the law of selling religious endowment and spending it on culture and public health”
(p. 29). To Hakamizadeh, however, the state is not exempt from the same burden of
accountability: “If we protested the state for dodging its duties or spending taxes
ineffectively, we would not witness this waste and undutifulness” (p. 24).
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In response, Khomeini offers a lengthy account of the Islamic tax system through
which he defends religious taxes and tries to match them up with modern taxation systems.
He acknowledges, though, that his detailed account is incomplete and at times fuzzy. He
points out that, “we need a separate book to explain all different types of Islamic taxes” (p.
255). Aware of the insufficiency of his response, he claims that, “there is no way that we can
discuss and resolve this issue [Islamic taxation] from a jurisprudential viewpoint here, for
this requires scientific debate, which is beyond the scope of this document and these peoples’
[Hakamizadeh and alike] understanding” (p. 268). However, from this study’s perspective,
Khomeini’s reaction accentuates the main argument of his discourse on the state, namely the
perpetuation of the dual structure of power. Subsequently, as seen below, he will show his
inclination to eventually transform this duality into a unified system with the ecclesia in the
control.
Khomeini characterizes Islamic taxation as, first, a feasible system: “Even though it
contains many taxes, Islamic law of taxation is adopted based on rationality and fairness,
which puts excessive burden on no specific social class” (p. 265); and second, as universal:
“it is not designed solely for our country; rather, it is adaptable to all countries” (p. 264).
Framing the debate within modern budgeting procedure, he organizes Islamic taxation under
two categories: collection and spending. The larger portion of his detailed account of this
system is dedicated to the collection phase, the examination of which rests outside of the
reach and expertise of this study. It is in the category of spending that he favors the ulama,
the “descendents of the Prophet” (p. 270) with privileges and compensations in distinction
with the Others, “non-descendents of the Prophet.” He defends the practice of collecting
religious tax by the ulama, as argued above in the chapter on the clergy. He goes further and
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maintains that rewarding the ulama and seminary students with financial assistance from
taxes is justified for: “they are the employees of the Islamic State and responsible for the
presence of Islamic identification and the interpretation of law…. The fact that no Islamic
State is still in place today… does not negate the truth that the service of this class to the
country is far more than that of other classes” (p. 271). On the surface, he seems to put this
argument forward in direct response to Hakamizadeh who accused the shi’ite hierocracy of
self-indulgence: “How do Mohammad and Ali, who are the fountain of courage, consent to
the idea that their descendents [the Ulama] receive money in exchange for doing no work;
thus, in the name of the faith, a large group of people become idle and indolent” (p. 27).
Hidden in Khomeini’s argument, however, is the shi’ite hierocracy’s well-established
practice of preserving its financial advantages in relation to the state, and hence
counterbalancing the system of political domination. While Khomeini does not press
forward the hierocracy’s aim at political power and expresses no objection to the temporal
state for collecting taxes, he refuses to situate the hierocracy on the margin in this process.
Therefore, he defines the conditions under which profane tax-collection is legitimate. First,
Khomeini calls for the formation of hierocratic administrative machinery that, independently
from the state, promotes and protects the interests, financial and political, of the ulama. To
this machinery, he gives the name of “the office of Islamic propaganda” and the
responsibility for “devising the statutory membership of all people and assigning everybody
to their specific task” (p. 246). Khomeini, then, points to the inability of the actual rulership
to execute Islamic taxation: “as a matter of fact, the Islamic law of taxation is inoperable in
the country today; the existing state cannot implement this law the way it is written because
the existing governmental apparatus is not Islamic” (p. 261). However, he maintains that
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collecting taxes can be made possible through the operation of the propaganda office: “If this
Islamic apparatus is established and the office of Islamic propaganda becomes operative,
nobody will evade paying tax and disobey law” (p. 265). Thus, in a way, he directly places
the ulama in the center and indirectly expresses the hierocratic ambition for political goals.
Weber (1978) introduces the “autonomous administrative apparatus” (p.1163) as the “office
charisma” that facilitates the hierocracy positioning itself in proximity to political power:
The church advances its demands toward the political power on the basis of its claims
to office charisma…. By virtue of its power, the hierocratic church also establishes a
comprehensive ethico-religious réglementation of all spheres of conduct; in principle
this system has never tolerated any substantive limitations…. For the enforcement of
its claims hierocracy disposes of very considerable means of power, even beyond the
support of the political authorities (p. 1164-65).
Khomeini inclines to the political triumph of the hierocracy and the establishment of,
in the words of Murvar (1979), “an ever-increasing structural unity: one ruler, one religion,
one society” (p. 79). But, unmistakably, he attempts to communicate this inclination in a
politically unthreatening fashion. In his discourse, he transgresses the monarchical structure
of domination not by negating it, but rather by reproducing it in accordance with the shi’ite
requirements. This brings me to the other dimensions of the practice of improvisation by the
shi’ite hierocracy, namely co-optation and absorption.
Co-optation and Absorption
Khomeini’s critical rhetoric vis-à-vis the status quo reflects a paradoxical argument.
As argued previously, Khomeini lends support to the authority of the Shah, thereby
upholding the status quo; that is the political dominion of the actual power. On the other
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hand, he shifts radically to destabilize the status quo by supporting the shi’itization of the
organizations of power; that is, the hierocratic control of existing branches of political
structures. He seems to swerve between “oppositional” and “complicitous” approaches.
This contradictory feature, or to his admirers, this politically sophisticated approach, is
intrinsic to what Graff (1989) calls the practice of co-optation. According to Graff, “what
makes ‘co-optation a paradoxical concept is the negative value it assigns to something we
usually think of as desirable” (p. 171). Khomeini consistently situates himself between a
negative valuation, that is the tyrannical character, and a desirable appropriation, that is the
shi’itization, of the status quo.
To produce, distribute, and extend its own authority structure, the hierocracy needs to
co-opt the ethos of the political authority. Inevitably, in this process, the repressive character
in the power of the secular monarch is reproduced and featured in the power of the
ecclesiastic ulama. Khomeini’s tolerance for the repressive Shah serves the cause of another
mode of repression, that of the ulama. This tolerance is absorbed into his product, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and is extended, as incisively put by Marcuse (1968), to “policies,
conditions, and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are impeding,
if not destroying, the chances of creating an existence without fear and misery” (p. 1). In this
sense, Khomeini’s discursive practice is repressive by being permissive. The phenomenon of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, taken in relation to Murvar’s analysis of the duality of power,
reflects a shift in the monistic make-up of the power structure from political to hierocratic,
and portends a change in the social organization of domination. Under the hierocratic
monism of Iran’s Islamic state, the rulership of the political is transformed into an
administrative branch of the religious; that is an inverse transposition of what Weber (1978)
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pictures for a caesaropapist state: “Caesaropapist government treats ecclesiastic affairs
simply as a branch of political administration” (p. 1162). In other words, the Islamic
Republic tends to treat political affairs simply as a branch of religious administration.
While the monarchical and Islamic states do indeed represent a divergence in the
relation of subjugation between the political and the religious, this divergence hides an
important parallel in the underlying composition of the two regimes: the authoritarian
structural sameness embodied in the two institutions of the King and the Mandate of the
Jurist. The totalizing condition of the shi’ite hierocratic monism, one state, one society, one
religion, leaves no space for the co-existence of a two-power structure and two modes of
authority. It demands, though, that the shi’ite rulership sacralize its political authority. The
presence of an independent political power stands in the way of the fulfillment of this
requirement. To resolve this tension, hierocratic domination must absorb the political mode
of control into the religious mode of control. There is nothing wrong with the presence of
legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of the states. But, they must be “under the
guardianship of a hierocratic ruler, a faqih” (p. 232). Thus, Khomeini obliterates the
symbolic kingship but internalizes its modes of control within the Islamic Republic and
presents it as a stride toward salvation. His successor, Khamenei, takes this practice farther
and wants to remove the kingship from Iranian history all together. This parallelism,
nonetheless, denotes a transition in the practice of improvisation by the shi’ite hierocracy
from displacement to absorption as defined by Greenblatt (1993) as the “process whereby a
symbolic structure is taken into the ego so completely that it ceases to exist as an external
phenomenon” (p. 230).
It might be relevant to note that, in recent months, in a statement from prison a
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prominent shi’ite reformist in Iran, Mostafa Tajzadeh, who, ironically, happened to have a
hand in the construction of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wondered why the hierocratic
rulership interpreted any criticism of the Shah as a critique of the Supreme Jurist Khamenei.
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Chapter 11
Fifth Discourse: The Law
The final chapter of my main analysis concerns the discourse of law as represented by
Hakamizadeh and Khomeini. The importance of this chapter lies in the perception that our
authors would offer a legal framework for institutionalization of their visions as presented in
previous chapters. Short of a comprehensive blueprint for institutionalization, in relatively
short chapters, Hakamizadeh and Khomeini sketch out a general understanding of law, which
once more displays, in larger perspective, how the two authors differ in their approach to
social and political life. While Hakamizadeh detects and cultivates non-Islamic secular
elements of law, Khomeini presents an Islamic legalist approach that aims at securing the
central position of the shari’a and its bearers: Islamic jurists.
On the surface, their positions regarding the law appear quite similar – indeed, as we
shall see, each revolves around a nearly identical set of three concepts. Despite their
rhetorical resemblance, however, the visions presented by our authors diverge significantly
when they are put into concrete legal envelopes. The authors of the two legal frameworks
differ deeply in their understanding of the types of law and their centrality to social life.
The Central Exchange: Hakamizadeh and Khomeini on The Law
Hakamizadeh begins his arguments with a general practical question: “why is law not
enforced in this country?” In answering this question, he makes an excursion into the
underlying dynamics of religious and secular law in shi’ite Iran. He accuses the shi’ite
clerical establishment of a gross travesty, describing it “as one of the founts of this country’s
malady” (p. 30). In his phrase: “Our today’s faith [i.e. the clerical establishment] declares
that the only official law, the sole enforcement of which is legitimate, is the one that derives
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from the shari’a. All other laws are [depicted as] counterfeit and self-invented” (p. 30). He
sees this as absurd, and argues that human law must also be enforceable. On the basis of this
claim, he structures his vision of law around three dimensions: 25 “faith, reason, and nature,
which come from the truthful God and may not always cohere; nevertheless, they never act
contrary to each other” (p. 34).
In response, Khomeini reasserts his conviction that “it is no secret that religion of
Islam recognizes no other laws; that God has sent the Islamic law [i.e. shari’a] for the whole
universe, the whole time, and the entire humanity” (p. 292). Consequently, he labels the
accusation of travesty leveled at the clergy by Hakamizadeh absurd and the product of
“syphilitic irrational brains” (p. 292). In this sense, Khomeini affirms the centrality of faith
in the province of law. He envisions a regime of law that revolves around three themes: God,
reason, and faith.
In a fairly short essay and in a rather implicit mode, Hakamizadeh translates the three
dimensions of faith, reason, and nature (noted above) into the natural law and the human law.
Khomeini incorporates his three dimensions into the themes of the eternal law, the human
law, and the sacred law [the latter sometimes termed the divine law].
Hakamizadeh’s Detailed Position on the Law
Hakamizadeh posits the doctrine of natural law as the centerpiece of his account of
law. To him, the natural law reconciles the providence of God with human will. He states,
‘it is the law of nature that clearly and appropriately represents the will of God” (p. 32).
Weber (1987) contends that Christianity created natural law to build a “bridge between its
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own ethics and the norms of the world” (p. 866). From a sociological angle, Weber classifies
natural law as the ensemble of the norms that not only are independent from man-made law
or positive law, but also by virtue of their theological nature underpin the legitimacy of the
positive law. Weber, thus, identifies natural law as a “collective term for those norms which
owe their legitimacy not to their origin from a legitimate lawgiver, but to their immanent and
teleological qualities” (p. 867). Hakamizadeh seems to reflect on the same point when he
states, “when we look at nature’s system and laws, which are God’s creation, we can easily
decipher what God wants from us” (p. 33). While Hakamizadeh suggests that individuals
should not look beyond the law of nature to exercise their own agency, nowhere in his text
does he advocate the supremacy of God’s will. Rather, Hakamizadeh stresses that the human
being synchronizes his will with the providential teleological design and discern his own
moral law. Hakamizadeh maintains that their capacity of reasoning makes human beings
provident: “It is true that the human being is in need of guidance, but God has bestowed us
with eyes and intellect to determine our goals and ways” (p. 32). In his logic, the law of
nature is defined by the contribution of divine will in the creation of rational being. He,
consciously or unconsciously, resonates with Aquinas, the distinguished monk of the
Dominican Order, who states:
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident
both for itself and for others…. Whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act
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and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the
natural law. 26
To Aquinas, the natural law is a guide of conduct for human beings to fulfill their deepest
natural inclinations, which in turn reflect the will of God written into the very fabric of
human nature.
Hakamizadeh seems to adopt a similar position, believing that the human being is
civic and social by nature. He equals the human being with organs of our body, which
“adapt their function to the change in the environment. Furthermore each organ is for the
benefit of the collective body first, and then for its own” (p. 33). This natural inclination
poses practical questions involving human conduct and human community. How can
humans discover natural law and its application? What constitutes the directives of natural
law for human conduct? What are our human obligations toward law? How can we
determine those obligations? What is considered to be a just law? Hakamizadeh appears to
be aware that the notion of natural law in itself is too abstract and general to address the
above questions. As indicated earlier, he proposes the human capacity to reason as the key
element in addressing realistic issues. The use of reason, however, cannot take effect in a
vacuum and must be transformed into real actions and practical decisions.
Here, one can distinguish between “law finding” and “law making”: To keep legal
activities, in principle, within the bounds of natural law is to linger, in practice, in the realm
of law finding. Taking real actions and making practical decisions demand transition to the
domain of law making. This leads Hakamizadeh to the discussion of human law -- that is,
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those laws made by human beings -- which according to Weinreb (1987) “is the positive law
of particular communities” (p. 59).
Khomeini’s Detailed Position on the Law
Unlike Hakamizadeh but similar to Aquinas, Khomeini starts his account of law with
an accent on the law of God or the eternal law. His version of the eternal law parallels that of
Aquinas, who defines it as “the very idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the
universe.” 27 Khomeini reiterates his conviction that God is the only qualified legislator
“whose ordinances are pervasive and binding for He is the creator and true owner of the
universe” (p. 289). His conception of the eternal law follows from the notion of divine
providence and is anchored in two premises: transcendent justice and reason. He states, “we
attribute to God the highest degree of justice and understanding” (p. 291). God’s justice and
understanding transcends the vicissitudes of human subsistence: “You must know that the
legislator must be somebody who is devoid of materialistic life, lustfulness, and egoistic
tendencies ... and this can’t be anybody but the Just God” (p. 291). God’s reign over the
universe, logically, reflects this transcendent justice.
In the same streak, Khomeini tends to limit the origin of reason to God alone. To
him, legislation is a rational practice, which is exclusively suitable for the domain of God:
“On the basis of reason, God’s rules are compulsory, while human rules are not, even if they
are considered rational and in line with the common good” (p. 289). For Khomeini the
practice of reason belongs solely to God’s providence. The eye of Providence closely
observes natural and human life. Whether resulting from nature or human action, every
event is a sign of the pervasive presence of God’s wisdom. Favorable and unfavorable
27
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events in the life of human beings display the Providence’s infallible justice. In this
connection, according to Khomeini, “the Just God has fulfilled his responsibility, otherwise
we shall regard God as irresponsible and a traitor” (p. 291).
Of course, when reason is associated with the unfalsifiable order of Providence, it
cannot be refuted. Given that critique is an inherent function of reason, by restricting the
practice of reasoning within the framework of God’s faultless guidance, Khomeini depletes
human reason from its critical function. Furthermore, the critical function of reason lies in its
relativity. However, when justice and reason are converted into elements of divine
providence, they are logically considered to operate independently from the sociopolitical
order; hence they are parts of the absolute ordinance of God. On this premise, Khomeini
contends that, “since reason determines that legislation is God’s exclusive responsibility,
nobody but God has the right to legislate” (p. 291). This would appear to rule out all human
law making.
But God does not legislate in a vacuum. He translates His rule into the system of
religion; that is Islam. Thus, in Khomeini’s vision the religion of Islam “is God’s supreme
law, which is initiated to manage quotidian life as well as the world system, and its practice
will be rewarded with salvation in this world as well as the other” (p. 291). In other words,
transcendent justice and reason become undivided parts of Islamic faith. From this, Khomeini
shifts his argument toward the system of Islamic law, or Islamic jurisprudence [Fiqh], in
which the practice and administration of divine reason and justice are specified.
In this way, Khomeini moves the jurisprudence, which is the product of human
agency to the center to replace the eternal law, which is the product of God. This is crucial,
because Khomeini subsequently bases his claim of authority to transform society on the
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Qur’an and positive religious norms, Islamic jurisprudence. It is not accidental that he pays
little or no attention to natural law because within this paradigm there is not much space for
the invocation of natural law. He substitutes shari’a-based order for natural order and
considers shari’a-based order normative. It is as if Khomeini involuntarily intends to reverse
the assumption behind Weber’s insight that natural law continues to exist while sacred
authority can no longer hold sway. In other words, by claiming such continuing force for the
shari’a, Khomeini cancels out the raison d’être of natural law. In the contest of natural law
and religious authority, Weber (1978) refers to natural law as “the specific and only
consistent type of legitimacy of a legal order which can remain once religious revelation and
the authoritarian sacredness of a tradition and its bearers have lost their force” (p. 867). By
displacing the natural and eternal law in his discourse, Khomeini, thus, poses the shari’a as
the single legitimate law to counter the positive law or human law in Hakamizadeh’s
discourse.
Human Law (Positive Law) Versus Sacred Law
As shown above, for Hakamizadeh, the human law is an extension of the natural law.
He draws on a simplified analogy to present his transition from the natural law to the positive
law in the text:
When we look at our body, we see that there is one managing organ called brain,
which puts to work all other organs for the preservation of the body. We also see that
these organs change their functions according to the change in the environment. We
further observe that each organ is for the benefit of the collective body first, and then
for its own. If one organ does not function well it will become ill and after a while
the illness will spread across the whole body. Mass people are like the body. They
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need ruler, soldier, taxation, and law; and this law must be adaptable to the changing
environment (p.33).
This analogy establishes a direct link between general precepts of the natural law and their
application to human law. Hakamizadeh seems to present the positive law as outsourced
from the law of nature, hence normative. However, the adaptation of human law to the
changing environment requires human interpretation. Therefore, the conformity of the
human law to natural law is not absolute; rather, it depends on the relative state of human
existence and is subjected to the constraints of time, space, and human reason.
Furthermore, Hakamizadeh’s view of positive law follows the main premise on which
his entire discursive line of argument in the text is grounded: the segregation between secular
and ecclesiastical polities. In his account of the functional necessity of law, he assigns the
shari’a to the domain of the religious jurisprudence and dissociates it from the sphere of
public and civil legal proceedings:
Undoubtedly, the shari’a, no matter how comprehensive and complete it might be,
cannot fulfill all human necessities everywhere and every time. So to say, today we
are in need of a wide range of legislation concerning municipal law, custom law,
statute limitations, due process, budgetary law and accounting, and hundreds more for
which the shari’a offers no say (p. 30).
To Hakamizadeh all such legislation is the result of human reasoning. In this sense, a great
measure of judgment and thoughtfulness is required to apply the prescriptions of the natural
law to positive law. To exemplify his case, Hakamizadeh directly confronts the clergy with
respect of the source of law: “When they claim that all laws are in the Book [the Qur’an] and
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the tradition [hadith], they want to thwart the practice of analogical deduction [human
reasoning]; obviously, they will fail at the end” (p. 33).
Khomeini approaches the concept of human law with some ambivalence and
confusion. By alluding to Islam as the religion in which God’s law is embodied, Khomeini
portrays Islam as a religion that “has cancelled out all other laws of the universe and
recognized no other law as legitimate” (p. 292). He accuses Hakamizadeh of ignorance of
Islam and the Qur’an and concludes, “God has sent Islamic law for all time and all people”
(p. 292). Thus, Khomeini reasserts the transference of the eternality and universality of
God’s law to the already written Islamic law of the shari’a.
Historically, the shi’ite jurists’ legal activities were limited to compiling and
interpreting the traditions of the Prophet as well as providing written answers to questions
posed to them by members of the community, a practice identical to the Roman jurists’
activity in Medieval Christendom, which is called recognised responsa prudentium
(Arjomand, 1993a; Schiller, 1958). In this sense, the shari’a has historically been a juristcentered law whose core activity remains within the boundaries of law finding rather than
law making (Arjomand, 1993a). By elevating the shari’a to the status of a sole legitimate
law, however, Khomeini represents Islam as a corporate institution of law that is entitled to
prescribe the codes of conduct for the entire society in light of religious expertise alone.
Furthermore, he proposes the shari’a as the only venue through which a society can change
and reach a desired end: an ideal social order yet to be formed. Thus, Khomeini argues:
Every reasonable person admits that besides this infantile life there is a bigger
universe. God has sent messengers and guides to organize that bigger life; however,
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God has designed law for this world and this life as well. But, the ultimate end is to
provide the eternal life of the other world (p. 304).
According to Khomeini, God has not ignored this worldly life: “God is aware of everybody’s
needs and possesses the power to meet them” (p. 293). He encases God’s power in the
shari’a on the premise that beside Islam no other source of legitimate law exists; therefore,
Islamic law must satisfy all private and public needs: “There is no law in Islam that cannot
relate to this life; rather, all Islamic laws constitute the foundation for building a logical and
moral life” (p. 305).
Khomeini’s arguments, inescapably, implicate the shari’a in the practice of human
law and legislation. However, this raises profound questions for a religion that has
traditionally exercised its legal authority within the purview of law finding rather than law
making: What to legislate? What procedure should the practice of legislation follow? Every
act of law is implicated in the act of abolishing laws as well. What laws should be
abolished? And, on what basis should they be abolished? Most importantly, given the plural
structure of juristic authority within shi’ism, questions will arise about what institutions in
the hierocratic order would be in charge of making law. Not surprisingly, Khomeini does not
answer these questions in his text. He instead sets out an intangible and obscure
classification on the basis of which the hierocracy takes up the task of law making.
According to him:
The laws that the country will gradually need and are not mentioned in the shari’a can
be classified under two categories. First, are the laws regulating conduct against the
shari’a, such as tax on prostitutions and alcohol…or laws related to judiciary,
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illegitimate trades, marriage, and the like? These laws regulate conduct detrimental to
people and against the interests of the nation (p. 294).
Second are the laws that contribute to the order and progress of the nation and
do not contradict the shari’a…. For example, in early Islam due to the limited Islamic
territory, there was no need for property rights, banks, and census; and the
organization of military was different from that of today…. The Islamic law is not
against the formation of these institutions even though it does not speak about them
(p. 295).
In this statement, the hint at public order in the second category is associated with laws that
are not provisioned in the shari’a. In shi’ite jurisprudence, these legal provisions are
considered secondary ordinances, which in distinction with primary ordinances, are related
to governmental regulations and public law. According to Arjomand (1993b) the primary
ordinances “derive from the source of the Sacred Law” while the secondary ordinances
derive from “expediency as the prerequisite for the implementation of the incumbent primary
ordinances” (p. 104). In other words, when the sacred law does not provide adequate ground
to reach a ruling on a particular case, the use of secondary ordinance becomes necessary or
expedient. Such secondary ordinances comprise all state and public laws, the enactment of
which entails the engagement with the practice of law making. But such law making is only
legitimate in so far as it is necessary for implementing primary ordinances.
Khomeini’s approach to secondary ordinances is as vague as his preceding
classification of law. He seems to include these ordinances in the second category of his
classification; that is, among those laws that are not against the shari’a and result in societal
progress. For example, he points to the “accounting law” as an instance of the “secondary
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law” within the frame of the “Islamic budgetary law” (p. 300). He is certainly aware of the
ulama’s deep-seated preference for disengagement from the practice of law making;
therefore, he cautiously avoids giving such legal advice that would contradict, in principle,
the ulama’s orthodox position. The disengagement though is bound to generate a sense of
passive quietism in the ulama’s approach to the concept of positive law. On the other hand, a
passive approach sits at odds with the logic of the centrality of the shari’a that Khomeini
enjoins throughout his discourses. While he attributes the status of lawlessness in the
country to the lack of Islamic ruling (pp. 298, 304, 305), his insufficient competence in the
shi’ite jurisprudence does not give him the permission to make any recommendation that
would suggest a radical departure from the traditional shi’ite juristic authority: a move away
from law finding to law making.
For Khomeini, the question is how to reconcile, in principle, the central position he
wants to give to the shari’a and the clergy with the previously marginal practice of law
finding. His answer, however, furthers his conundrum. He proposes that, “an Islamic state
[emphasis added] with the help [my emphasis] of competent religious experts [the mujtahids]
can identify these secondary provisions, conform them to the shari’a, and then adopt them”
(p. 295). However, he does not define the nature and composition of the Islamic state;
therefore, the relation of the shari’a to this state remains obscure. On one hand, the
enactment of the public law – the secondary provisions – continues to be the state’s function.
Therefore, the state occupies the central position, inevitably pushing the shari’a to the
margin. On the other hand, all state laws must be commensurate to and directed by the
shari’a. In other words, the Islamic exposition of a norm must become an enforceable rule of
action. In this sense, the shari’a takes the center, pushing the state to the margin. But
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directing, orienting, and enacting specific laws presuppose the exercise of authority. This
conundrum would ultimately be institutionalized at the heart of the state four decades later,
when Khomeini ends up in authority. In the formative years of the Islamic Republic the
debate over the primacy of the interests of the two contending authorities, the ecclesia and
the state, took a position of enormous importance in mundane political and social affairs.
This dispute encroached upon and, for the most part, obscured much of the processes of
institution building and decision-making in the Islamic regime. The gravity of the situation
demanded Khomeini’s direct arbitration. In the summer of 1987, a dispute between the
parliament and the Guardian Council over the labor law forced Khomeini to intervene. Now
that Khomeini was in power and facing the logic of maintaining law and order, he issued a
governmental edict backing the state’s exclusive power to rule:
By using this power, the state can replace those fundamental … Islamic systems, by
any kind of social, economic, labor … commercial, urban affairs, agricultural, or
other system, and can make the services … that are the monopoly of the state … into
an instrument for the implementation of general and comprehensive policies. 28
With this statement Khomeini unambiguously implied that the state’s “expedient
interests,” maslahat in Farsi, take precedence over the interests of the hierocracy. On another
occasion in January 1988, Khomeini found it appropriate to extend the notion of maslahat, in
Brumberg (2001) words, “to its most logical extreme.” In publically rebuking Khamenei –
then the President and now the Supreme Leader – who tried to subjugate the power of the
executive branch to the constraint of Islamic laws and principles, Khomeini re-emphasized
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the primacy of maslahat, the determination of which is the prerogative of the “supreme
faqih:”
Government is among the most important divine injunctions and has priority over all
peripheral divine orders. Your interpretation of what I said, that is, the government
[or state] has jurisdiction within the framework of divine injunctions, is …
contradictory to what I said…. The government, which is part of the total [or
absolute] vice-regency of the Prophet … is one of the foremost injunctions of Islam
and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and the
hajj…. The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any lawful agreement …
if the agreement contravenes the interests of … the country. It can prevent any
matter, whether religious or secular, if it is against the interests of Islam. 29
According to this statement, once a jurist takes the helm of the state power, the state’s
injunctions bear divine validation equal to those of the absolute “vice-regency of God.” The
jurist, and by extension the state, has the privileged authority to define the maslahat of Islam
and the nation, and accordingly, to determine both the divine and secondary provisions.
Whether or not the article of maslahat exists in shi’ite jurisprudence is beyond the purview of
this study; 30 nevertheless, it reverberates significantly through the structure of power in the
politics of the Islamic Republic. It is fair to say that the introduction of maslahat played a
large part in the demise of the clergy, ironically, under the supreme rein of Khomeini,
29
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Shirazi (1998) maintains that, “the resort to maslahat to justify various government or
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account of interests) and masaleh-e-morsaleh (consideration of interests without deriving the
from the shari’a). However, the Twelver shi’a have always rejected it as bed’at (forbidden
innovation) (p. 233).
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himself a cleric. Today Khamenei, who on one occasion was bemused by Khomeini’s ruling
and terrified by the prospect of clerical diminishing, has been keen to selfishly exploit
Khomeini’s diktat and forcefully press forward the interests of the state that he is heading
thus speeding up the course of the priestly downfall.
Khomeini’s Dilemma
At the time of his writing in the 1940s, Khomeini was facing a different problem. In
Khomeini’s reasoning, only an Islamic state could resolve the paradox of the secondary
provisions. According to the same reasoning, the existing secular government of the Shah
did not possess the qualifications of an Islamic state, and hence lacked the authority to take
up the task of law making. Does this mean that in the absence of the Islamic state no
instance of law making can legitimately take place? Khomeini’s recognition of the
inevitability of order and government renders the enactment of the state law imperative
notwithstanding the nonexistence of the Islamic state. In Khomeini’s view, however, the
absence of the Islamic state does not necessarily undo the continuous and pervasive presence
of the shari’a in the process of legislation. Through the agency of the ulama in helping the
state to make laws in accordance with Islamic norms, the intervention of the shari’a and its
central position is ascertained. He further insists, “today, experts in Islamic affairs, the
ulama, must give consideration to all institutions that are in compliance with Islamic norms
and necessary for the country, and must help to establish them. Also, the military’s
accoutrements must be arranged in the interest of the nation. The Islamic law never opposes
these political and social progresses” (p. 295). Thus, Khomeini allowed law making under
the Shah only when guided by the ulama’s expertise in the shari’a.

166
The Ongoing Exchange
Unlike Khomeini and unconcerned about the shari’a’s position in legislation,
Hakamizadeh premises his understanding of the concept of law on the natural law ordained
by God, and proclaims that all other laws are the extension of the natural law. To him, rules
of conduct do not descend from God; rather, they are the product of human reasoning and
argumentation. Faith, in this process, logically plays a nominal role, because it is less
reliable and more open to (mis-)interpretation than are natural law and reason. According to
Hakamizadeh, “the Qur’an is one of God’s books, but the universe is His bigger book. You
perceive God’s prescription from nature and reason in a direct way, but the prescriptions
from faith might reach you with all kinds of mediation, each changing these directives by
prejudgment and mistake” (p. 34).
In this way, by ruling out the authority of the hierocracy to make law, Hakamizadeh
implicitly but necessarily charges the only competing structure, the state, with the
responsibility of legislation. However, he is mute about the procedure and mechanism by
which the act of legislation should proceed.
Dissatisfied with Hakamizadeh’s approach to human reasoning as the unique source
of law, Khomeini ties his arguments about law and human conduct to an ultimate end:
“Philosophers believe that human beings run two lives. One is the material life of this world
and the other is the spiritual life of the other world. For each of these lives there are
instructions and means … for which the prophets’ directives are enough” (p. 312). He
further states that, “all human laws invite the individual solely to the material life and keep
him unaware of the eternal life” (p. 312). On this premise, he presents Islamic law as an
entity that contains both dimensions of life. The shari’a attends to “the material life as well
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as to the spiritual life and the means necessary to fulfill both” (p. 312). As stated earlier, to
him God’s main objective is the other world, or the ultimate end: “For this reason, in his
celestial book [the Qur’an], God considers the life of this world infantile and strained by the
indulgence to sensual pleasures” (p. 304). Khomeini is resolute in indicating that the shi’ite
hierocracy is the sole body qualified to define the ultimate end, to provide resources and
means to realize it, and to determine the rules and conditions of the use of these resources:
“The Qur’an and hadith have come for various classes of people. They consist of sciences, to
the knowledge of which only experts in revelation, not other people, are privy. These
sciences are for one class of scientists…. Not everybody must intervene in the sciences of the
Qur’an and hadith, and the Qur’an and hadith themselves forbid any foolish appropriations”
(p. 323). Regarding a very different context, Pizzorno (1978) gives an observant insight into
the logical consequence of such monopolization: “Such a monopoly of spiritual resources
grounded the demand for the advent of an order in which that class [ecclesiastical] would be
autonomous and, in some form, superior” (p. 35). Khomeini’s position is oriented to
establishing a similar socially superior position for the ecclesiastical shi’a elite.
In principle, Khomeini seems to stick to the two traditional quests of the hierocracy:
the preservation of religious identity and prescription of the rules of everyday life (Pizzorno,
1978). In practice, with the separation of the temporal and religious orders, fulfilling this
task grows increasingly complicated. Khomeini introduces the ulama as a new actor to
bridge the religio-temporal gap. But the ulama’s historical alienation from the act of
legislation compels him to afford no more than a councillorship function in the capacity of
help to the state, for the hierocracy. This role, however, is hardly central. To seize the
possession of the center requires the control of normative procedures. In Iran’s routine of the
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1940s, in which the religio-temporal dissociation was partly in place and encouraged by the
hierocracy, the ecclesiastical management of the rules seemed to be impractical. Therefore,
the shi’ite hierocracy was doomed to remain in the margin. Some exceptional time was
necessary for the hierocracy to engage in the law making process and, in consequence,
occupy the center. The 1979 Islamic Revolution provides this extraordinary moment and
Khomeini would forcefully and effectively seize upon it.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
The point of departure of this study is the examination of two texts written in the
early 1940s in Iran. To a significant extent, three decades later these texts constituted the
underlying discourses that have shaped the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran – the most
crucial episode in the contemporary history of the country. It is clear that in their texts both
Hakamizadeh and Khomeini present a mindset primarily concerned with the analytical
presentation of a desirable order. Both authors represent themselves as reformers who aim at
improving the social project of life for Iranians, albeit with different approaches. However, it
was Khomeini who some three decades later found himself intimately engaged in the real and
pragmatic conditions of constructing such a social order, namely, the Islamic Republic of
Iran (IRI). This concluding chapter will largely explain how Khomeini’s construction of the
Islamic order in 1979 in Iran is inspired by his analytical conception of an ultimate order
articulated in the above discourses more than three decades earlier. In keeping with my
method of analysis, I analyze the text of the Constitution of IRI to locate the instances of this
inspiration.
I start with a brief summary of the main arguments and key insights regarding the
above discourses. Adopting the format of a dialogue and operating within the milieu of a
shi’ite outlook, the two authors, Hakamizadeh and Khomeini touch upon several social and
political discourses such as the God/human relationship, the notion of Imamate, the
institution of the clergy, the state, and the law. In his review of these discourses,
Hakamizadeh emerges to be critical of the official clergy’s understanding and practice of
shi’ite teachings, while Khomeini stands in defense of the shi’ite establishment.
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The notion of providentialism is at the heart of the dispute between the two authors in
regard to the discourse of God/human relation. While both authors identify with the idea of
providentialism, they vastly differ in their interpretation of this concept. To Hakamizadeh,
because of the individual’s ability to rationalize and reason, the human being is capable of
functioning autonomously within the providential design. By pointing to the notion of the
sovereign individual, he tries to present a modernizing translation of the shi’a Islam. In sharp
contrast with Hakamizadeh, Khomeini affirms the providential power of God over the free
will of human beings and uses it to delegitimize the then existing social order. He presents
faith as the sole mechanism for healing social maladies. This leads him to present Islam as
the self-enclosed curative source and reservoir of good judgment, to which only a few, the
ulama, have access. In Khomeini’s design, the authority to exercise sovereignty belongs to
the shi’ite hierocracy, to which the Muslim community is obliged to subordinate itself.
The leadership of the Muslim community constitutes the main content of the second
discourse, the Imamate. Hakamizadeh views the Imamate as a simple and commonsensical
practice devoid of any ideological character. To him the notion of Imamate is time-bound,
therefore, not subject to teleological consideration. He is averse to the Iranian people’s
devotion to the institution of Imamate. Hakamizadeh limits the application of the Imamate to
the leadership of the religious sphere, thus separating it from political management of
society. In contrast, Khomeini considers the Imamate as the rational extension of
Mohammad’s prophetic legacy, which embodies political and religious leadership combined.
For Khomeini, however, this combination does not stop at the Imamate; it continues its
function through the guardianship of the ulama who personify the Imamate in the absence of
the Imam. In this line of succession, the absolute and universal attributes of the Prophet’s
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authority will be passed on from the Imamate to the guardianship of the faqih, a notion that
Khomeini formulated later in the form of the theory of the “Mandate of the Jurist”.
The exchange between Hakamizadeh and Khomeini over the notion of clergy
inescapably follows their dispute about the Imamate. The two authors depict different
function for Islam in social and political life, and accordingly, present different views of the
clergy’s role in public. Hakamizadeh’s focal point is the separation of the clerical function
from the practice of politics and governance. Throughout his text, Hakamizadeh implicitly
and explicitly stresses that religious institutions are irrelevant to political institutions. For
him, religion is mandated to improve individuals’ spiritual and moral life. In accordance, the
agents of religion, the ulama in Islam, are obligated to concentrate their effort on helping
individuals to achieve their spiritual goals. But, it is not evident that whether or not in his
vision of an ideal faith there is a place for religion in public life. More specifically, he
expresses no position whether faith should enter the public sphere to defend the individual’s
rights and freedom from the arbitrary infringement of the government, as well as to promote
democratic civil society. Khomeini, on the other hand, is rather forthright in stressing that
political institutions must embrace a sacred cosmos and religious outlook. In principle, he
puts an end to the differentiation of political and religious society. In his perspective, Islam
is placed within political society and holds a political function. Moreover, in this
dedifferentiated structure, Khomeini bestows religious institutions primacy over political
institutions. In Islam he sees a complete blueprint for the management of society. But he
relocates Islam from the broad public sphere into political society and the state. Therefore,
Islam in Khomeini’s paradigm is incapable of establishing a public autonomous space to
safeguard and cultivate civil society. Moreover, he proposes the ulama, by virtue of their
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total knowledge of Islam, as the undivided group to assume the task of the leadership of
political society. In this scenario, once in power, the ulama are no longer qualified to contest
and question the arbitrary authority of the state. This became manifest in his construction of
the Islamic Republic of Iran few decades later.
In principle, Khomeini puts an end to the differentiation of political and religious
society. In his perspective, Islam is placed within political society and holds a political
function. Moreover, in this dedifferentiated structure, Khomeini bestows religious
institutions primacy over political institutions. Relocated from the broad public sphere into
political society, and therefore lacking agency in civil society, Islam in Khomeini’s
paradigm, is incapable of taking up a democratic function. In Islam he sees a complete
blueprint for the management of society, and with that he proposes the ulama, by virtue of
their total knowledge of Islam, as the undivided group to assume the task of this
management. This became manifest in his construction of the Islamic Republic of Iran a few
decades later.
The point of contention between our two authors on the fourth discourse, the state,
lies in the relation between the two structures of domination: the state and the hierocracy.
Sticking to his underlying argument, Hakamizadeh makes a case for the separation of politics
and religion. By drawing on the modern notion of specialized differentiation, he resolutely
asserts that, by definition, the function of a mujtahid has no equivalence to that of a political
ruler. On this ground, he concludes that the concept of Islamic state has no relevance to a
modernizing society. While he rejects the religious basis of the state legitimacy, he does not
concretely make a suggestion on its replacement, but his position implicitly embraces
democratic authority. For Khomeini Islam presents the sole legitimate regulatory system of
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governance. It would be rational that those who possess the unsurpassed knowledge of this
system, the mujtahids, reside at the helm of this system. Therefore, Khomeini rather
explicitly proposes the foundation of an Islamic state in which the clergy are positioned on
the leadership of major political institutions. In this way though, He sets the intellectual
foundations of the future state/religion relation in Iran.
The final discursive argument between Hakamizadeh and Khomeini is allocated to
the concept of law. At first, Hakamizadeh laments the absence of the rule of law in Iran and
largely faults the existing practice of shi’ism in this regard. He then turns to three elements
of faith, reason, and nature, which he believes are key to the institutionalization of major
social and political proposals in his text. In an argument that is coherently in line with his
idea of providentialism, Hakamizadeh suggests that human beings are inherently rational,
civic, and social. Due to their capacity to reason, according to Hakamizadeh, individuals are
well situated to define and make their own law or the positive law. In contrast to
Hakamizadeh, Khomeini places emphasis on God’s law. To him, God has the sole authority
to legislate, and human beings are only capable of interpreting God’s supreme law. The
product of human interpretation, according to Khomeini, is best embodied in the Shari’a. In
this manner, Khomeini, in principle, opens the way again for the centrality of the shi’ite
hierocracy. For him, God’s law is superior to human law because it offers provisions for the
eternal life. He acknowledges that in certain circumstances, human beings must attempt to
provide provisions for earthly life, but these are secondary provisions and inferior to God’s
law. He contends that the Shari’a directs the production of the secondary provisions;
therefore, the knowledge of the shari’a is required in this process. Needless to say, in
Khomeini’s mind, it is the institution of the clergy that monopolizes this knowledge.
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Clerical Social Position Vis-à-vis the State
Among the various dynamics of religion and society in Iran that the two texts
attempted to address, the social position of the clergy emerges as the most recurrent theme in
both texts. That theme thus provided the impulse behind this dissertation. Within this
religiopolitical context, the two authors, Hakamizadeh and Khomeini express two different
attitudes to the centrality and marginality of the clerical establishment.
Hakamizadeh portrays the existing social conditions of Iran as irrational and
unnatural. Furthermore, he maintains that the shi’ite hierocracy plays a socially central role
in the creation of these conditions. He goes on a quest to put an end to the sway that faith
exercises on the emotional and intellectual trends in Iran society and to replace it with secular
social ethics. This move implies the substitution of, in Talmon’s (1952) phrase, “social
utility for tradition as the main criterion of social institutions and values” (p. 3), which to
Hakamizadeh would be a natural and rational antidote to the status quo. In this schema, on
which Hakamizadeh’s entire text persists, religious authority can hardly hold the position of
center and is accordingly tossed to the margin. Hakamizadeh rejects the idea of faith as the
sole source of public social morality and sees in this rejection the rise of the ordinary
Iranian’s consciousness over the habit of intransigent religious ethics. While it can be
assumed that with the rejection of the shi’ite hierocracy and displacement of Islamic ethics in
Hakamizadeh’s logic, the state would consequently take on the main authorship of social
morality, he does not clearly stress the state as the institution that would replace faith for this
function. Hakamizadeh implicitly and unconvincingly points to the role of the state [the
Reza Shah’s state] in this regard, but never goes beyond this casual hint.
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Khomeini seems to affirm Hakamizadeh’s assertion about the unnaturalness and
irrationality of the conditions of social life in Iran. But, in a contrasting line of argument, he
attributes the existing social maladies to the incomplete and aborted rule of Islamic faith.
Khomeini asserts the need for shared values in society with a sense of significance and
urgency and argues in favor of Islamic ethics as the sole unifying organization in society. In
his schema, however, he largely leaves the reader in the dark with respect to the function of
the state. As expressed previously, he simply speculates that the institution of politics finds
in religion the precept of a self-enclosed and all-encompassing truth based on a “preordained,
harmonious, and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which
they are bound to arrive” (Talmon, p. 2). He argues that on this foundation an ideal society
can be built. Khomeini designates the clerical group, by virtue of having the possession of
spiritual resources, as the sole social agent responsible for leading Iranian society in the
direction of this ideal society and demands obedience of the others to the ulama’s cause. In
this yet-to-be-created “perfect scheme of things,” politics and religion are naturally and
rationally deemed undifferentiated. Not surprisingly, this vision was resonated in an
expression frequently used by nouveau religious revolutionaries in the aftermath of the
demise of the regime of the Shah in 1979: ‘our politics is identical to our religion and our
religion is identical to our politics,’ or in Farsi: ‘siasat ma ei’n dianat ma ast and dianat ma
ei’n syasat ma.’
Politics of Ultimate Ends
Infrequently in his text, Khomeini attempts to discern politics as a domain
independent from religion. As previously shown, this attempt is instantiated in his support
for the position of the Shah as the head of the political structure. At the same time, however,
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he ties the institution of politics with the premise of ‘godly ends,’ hence shaping the
substance of the political in the mold of the religious. Accordingly, in the construction of the
new Islamic order, he ties politics with godly or ultimate ends. In this connection, he
attributes a religious trait to all spheres of politics in the Islamic state. The second Article of
the IRI’s Constitution defines this particular set of godly ends:
The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:
1. The One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His
exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to
His commands;
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws
3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the
course of man's ascent towards God
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation
5. Continuous leadership (Imamate) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental
role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam; 31
Stemming from the enduring struggle between the two contending structures of authority, the
religious and the political as explained in the fourth discourse, it is logical to suppose that the
Constitution designates two collectivities responsible for godly ends. The first designation is
the collectivity of Islamic believers including, in particular, those who are faithful to the
shi’ite orthodoxy; the second is the collectivity of the state that binds individuals on the basis
of territorial boundaries irrespective to their religious allegiance or degree of religiosity.
31
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Pizzorno (1978) sees these two collectivities as the social base for two forms of power:
“power spiritual” and “power temporal” respectively (p. 34). The two collectivities differ
significantly in terms of the nature of their identity. While the collectivity of believers
identifies with a particular religious bond, the state collectivity determines the identity of
individuals on the basis of their living within the boundaries of one state. The tensions
between these two identities are evident in the title of the new regime in Iran: the Islamic
Republic, in that ‘Islamic’ represents the first collectivity and ‘Republic of Iran’ the second
one. Article 2 of the Constitution, nevertheless, assigns godly ends to both collectivities with
the expectation of transcending their differences and avoiding their looming friction.
Article 57 of the Constitution of IRI instantiates the source of the tension between the
two powers. At first, the article seems to recognize the modern notion of the politics by
espousing the principle of the separation of powers: “The powers of government in the
Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers….
These powers are independent of each other.” This secularized principle treats the state as a
temporal body located within political society and serving mere political purposes. However,
the principle of power separation in the Constitution seems untenable since in Khomeini’s
“grand schema” the state should also tend towards godly ends, and by subjecting to the
clerical authority, strives to assure that it will function as a spiritual agent.
In remarks about the evolution of the notion of the State in European political
thought, Skinner (1978) argues, “the sphere of politics should be envisaged as a distinct
branch of moral philosophy, a branch concerned with the art of government” (p. 349).
Skinner concludes, “the acceptance of the modern idea of the State presupposes that political
society is held to exist solely for political purposes. The endorsement of this secularized
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viewpoint remained impossible as long as it was assumed that all temporal rulers had a duty
to uphold godly as well as peaceable government” (p. 352). With respect to Skinner’s
argument, the above principle in Article 57 had to be altered to accommodate the ‘godly’
nature of the Islamic state. Therefore, the Article was furnished with a supplement: all three
powers function “under the supervision of the absolute vilayat al-'amr [Mandate of the Jurist]
and the leadership of the Umma, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this
Constitution.”
Article 57, on one hand, provides the context for the transfusion of the latent
contention in the dual system of authority in the old society into the new regime of the
Islamic Republic. The conspicuous invocation of absoluteness in the Article, on the other
hand, points to the intention of the framers to secure the superiority of the power spiritual.
The Article also refers to the later provisions in the Constitution that pave the way for clerical
dominion in the power structure of the Islamic Republic. The rest of this chapter examines
the ways the supremacy of the clergy is established in the ethos developed in the IRI’s
constitutional text.
In traditional societies, by way of monopolization and control of spiritual resources,
the clerical class professes its autonomy and supremacy. According to Pizzorno (1978), four
modes of control of spiritual resources aid the ecclesia in purifying and advancing its
vocation and standing in Christendom: “These controls are of knowledge, of normative
procedures, of the states of devotion, and of the definition of the enemies” (p. 35).
Pizzorno’s insight can be applied to the case of the shi’ite ecclesia, which in 1979 ventured
the initiation of a social order in which its sovereignty and primacy is delivered. The shi’ite
hierocracy uniquely assumed the task of defining and prescribing the usage of these
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resources. It was up to the framers of the Constitution of this social order to objectivize this
task amidst the growing complexity of the social division of labor.
The Control of Knowledge
As expressed in various lines of reasoning, this study’s analysis is premised on the
interplay of power and knowledge. On this ground, it can be argued that the control of
knowledge makes up a powerful resource for the exercise of domination. Pizzorno (1978)
attributes great importance to this resource “especially insofar as it rests on the basis of an
all-encompassing vision of the long-term, ultimate ends of society and individual” (p. 35).
As explained above this is manifest in the constitutional text of IRI, which imperatively calls
on the new Islamic order to attend godly ends. However, in parallel to what we have so far
seen in the large majority of Khomeini’s discourses, Article 2 of the Constitution introduces
these ultimate ends in a mystified and esoteric style placing them beyond the range of
ordinary perception. The novel revolutionary shi’ite ecclesia employs this as a pretext to
claim the exclusive possession of resources and proficiency for supplying the transcendental
knowledge of ultimate ends. In this way, the eschatological knowledge of godly ends
becomes an important source of power for the newly emerged ulama around the charismatic
Khomeini.
But the transcendent knowledge of ultimate ends does not put forward a complete
package in which answers to all dimensions of social life can be found. There is a need for
the unorganized, common, and everyday knowledge; that is, the shifting knowledge of daily
policies for the changing social environment: the knowledge of proximate ends and means.
To keep the centrality of the clergy intact, the framers of the Constitution have to provide the
control of the shi’ite ecclesia over the knowledge of proximate ends as well. The framers
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sought to achieve this control by tying the knowledge of daily ends to the knowledge of
godly ends in major articles of the Constitution that deal with multiple facets of the
individual and collective life such as education, economy, justice, associational life, human
rights, public policy, civil and political engagement. In each of these cases, and in a rather
perfunctory manner, they attached phrases such as Islamic criteria, ethics of Islamic norms,
or law of Islam. The tacked-on qualities of these terms amount to fairy phrases: terms lurk
around the constitutional text like fairies on the land to prove that, on the surface, as if the
‘magical power’ of these phrases routinely transforms the profane nature of these practices
into sacred. Beneath the surface, however, the attachment aims at bindingly subjugating the
pursuit of daily social activities to the power of the clergy; that is, the social group that
monopolizes the knowledge of the above ‘fairies.’ Pizzorno (1978) believes that
transcendent knowledge bears to the knowledge of proximate ends “the same relation that the
‘general’ bears to the ‘particular’: it gives meaning to it” (p. 36). By applying this
parallelism to the quest of Christian ecclesia for supremacy, Pizzorno suggests that:
Awareness of all these facts provided the partisans of the superiority of the spiritual
power with their central argument: As knowledge of the “general” is superior to
knowledge of the “particular”, since one cannot grasp the latter without having first
understood the former, so spiritual power is superior to the temporal one. It follows
that a ruler cannot take day-to-day decisions successfully if he is not enlightened by
knowledge of the general ends of society. And this only the spiritual (ecclesiastical)
class possesses” (p. 36).
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The Control of Normative Order
Another source of power in close association with the control of knowledge is the
authority to control normative processes. The prescription of rules, on one hand, ascertains
the continuous presence of ultimate ends in daily life; on the other hand, it establishes norms
for long-term goals and proximate ends. In this respect, the main challenge for the founders
of the new order in Iran was to determine which collectivity must undertake the
responsibility of normative order. Leaving the discovery, interpretation, fixation, and
execution of norms to the discretion of the state collectivity was incongruous with
Khomeini’s reasoning for the centrality of the clergy. First, it would amount to the
recognition of rival jurisdiction, the state, within the clerical boundaries. Second, it would
interfere with the monopolization of knowledge by the clerical hierocracy. Both conditions
tend to wear away the independence and authority of the shi’ite ecclesia.
To accommodate the above challenge, the founders of the Islamic Constitution draw
on two key provisions. First, the heads of all main judicial positions must be mujtahids and
appointed by the supreme leader, himself a mujtahid. Second, all judicial processes, from
law finding to law making to due process are subjected to obscure provisos such as “Islamic
penal code”, “authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa”, “Islamic criteria”, and
“laws or the norms of Islam”, which are added to the descriptive content of each Article.
These so-called ‘legalistic’ qualifications are incorporated into the Articles 156, 157, 162,
167, 168, 170, and 171 to imply that in the Constitution’s frame of mind, to borrow from
Pizzorno’s account of ‘Gregorian movement’ (1978), both “power ordinationis” and “power
jurisdictionis,” that is, “both eternal knowledge and daily regulations should then stay in the
hands of spiritual apparatus” (p. 37).
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But there is more. The constitutional text is designed to exemplify both the
descriptive and normative contents of the shari’a. But unlike the cognitive system of the
shari’a, in which the descriptive and normative narratives are undifferentiated and embody a
single practice of faith, in the Constitution the two texts are separated and grounded on
different knowledge. A look at Articles 167, 168, and 170 illustrates the above point. Article
167 delineates the authority of a judge: “The judge is bound to endeavor to judge each case
on the basis of the codified law. In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his
judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa [emphasis
added]”. Article 170 further delineates this authority: “Judges of courts are obliged to refrain
from executing statutes and regulations of the government that are in conflict with the laws
or the norms of Islam.” The Article 168 defines the adjudication process of political
offenses: “Political and press offenses will be tried openly and in the presence of a jury, in
courts of justice. The manner of the selection of the jury, its powers, and the definition of
political offenses, will be determined by law in accordance with the Islamic criteria.” Since
the shari’a has no voice on matters regarding constitutionalism, the normative content in the
above Articles is adopted from non-Islamic sources – Western narratives – reflecting,
therefore, secular knowledge. The secular knowledge, however, raises the question of the
legitimation of the relevant Articles in a constitution that is deemed Islamic. While in the
shari’a it is the sole authority of the Providence that validates both normative and descriptive
dimensions, in the Islamic constitutional text of Iran, the validation transpires differently.
Rather than “Providence” generally, specific Islamic descriptive phrases will fill the divine
validation vacuum: “Authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa” or “determined by
law in accordance with the Islamic norms” or “law in accordance with the Islamic criteria.”
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The Constitutional articles are thus transformed into textual amalgams confounding
subjective assertions with objective norms. In a parallel description of the operation of the
ideology of the Communist State, Kolakowski (1999) aptly characterizes this process: “The
distinction between normative judgments and factual utterances is blurred in such a fashion
that ostensibly descriptive judgments disguise normative rules which the believers are
supposed to accept in their descriptive meanings” (p. 235). To the framers of the
Constitution, the Islamic descriptive narratives provide explanatory value for empirical
normative elements, thus justifiably changing the substance of normative stances into Islamic
stances. Islamic contents, in this sense, supply the mechanism of validity for normative
rules. Moreover, because Islamic judgments are deemed never wrong, they have the
authority to validate normative rules in one context and invalidate them in another.
The Control of Devotion
In the context of rivalry between the collectivities of the state and the ecclesia, the
third form of control plays an important role in relations of power. Pizzorno (1978) defines
devotion as “that attitude of mind, or that project of life, thanks to which individuals
determine to ‘devote’ their activity, time, and riches to a collective cause that transcends their
self-interest” (p. 37). In a religious context, the sacrifice of self, in any of its forms, is linked
with the status of the individual in the afterlife, or understood differently with the aspiration
for spiritual ends. In this context, the individual’s identification with ultimate ends coincides
with religious society’s ultimate ends. In shi’ite Iran, as the underwriter and director of
godly ends and prescriber of norms of conduct, the revolutionary ulama arrogate themselves
the ‘right’ to control the act of devotion. In the totalizing mindset of the shi’ite hierocracy,
any step back from this ‘right’ will be countered with a step forward by the rival collectivity,

184
the state; hence, any such ceding of control would represent a step down from the center of
power – and thus is unacceptable; indeed, it would violate the very calling of the ulama to be
authoritative interpreters of divine will for society.
To establish its control of devotion, the shi’ite ecclesia must patch up the modes and
techniques of commitment to ultimate ends. In the tormented climate of the 1979 postIslamic revolutionary, which was burdened with political pretensions and contentions, the
traditional mode of devotion such as committing one’s wealth, time, and even life would not
suffice. A new mode of commitment must supplement it: political allegiance. By virtue of
being the agent spiritual and ‘possessor’ of truth, the ulama, in principle, would claim the
control of this allegiance. In practice, however, they faced the task of doing away with the
competition of the state for the allegiance of the populace. For a while the personal
magnetism of charismatic Khomeini would reliably secure the devotion of the ordinary
populace. But this alone was not enough: political allegiance is not an unbound commitment
and it can only temporarily draw on contemplative factors such as charisma. It demands
permanent institutions. On this ground, the induction of devotion leads to the proliferation of
clerical-cum-political institutions in parallel with the state’s institutions. Such parallel
institutions are thus adopted in the Constitution, as shown in the Constitutional Chart (see
Appendix B, and further discussion below).
At the head of each institution resides a member of the ulama, a mujtahid, to assure
(a) identification with the organized knowledge of godly ends; (b) the autonomy of power
spiritual versus power temporal; and (c) immediate personal ties to the ecclesiastical
institution of religion. Thus, the old dual mode of power reincarnated itself within the
system of the Islamic Republic, this time with the dominance of the religious.
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The Control of the Definition of the Enemies
Pizzorno (1978) believes that, “an institution entitled to decide who my enemies
should be – enemies that I will have, at times, the right to kill, enemies of life and death – has
a deeply penetrating power” (p. 38). In a modern state, setting boundaries with enemies is
normally within the sole authority of the state. But, in the extraordinary arrangement of IRI,
this authority becomes the subject of relations of power. For the militant shi’ite ecclesia the
boundaries of ultimate ends determine the boundaries of the enemies; that is, “us” versus
“others.” Those who do not incline to the same ultimate ends are in the outer edge of
legitimacy. Moreover, as the narrator of ultimate ends, the shi’ite hierocracy determines the
dynamics between sameness and difference; hence, it settles on who is included and who is
excluded – and who among the excluded will be defined as collective “enemies.” Pizzorno
(1978) gives a picture of the same practice for the historical Christian ecclesia: “This has
been the fundamental, long-term function of the church in the formation of Western
civilization: offering a set of symbols of a common identity [emphasis added] which made it
possible to establish who belonged and who was excluded, irrespective of cultural origins,
and to test the bids of belonging” (p. 39).
The IRI’s Constitution has made the issue of shared identity essential to its text. This
is projected in the Preamble of the Constitution in which all levels of life are shaped by an
Islamic aspiration: “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran advances the cultural,
social, political, and economic institutions of Iranian society based on Islamic principles and
norms, which represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah 32.” The Constitution,
however, portrays Iranian identity as ‘one true Islamic self’ that ‘one Iranian people’ hold in
32
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common. Surpassing history and culture, this ‘oneness’ underlies the stable and unchanging
essence of ‘Iranianness,’ which was hidden beneath manufactured and superficially imposed
‘identities.’ The Islamic Revolution of 1979 unearthed the ‘true Islamic oneness’ of Iranian
identity: “This aspiration was exemplified by the nature of the great Islamic Revolution of
Iran, and by the course of the Muslim people's struggle, from its beginning until victory, as
reflected in the decisive and forceful calls raised by all segments of the populations” (The
Preamble). The distinct characteristic of this Revolution, according to the Preamble, is its
“ideological and Islamic nature”, which directs the Islamic government “to represent the
fulfillment of the political ideal of a people who bear a common faith and common
outlook,[emphasis added],taking an organized form in order to initiate the process of
intellectual and ideological evolution towards the final goal, i.e., movement towards Allah”.
The discourse of ‘Islamic oneness’ establishes a system of representation that serves
several purposes. First, ironically it provides a ground to divide Iranian society into different
categories. Second, it tends to condense complex differences that exist among different
categories of Iranians into a stereotypical entity, in the words of Hall (1993), “one simple
cardboard cut-out” (p. 308). Third and most importantly, it sets out a criterion for comparing
and evaluating these categories. In this connection, the authors of the ‘one Islamic identity,’
the militant ulama, judiciously divide this stereotype into a bi-polar set of adjectives such as
‘good’ or ‘bad’ and present it as truth. The structure of the IRI’s dominant sense of identity
is constructed on the basis of this “stereotypical dualism:” 33 either ‘us’ or ‘them,’ and in
Farsi, either ‘khodi’ or ‘non-khodi.’ Far from being immune to the play of power, this
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dualism has been an important part of the mechanisms by which power flows and performs
in Iranian society. Thus, them’ are infrequently considered ‘apostate’ or ‘enemy’. They
become ‘beasts in human disguise’ who possess no sense of ‘reason’ and ‘wisdom’. 34 They
must be brutally marginalized due to their ‘bestiality’ and ‘maliciousness.’ The IRI’s list of
non-khodi is unsurprisingly wide. It cuts across ethnicity, religion, gender, unions, ideology,
and political dissension. Ironically, in recent years the list has incorporated the very
individuals who zealously contributed to the advent of the Islamic Revolution and the
creation of the Islamic Republic.
Finally, at times in his text, Khomeini laments the displacement of Islam in matters
associated with social life and bemoans the marginality of the ulama’s social position in
much of the history of Islam. For example, in the opening pages of his book he wonders that,
“Islam conquered half of the world in half a century, but declined afterwards in the next 13
centuries” (p. 6). Because his mentality was engrossed by a commitment to ‘a single truth’,
‘one identity’, and ‘essentialized experience’ that is Islamic, he was incapable of situating the
decline of Islam within the breakages and discontinuities of history. Instead, he insisted on
the ground of the sufficient religiosity of Islam’s first half-century, to conclude that
inadequate religiosity is the main cause of the subsequent Islamic decline: “The rulers of that
period [the first half-century] were those who enforced God’s punishment. They would cut
thieves’ hand; they would behead insurgents and seditious and ward off aliens and infidels…
While they benefited from religiosity, from belief in the invisible, and from affection for the
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clergy, we are lagging behind and will remain behind them in these matters” (p. 7). These
points seem to be depicted in the Preamble of the Constitution:
Although the Islamic line of thought and the direction provided by militant religious
leaders played an essential role in recent movements, nonetheless, the struggles
waged in the course of those movements quickly fell into stagnation due to departure
from genuine Islamic positions. Throughout this time, the conscious and responsible
segment of society was bringing enlightenment to the people from the strongholds of
the mosques, centers of religious teaching, and universities. Drawing inspiration
from the revolutionary and fertile teachings of Islam, they began the unrelenting yet
fruitful struggle of raising the level of ideological awareness and revolutionary
consciousness of the Muslim people.
Furthermore, the Preamble does not conceal the militant clergy’s longing for globalizing
Islamic revolutionary aspirations: “In particular, in the development of international
relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare
the way for the formation of a single world community – in accordance with the Koranic
verse ‘This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me’
[21:92].” In this sense, the IRI Constitution is a document of imagined rediscovery and
reunification.
Iran entered the revolutionary phase of the 1970s with two distinct structural patterns.
At the level of authority, a competing dual structure of religious power, and political power
made its presence pervasive. At the level of political culture, competing discourses of
patrimonial monarchism and radical shi’ite traditionalism dominated the ideological market,
while no meaningful presence of liberal democratic and leftist discourses could be observed.
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Khomeini emerged from the combination of these two structural dimensions. As a member
of the shi’ite establishment, he had published the “Unveiling the Secrets” in 1943 to
accentuate the position of the shi’ite hierocracy in the dual structure of domination; and in
1979, he assumed the ideological control of a bipolar political culture leading a revolution
that established the supremacy of the shi’ite hierocracy within the same dual relation of
power.
The processes that were at work to shape the above combination put limits and
constrains upon Khomeini’s intervention. As the teachings of new historicism suggest,
Khomeini could not move beyond his own historical moment. In his response to
Hakamizadeh in 1943, Khomeini was bound up with the requirements of the shi’ite
Orthodoxy. However, this boundedness did not exclude the possibility that Khomeini was
able to alter these contingent processes: By 1979, Khomeini would break with shi’ite
Orthodoxy, but not with the path laid out in 1943 and analyzed here. His visions in
“Unveiling the Secrets” evolved into his theory of the state, the Mandate of the Jurist, which
has been serving as the legitimate narrative of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. As
already expressed, at the advent of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Khomeini pried
himself loose from the ethos of the shi’ite hierocracy and set a radically different structural
pattern of power relations. In the moments of societal distress of the Iran’s 1979,
sociopolitical conditions made people susceptible to an “otherworldly” experience. “All
extraordinary needs,” Weber (1978) explains, “i.e., those which transcend the sphere of
everyday economic routines, have always been satisfied in an entirely heterogeneous manner:
on a charismatic basis. The further we go back into history, the more strongly this statement
holds” (p. 1111). The absence of a rational democratic discourse bolstered this preexisting
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charismatic void. It was Khomeini who filled the void. His innate qualities conditioned by
society’s predisposition toward a charismatic response, enabled him to exercise and establish
a charismatic bond with his followers. Through his agency, Khomeini was able to effectively
alter the course of contemporary Iran. Although it might be logical to conclude that, under
the leadership of somebody other than Khomeini, the 1979 Islamic Revolution would have
inevitably resulted in the formation of a similarly authoritarian structure of domination.
However, in Khomeini’s absence the social and political organization of that structure would
have been very different from the actual Islamic Republic of Iran.
Drawing on an essential tenet of new historicism, I found a powerful interpretive link
between the Hakamizadeh/Khomeini exchanges in 1943 and the advent of the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. Greenblatt (1990) writes, “new historicist critics… have been more interested in
unresolved conflict and contradiction than in integration; they are concerned with the
margins as with the center; and they have turned from a celebration of achieved aesthetic
order to an exploration of the ideological and material bases for the production of this order”
(p. 168). In the moments of disintegration of the early 1940’s, in his reply to the publication
of “Secrets of a Thousand Years”, a marginal text by a marginal writer, Khomeini, a
marginal cleric, wrote “Unveiling the Secrets”, a marginal work, in which he presented a
blueprint for a Shi’ite state. In the tormented periods of 1979 and after, under favorable
structural bases, this blueprint, woefully ignored by the scrutiny of critical observance,
became a central ideological precept for the formation of a shi’ite order in Iran.
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Appendix A
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Conceptual Map
The initial intent of the framers of the constitution was to combine constitutional
democracy with Islamic authority in society. Its first draft was modeled on the 1958
constitution of the French Fifth Republic (Amir Arjomand, 2000 35). With the incorporation
of the Shi’ite vision of authority, however, the final draft was profoundly altered.
As illustrated in the conceptual map, the structure of the Iranian political system is a
system of parallel sovereignty with no clear relationship between power and authority.
Theoretically, the elements of a modern nation-state are in place: three independent branches
of power in charge of running the state. According to the constitutional text, these branches
function independently. In practice, however, the check and balance system does not exist.
The parliament and the president are the elected bodies. The supreme leader, however,
appoints the head of the justice department. Located at the division of Power Spiritual, there
are four additional and extra-democratic bodies whose basis of legitimacy, unlike the
presidency and parliament, are not popular election but divine mandate: (a) the office of the
supreme leader (valy-e faqih); (b) the Guardian Council (shoray-e negahban); (c) the
Expediency Council (majam-e tashkhis-e masla-hat); and (d) the Assembly of the Leadership
Experts (majles-e khobregan-e rahbari). Several characteristics of this constitutional
structure bear mentioning. But first, it should be noted that each arrow in the constitutional
chart indicates the direction of domination and superiority.
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The Office of the Supreme Leader- Although selected in a non-democratic process,
the supreme leader – located in the middle of the map- is the head of the state and
representative of the Islamic society. The supreme leader possesses the ultimate power and
the authority to dissolve all the state institutions, and rule the country through decrees.
Furthermore, the 1989 constitutional amendment raised the authority of the leader to such an
absolute power that no modern constitution could match it. The direction of the arrows
flowing from the leadership position indicates its supreme authority over the institutions of
the Islamic state. It is the responsibility of the Assembly of the Leadership Experts to select
the supreme leader.
The Guardian Council- The Guardian Council is arguably the most powerful
decision-making body of the state. The main and permanent members of this council consist
of six high ranking jurists appointed by the leader. The rights and responsibilities of the
Guardian Council include:
a- The interpretation of the Constitution
b- To ratify or veto all parliamentary legislations
c- To approve the qualification of candidates for presidency, parliament, and the
Assembly of the Leadership Experts
d- To supervise elections and sanction the results of voting
Through the above constitutional rights and responsibilities, the Guardian Council has
accumulated immense power whose exertion extends from the highest public office to the
private lives of the citizens of the country.
The Expediency Council- This Council was created by Khomeini to intervene
between the Guardian Council and the Islamic parliament. Initially, its main responsibility
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was to determine the fate of any legislative gridlock between the Guardian Council and the
Islamic Parliament. Under the rulership of Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, making state
macro-policy was added to this institution’s responsibilities. This was an indication of the
ruling clerical elite’s determination to undermine and erode the power of the executive and
legislative branches as the elected institutions of the Islamic state. It should be noted that the
jurists of the Guardian Council are among the members of the Expediency Council as well.
The Assembly of the Leadership Experts- This assembly consists of eighty-six clerics
who are in charge of the selection and supervision of the supreme leader. The members of
this assembly are exclusively clerics and the majority of them are elected by direct popular
vote. However, the candidates are carefully selected by the Guardian Council to ensure that
no voice of dissent against the authority of the “Mandate of the Jurist” could be expressed in
this influential institution. The supreme leader appoints a few of them.
The State Executive Branch- The two legislative and executive bodies subject to
popular vote form the other ingredients of this dissonant constitutional composition. As
opposed to the “divine” section of the Constitution, popular direct vote constitutes the basis
of the legitimacy of the President and Parliament. In the reality of power relation, the two
institutions possess marginal authority, thus they represent the democratic façade of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
The constitutional map unmistakably displays the duality of power structure in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: Power Temporal and Power Spiritual. In the competition for power
the Constitutional text stands upon the side of the spiritual dimension. The orientation of
arrows in the constitutional map demonstrates the extensive encroachment of the religious
upon the temporal. Moreover, each of the extra-democratic institutions that instantiate this
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invasion is chaired by a mujtahid, intended to ensure the centrality of the ulama in the
determination of knowledge, rules, devotion, and enemies. To be sure, the introduction of
the concept of maslahat by Khomeini, as explained before, jeopardizes this power
arrangement and has become a source of instability in the balance of power between the two
structural elements, namely the state and the hierocracy, in post-Khomeini era of the IRI.
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Appendix B
Islamic Republic’s Constitutional Chart
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